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This dissertation consists of three essays studying on over-the-counter trading (OTC henceforth). 
In Chapter 1, I model the formation of the inter-dealer network in an OTC market, and study 
how the network affects prices and volumes in the market. The model explains the empirically 
observed core-periphery network with dealers’ capacity of providing liquidity. Specifically, 
dealers with large capacity comprise the core of the network, connecting them to all other 
dealers, while dealers who have small capacity operate at the periphery. In addition, my model 
matches the empirical finding on the negative relation between markups and order sizes. 
Furthermore, I show that there may be structural breaks in this negative relationship as variations 
in order sizes may alter the inter-dealer network. These results suggest that empirical studies on 
OTC markets should control for the stability of an inter-dealer network to avoid model 
misspecification. 
 Chapter 2 evaluates how a centralized market could provide an incentive for OTC dealers to 
reduce opacity in trading. In this chapter, opacity is modeled as Knightian uncertainty faced by 
investors. I find that while a competitive centralized market provides an incentive for dealers to 
reduce opacity in an OTC market, a noncompetitive centralized market does the opposite. 
Competition between the competitive centralized market and the OTC market forces dealers in 
the latter to reduce opacity. With the noncompetitive centralized market, opportunities for 
collusion provide an incentive for dealers to increase opacity. Dealers do not have the incentive 
to reduce opacity in this case. 
  In Chapter 3, we test the model implications in Chapter 2 with an empirical study on the 
corporate bond markets, and find consistent results. We find that transaction costs of bonds 
traded only in OTC markets are significantly different from (10 basis points larger than) bonds 
traded both in OTC markets and the NYSE market. Since the latter contains pre-trade 
information from the NYSE market, this finding suggests that pre-trade transparency reduces 
bonds’ trading costs. This result implies that pre-trade transparency benefits investors but hurts 
dealers, as the major part of dealers’ profits comes from investors’ trading costs. We also find 
that pre-trade transparency increases bonds’ values. Bonds with the NYSE pre-trade transparency 
have significantly lower bond yields than bonds without the pre-trade transparency. Our findings 
are robust to endogeneity of firms’ bond listing decisions on the NYSE. 
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PREFACE 
Over-the-counter (OTC henceforth) markets are important ingredients of the modern financial 
world. Unlike an exchange market, trading in an OTC market is done directly between two 
parties. This bilateral trading offers greater flexibility on terms of a trade, which helps process 
non-standardized transactions. As a result, financial assets traded in OTC market are those 
requiring customization or traded in enormous amounts, e.g., asset-backed securities, credit 
derivatives, interest rate products, corporate bonds, municipal bonds, etc.  
 Customization of OTC assets implies that direct matches between buyers and sellers would 
be challenging. Most OTC trades involve dealers who act as intermediaries between buyers and 
sellers. Dealers are the most active participants in OTC trading. However, not many studies try to 
investigate dealers’ strategies and behaviors in OTC markets. With the goal of filling this gap, 
my first chapter studies how dealers influence OTC trading. In Chapter 1, I study the inter-dealer 
network in an OTC market. I ask what determines the network of inter-dealer trading and how 
the network affects prices in an OTC market.  
 While Chapter 1 focuses on trades among dealers, my second and third chapters investigate 
trades between investors and dealers. In Chapter 2, I study the relation between opacity and OTC 
trading. I find that opacity increases traders’ search costs in OTC trading. While traders suffer 
from opacity, dealers profit from it. Since dealers control most information in OTC markets (for 
example quotes), it is doubtful if one could have a mechanism that incentivizes dealers to release 
more information, thereby reducing opacity. Thus, in this chapter I evaluate how a centralized 
market could affect the opacity of an OTC market. I show that a competitive centralized market 
provides an incentive for dealers in the OTC market to reduce opacity, whereas a noncompetitive 
centralized market does not. 
 xiii 
 Chapter 3 tests the model implication in Chapter 2 with an empirical study on the corporate 
bond markets. We construct two groups of bonds with similar characteristics except that one 
group trades in both OTC and the NYSE markets and the other trades only in OTC markets. 
Since the NYSE market provides pre-trade information, the first group is more pre-trade 
transparent than the second group. Then we analyze the transaction costs, variances of 
transaction costs, and yields between these two groups. We find that transaction costs of bonds 
traded only in OTC markets are significantly different from (10 basis points larger than) bonds 
traded both in OTC markets and the NYSE market. The result is consistent with the model 
implication in Chapter 2.  
 
1 
Chapter 1 The Network of Inter-Dealer Trading in an 
Over-the-Counter Market 
1.1 Introduction 
Over-the-counter (OTC) markets have grown exponentially in the last decade. As OTC markets 
grow, researchers have increasingly investigated the trading structure of these markets. Research 
interest is further stimulated by the recent financial crisis, which has brought attention to the 
OTC market for subprime mortgage derivatives. However, studies on OTC markets overlook an 
important element — inter-dealer trading. Since dealers act as intermediaries in OTC markets, 
inter-dealer trades should affect trades between dealers and other market participants, and hence 
affect the entire market. To provide new insights into how inter-dealer trades influence OTC 
trading, this chapter studies an important aspect of inter-dealer trades, the dealers’ trading 
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network. Specifically, I ask several questions. How does such a network form? What determines 
a dealer’s position within the network? How does the network affect price determination in an 
OTC market? 
 To address these questions, I construct a theoretical model to study how dealers strategically 
form an inter-dealer network, and I then examine how such an inter-dealer network affects other 
aspects of an OTC market. In my model, OTC dealers form an inter-dealer network and trade 
through the network to share their inventory risks. The more links a dealer has, the more benefits 
the dealer obtains from risk-sharing. But the more links a dealer has, the greater are the costs he 
has to bear for maintaining his links. The linking cost includes the cost of hedging counterparty 
risk. For example, in the CDS markets collateral is used pervasively in transactions as a 
protection in case one party fails to deliver his commitment. Preparing collateral could be costly 
because of funding liquidity. A dealer with many links faces a larger linking cost, as he has to 
prepare a larger collateral pool in the event of trading.1 The trade-off between the benefit of risk-
sharing and the cost of linking determine the shape of the inter-dealer network. At one extreme, 
when the linking cost is trivial compared with the risk-sharing benefit, the inter-dealer network is 
a complete network. In a complete network, all dealers are connected. At the other extreme, 
when the linking cost is overwhelming, the inter-dealer network is an empty network, one in 
which no dealer is connected with any other dealer. Between these two extremes, inter-dealer 
networks can exhibit connectedness to varying degrees depending on the risk-sharing benefit and 
the linking cost. 
 Inter-dealer networks affect OTC trading insofar as the number of links a dealer has 
influences his markup (the difference between the price for which a dealer buys a security and 
                                               
1 The linking cost also includes the due diligence effort, telecommunication costs, data subscription fees to inter-
dealer brokers, and the time human traders in a broker-dealer firm spent on interacting with his linked parties, etc. 
 3 
the price at which he sells it), trading volume, and inventory risk. For example, in a more 
connected network, a dealer has more links, earns a higher markup, trades at higher volume, and 
is exposed to lower inventory risk. In such a network, having more links gives a dealer greater 
market power in the inter-dealer market, which enables the dealer to sell at a higher price to (or 
buy at a lower price from) other dealers. Since a markup is proportional to its corresponding 
inter-dealer price, this highly connected dealer charges a higher markup. Having more links also 
provides a dealer with more opportunities to trade in the inter-dealer market. As a result, the 
dealer completes more trades and manages his inventory risk more effectively. 
 My model resonates with recent empirical studies which show that inter-dealer networks 
have a significant influence on OTC trading. Hollifield, Neklyudov, and Spatt (2012) study the 
inter-dealer network of securitization markets (e.g., asset-backed securities, collateral debt 
obligations, commercial mortgage-backed securities, and collateral mortgage obligations) and Li 
and Schürhoff (2012) study the inter-dealer network operating in the municipal bond markets. 
Both studies document that the structure of the inter-dealer network correlates with dealers’ 
markups in OTC trading. Moreover, they show that inter-dealer networks across OTC markets 
exhibit structural similarity in spite of trading distinct classes of assets. This common structure is 
the core-periphery structure. That is, some dealers are closer to the center of a network than 
others.  
 In the abovementioned empirical studies, inter-dealer networks are treated as exogenously 
determined. This limits the capacity of the analyses to explain why inter-dealer networks form 
the observed core-periphery structure, and how the core-periphery network is related to prices in 
OTC trading. In principle, inter-dealer networks should be jointly determined with prices and 
trading volumes in equilibrium, since these are outcomes based on dealers’ decisions. This 
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suggests that theoretical models are needed to explain the formation of inter-dealer networks. 
More importantly, such theoretical models should generate new empirical implications by 
treating inter-dealer networks as endogenously determined rather than exogenously determined 
as in past empirical studies. The theoretical model I construct in this chapter satisfies these 
conditions. 
 Using differences in dealers’ capacity of providing liquidity, my model explains the core-
periphery feature of an inter-dealer network. Large-capacity dealers who can accommodate large 
orders comprise the core, while small-capacity dealers who only accommodate small orders 
become the periphery. This gives a novel testable empirical prediction regarding a dealer’s 
location in a network: a dealer’s capacity of liquidity provision positively determines his 
centrality (a measure that captures how central a dealer is in a network).  
 In addition, I show that the unconditional relationship between investors’ trading prices and 
dealers’ centrality is ambiguous. Dealers with high centrality do not necessarily offer better 
prices to investors than dealers with low centrality. However, this relationship is determined 
when it is conditioned on the size of the investor order. On orders with the same size, high-
centrality dealers offer investors more favorable prices than low-centrality dealers. This 
conditional relationship between investors’ trading prices and dealers’ centrality is consistent 
with empirical findings in Hollifield, Neklyudov, and Spatt (2012). The above suggests that the 
order size is an important control variable in determining how centrality is related to investors’ 
trading prices. 
 Another novel empirical implication arising from my model involves potential structural 
breaks in the price-size and price-volatility relationships in OTC markets. Changes in order sizes 
or volatility can alter the fundamental structure of an economy, which in the setup of this work is 
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the inter-dealer network. As a result, sudden structural jumps emerge in these relationships. 
Based on this result, I suggest that empirical studies examining OTC markets should control for 
the stability of an inter-dealer network in order to avoid model misspecification. Empirical 
research should, for example, include a measure of a network’s connectedness as an additional 
control variable interacting with other control variables in the regression model. 
 To the best of my knowledge, my study is the first to study strategic formation of an inter-
dealer network arising from dealers’ risk-sharing needs. My model not only confirms existing 
empirical findings, but also provides new empirical implications pertaining to OTC markets. 
Malamud and Rostek (2013) have also studied dealers who share risks through inter-dealer 
networks. While they focus on dealers’ strategic interactions in simultaneous trading on the 
network, I emphasize the formation process of the network. Although I model the rise of an inter-
dealer network from a risk-sharing perspective, I do not rule out other possible forces that may 
generate such a network. For example, sharing information is a possible incentive for building a 
dealers’ network. 
 My study is also the first to apply the risk-sharing idea of the network formation literature to 
a specific type of financial market, the OTC market. This approach provides the advantage of 
identifying the relationship between agents’ payoffs and primitive parameters, e.g., order sizes 
and volatility, as the trading protocol and needs are concrete and specific. As a result, I can 
explore issues that have not yet received much attention. For example, I consider how order sizes 
and volatility contribute to determining a network as well as how they affect equilibrium 
outcomes such as prices and quantities traded through the network. 
 In the next section, I review the related literature. Section 1.3 presents the benchmark model 
and Section 1.4 analyses the equilibrium results. In Section 1.5, I extend the benchmark model to 
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a case in which dealers’ capacity of providing liquidity varies and show the core-periphery 
network that emerges in equilibrium. Section 1.6 discusses the implications of the model for “hot 
potato” trading, which involves trades that occur between successive dealers. The empirical 
implications are summarized in Section 1.7. Finally, I conclude in Section 1.8. 
1.2 Literature Review 
Inter-dealer trading has been an important subject in market microstructure studies for a long 
time. Ho and Stoll (1983) point out that inter-dealer trading benefits dealers, since dealers are 
better able to manage their inventory risks by trading among themselves instead of filling an 
investor order with uncertain arrival. Viswanathan and Wang (2004) show that inter-dealer 
trading also benefits investors. In their model, an investor prefers trading with one dealer and 
letting that dealer unwind his extra inventory later in the inter-dealer market rather than splitting 
up the order and trading with multiple dealers. Thus, inter-dealer trading is beneficial to both 
dealers and investors. Both papers model the incentive for inter-dealer trading as the sharing of 
inventory risks. Based on this risk sharing idea, others build models to study issues such as price 
formation, information transmission, and transparency in multi-dealer markets (see Biais (1993), 
Lyons (1997), Naik, Neuberger, and Viswanathan (1999), de Frutos and Manzano (2002), Yin 
(2005), and Cao, Evans, and Lyons (2006)). Empirical evidence supports risk-sharing as the 
main driver behind inter-dealer trading. Reiss and Werner (1998) and Hansch, Naik, and 
Viswanathan (1998) find that dealers on the London Stock Exchange use the inter-dealer market 
primarily to share their inventory risks. In the foreign exchange market, Lyons (1995) finds that 
dealers control risk by systematically laying off inventory to other dealers.  
 Another thread of literature to which this work contributes, studies price determination in 
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OTC markets. Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005, 2007) study how search and bargaining 
determine prices in OTC markets.2 Spulber (1996), employing an alternative type of search 
model, shows that prices in decentralized markets (OTC markets) are determined by dealers’ 
transaction costs. 3  In addition, dealers’ transaction costs also affect OTC market structure. 
Atkeson, Eisfeldt, and Weill (2013) show that market entry costs help to determine the structure 
of OTC trading, and thereby prices charged in OTC trading. Past studies also show that dealers’ 
strategies influence price determination. For example, Zhu (2012) shows that repeated visits to 
the same dealer results in a less favorable price for the trader. Empirically, the price of an asset in 
OTC trading seems to depend on order sizes and transparency of the market environment. Green, 
Hollifield, and Schürhoff (2007) find that a dealer earns smaller markups on larger trades in 
municipal bond markets. This negative relationship between order sizes and markups is also 
found in corporate bond markets by Schultz (2001) and Randall (2013). Bessembinder, Maxwell, 
and Venkataraman (2006), Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2007), and Edwards, Harris, and 
Piwowar (2007) estimate the bid-ask spread in the OTC market for corporate bonds, finding that 
more transparent bonds have smaller bid-ask spreads. Recently, new empirical studies (Li and 
Schürhoff (2012) and Hollifield, Neklyudov, and Spatt (2012)) have discovered a new factor that 
affects prices in OTC markets, namely the inter-dealer network. 
 Finally, my study adds to the growing literature on network studies in financial markets. 
Compared with the rich applications of network theory that have been made to other areas in 
                                               
2 Vayanos and Wang (2007), Vayanos and Weill (2008), and Weill (2008) extend the original model to study OTC 
markets with multiple assets. Lagos and Rocheteau (2009) relax the assumption on constraint asset holdings in the 
original model, which enables market participants to accommodate trading frictions by adjusting their asset 
positions. 
3 This type of search model also receives extended treatment in the literature. Rust and Hall (2003) extend the 
original model by introducing a centralized market to compete with decentralized markets. Zhong (2013) 
incorporates Knightian uncertainty into the search process to study the impact of transparency on OTC markets. 
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economics, the application of network theory to financial markets has only just begun.4 Blume et 
al. (2009) and Gale and Kariv (2007) study how a network intermediates trades in a 
decentralized market. Gofman (2011) assesses the efficiency of resource allocation through the 
trading network in an OTC market. Malamud and Rostek (2013) develop a general framework 
for studying dealers’ strategic interactions in decentralized markets. The decentralized market in 
their model is represented by a hypergraph (an abstract network, loosely speaking). Many past 
studies also focus on information acquisition from a network and its impact on financial markets. 
Han and Yang (2012) extend the rational expectation equilibrium model to study the information 
network in a financial market. Babus and Kondor (2012) study information transmission through 
inter-dealer networks in OTC markets by extending the model in Vives (2011) to games in 
networks. In addition to using network models to study OTC markets, others apply network 
models to the inter-bank market to analyze the contagion risk in the banking system (see Leitner 
(2005), Babus (2013), Blume et al. (2013), and Elliott, Golub, and Jackson (2013)). There is also 
a growing body of empirical studies that explore networks’ implications on a variety of topics 
ranging from return predictability to CEOs’ wages (see Cohen and Frazzini (2008), Cohen, 
Frazzini, and Malloy (2008), and Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons (2012)). 
1.3 The Model 
1.3.1 The Environment 
Suppose there are ܰ ≥ 2 dealers in an OTC market. All dealers have the same mean-variance 
utility function over their wealth ܹ, and all dealers have the same risk-aversion parameter ߩ >
                                               
4  Economic research on networks has tapped into various fields, such as job hunting in labor economics, 
decentralized market trading in microeconomics, and international alliance and trading agreements in 
macroeconomics. Jackson (2008) and Easley and Kleinberg (2010) provide excellent surveys of network 
applications in economic research. 
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0.  That is, 
 ܷ(ܹ) = ܧ(ܹ) − ߩ2ܸܽݎ(ܹ). (1.1) 
The initial endowment, consisting of a portfolio of ݉ units of a risk-free asset and ܫ units of a 
risky asset, is identical for all dealers. In this initial endowment, the risk-free asset has a constant 
value of 1, while the risky asset has a random value ݒ following a normal distribution ࡺ(̅ݒ,ߪଶ).  
 
Figure 1.1: The Timeline 
 Figure 1.1 illustrates this timeline within the model. The timeline goes as follows. At date 0, 
dealers strategically form an inter-dealer network by building or severing links between each 
other. At date 1, an investor arrives and wants to trade an order of size ݖ. Only one dealer in the 
network meets this investor, with a probability of meeting of ߣ, which is the matching rate. 
Assume that ∑ ߣே ≤ 1, which means that there is a probability of 1 − ∑ ߣே  that the arriving 
investor does not trade with any other dealer. The matching rate is assumed to be the same for all 
dealers. The price of the investor-dealer transaction is ݌଴. At date 2, the dealer who fills the 
Date 0: 
Dealers form an 
inter-dealer 
network.
Date 1: 
An investor trades 
with one 
randomly drawn 
dealer.
Date2: 
The order-filling 
dealer unloads 
extra inventory 
through the inter-
dealer network.
Date3: 
The asset's value 
is realized.
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investor’s order at date 1 re-trades with other dealers to adjust his inventory risk. However, this 
order-filling dealer can trade only with those dealers who are connected to him. In this inter-
dealer trade, the order-filling dealer solicits bids from his connected dealers, and then chooses 
the price that clears the market. To differentiate that price from the investor-dealer price ݌଴, I 
denote the price in the inter-dealer market as ݌. Finally, at date 3, the value of the risky asset is 
realized. In Section 1.6, I extend the model to consider multiple rounds of inter-dealer trading 
before the value of the asset is realized. By doing so, I am able to generate implications on “hot 
potato” trading in inter-dealer markets. 
 Assuming that the risk-aversion parameter, the initial endowment, the distribution of the 
risky asset’s value, the matching rate, and the cost of adding links are common knowledge to all 
dealers, I solve the equilibrium by backward induction. Unless otherwise specified, in the rest of 
this chapter the arriving investor is regarded as a seller. (By symmetry, this would be similar to 
solving the equilibrium when the arriving investor is a buyer.) 
1.3.2 The Inter-Dealer Trade at Date 2 
 In an inter-dealer market, a given dealer is able to contact several other dealers to explore 
their interest in trading through inter-dealer brokers. Typically, a dealer who has filled an 
investor’s order solicits bids from other dealers. Then, as soon as the order-filling dealer receives 
quotes from interested dealers he chooses the price to clear the market. Past studies use search-
theoretic models to capture such an inter-dealer trade (see Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005, 
2007) and Lagos and Rocheteau (2009)). Those studies postulate that an order-filling dealer 
sequentially searches for another dealer with whom to conduct a bilateral trade. Recently, 
empirical studies by Saunders, Srinivasan, and Walter (2002), Dunne, Hau, and Moore (2010), 
and Hendershott and Madhavan (2013) suggest that inter-dealer trading in OTC markets has 
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become more like multilateral trading than bilateral trading. Services from inter-dealer brokers 
and the evolution of inter-dealer markets into limit-order book alike systems enable the order-
filling dealer to approach other dealers at the same time rather than searching sequentially among 
dealers. To capture this multilateral feature of inter-dealer trading, I model the inter-dealer trade 
as an auction of shares, as in Viswanathan and Wang (2004).5 
 To reflect that an order-filling dealer trades only through his inter-dealer network, I modify 
the model in Viswanathan and Wang (2004) by restricting the order-filling dealer to soliciting 
bids only from his connected dealers. Specifically, if dealer ݅ fills the investor’s order at date 1, 
he then announces an auction at date 2 to all his connected dealers. In the auction, dealer ݅’s 
connected dealers submit their demand schedules, which are combinations of prices and 
quantities, to dealer ݅. After dealer ݅ collects those demand schedules, he chooses the price and 
quantity to clear the market.  
 Following Viswanathan and Wang (2004), in such an inter-dealer trade auction, dealer ݅’s 
equilibrium strategy is 
 
൝൭ܫ + ݖ − ௜ܺ஺ᇣᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇥ
quantity	supply
, ݌௜⏟
the	inter-dealer	price൱ : ௜ܺ஺ = (ݒ − ݌௜)ߛ + ܫ + ݖ݊௜ ൡ, (1.2) 
where ௜ܺ஺  is dealer ݅’s risky holding after the inter-dealer trade, ݊௜ is the number of links dealer ݅ 
has, and ߛ = (݊௜ − 1) (݊௜ߩߪଶ)⁄  is the price elasticity. Let dealer ݆ be a dealer who is linked to 
dealer ݅; dealer ݆’s equilibrium strategy is  
                                               
5 The share auction is also called a uniform-price double auction. In such an auction, each player (the dealer in my 
model) bids for his residual supply and the market-clearing condition determines the price. This trading structure is 
used extensively in the literature to study the impact of strategic player interactions on asset prices (e.g., Kyle 
(1989), Vives (2011), and Malamud and Rostek (2013)). 
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ቐቌ ௝ܺ
஻
ด
quantity	demand
, ݌௜⏟
the	inter-dealer	priceቍ : ௝ܺ஻ = (ݒ − ݌௜)ߛ − ݊௜ − 1݊௜ ܫቑ, (1.3) 
where ௝ܺ஻  is the quantity demanded by dealer ݆. The market-clearing condition, which requires 
that ܫ + ݖ − ௜ܺ஺ = ∑ ௝ܺ஻௝:௝	is	linked	with	௜ , indicates that the inter-dealer price is 
 ݌௜ = ݒ − ߩߪଶ ൬ܫ + ݖ݊௜ + 1൰. (1.4) 
 Viswanathan and Wang (2004) prove that the above strategies (Eq.(1.2), Eq.(1.3)) and price 
(Eq.(1.4)) constitute a unique linear equilibrium in the inter-dealer trade. In the linear 
equilibrium, dealer ݅’s risky holding after the inter-dealer trade is 
 
௜ܺ
஺ = ܫ + 2ݖ
݊௜ + 1, (1.5) 
and dealer ݆ receives  
 
௝ܺ
஻ = ݊௜ − 1
݊௜
ݖ
݊௜ + 1, (1.6) 
shares of the risky asset from the inter-dealer trade. Dealers who are not connected with dealer ݅ 
maintain their risky holdings as before. Eq.(1.6) indicates that the minimum number of links for 
ensuring that the inter-dealer trade occurs is 2, since ݊௜ < 2 implies that ௝ܺ஻ ≤ 0. In other words, 
if the order-filling dealer connects to only one other dealer, no inter-dealer trade occurs.  
 Both dealer ݅  and dealer ݆  benefit from the inter-dealer trade. For dealer ݅ , his welfare 
increases by  
 
ܧݑ ቀܹ൫ ௜ܺ
஺൯ቁ − ܧݑ൫ܹ(ܫ + ݖ)൯ = ߩߪଶݖଶ2 ݊௜ − 1݊௜ + 1 ≥ 0. (1.7) 
And for dealer ݆, his welfare increases by  
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ܧݑ ቀܹ൫ܫ + ௝ܺ஻൯ቁ − ܧݑ൫ܹ(ܫ)൯ = ߩߪଶݖଶ2 ݊௜ − 1݊௜ଶ(݊௜ + 1) ≥ 0. (1.8) 
 These benefits become more prominent when the risk increases (that is, increases in ߩ, ߪ, 
and ݖ), which reinforces the idea that the inter-dealer trade is a channel through which dealers 
share inventory risks. The benefit for dealer ݅ increases with the number of links he has, whereas 
the benefit for dealer ݆ decreases with the number of dealer ݅’s links. This reflects the fact that 
dealer ݅ uses his market power to extract more benefits from risk-sharing, since he can increase 
his selling price by exerting his market power (see Eq.(1.4)). 
1.3.3 The Investor-Dealer Trade at Date 1 
In an OTC market, direct trades between investors are rare, since each investor has his unique 
needs. In most cases, investors trade with OTC dealers. Having said that, it should be noted that 
investors cannot trade with multiple OTC dealers simultaneously. The lack of a centralized venue 
where dealers and investors can post their quotes implies that investors and dealers must search 
their counterparties for trades in OTC markets.6 As a result, even though inter-dealer trades have 
evolved into multilateral trading, trades between investors and dealers remain bilateral.  
 Following precedent in the literature, I use a search-and-bargaining model to characterize the 
bilateral trading relationship between investors and dealers. To emphasize the influence of the 
inter-dealer network, I simplify the search problem. In particular, the probability that a dealer is 
matched with an incoming investor equals his matching rate ߣ. The matching rate measures the 
intensity of a dealer’s search for an investor, and could be related to his publicity in an OTC 
market, his expertise in the asset traded, or his reputation regarding the services he has provided.7  
                                               
6 Although some inter-dealer markets have adopted limit-order book systems in which dealers can post their quotes, 
those systems are usually not accessible to investors. 
7 Neklyudov (2012) considers the matching rate as the proxy for a dealer’s location since it represents a dealer’s 
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 When an investor meets a dealer, they bargain over the price. Following Nash (1950), the 
price is the solution of the following bargaining problem  
 max
௣೔
బ
൬ܧݑ ቀܹ൫ ௜ܺ
஺൯ቁ − ܧݑ൫ܹ(ܫ)൯൰௤ ቀݖ(݌௜଴ −ܯ଴ + ܯଵߪଶ)ቁଵି௤ (1.9) 
where ݌௜଴ −ܯ଴ + ܯଵߪଶ is the per unit utility gain for the investor if he sells and ݍ represents the 
dealer’s bargaining power.8 The investor’s gains from the trade can arise from aspects such as the 
search cost, his information about the asset, his risk aversion, and so on.9 To ensure that the 
investor is willing to sell, I assume that 0 < ܯ଴ −ܯଵߪଶ < ̅ݒ − ߩߪଶ ቀܫ + ௭ଶቁ. 
 If there exists an inter-dealer trade at date 2, then the order-filling dealer’s gains from trade, 
ܧݑ ቀܹ൫ ௜ܺ
஺൯ቁ − ܧݑ൫ܹ(ܫ)൯, which equals	ݖ(݌௜ − ݌௜଴). ݌௜ is the inter-dealer price from Eq.(1.4). 
Hence, the solution to the bargaining problem involving an inter-dealer trade is  
 ݌௜଴ = (1 − ݍ)݌௜ + ݍ(ܯ଴ −ܯଵߪଶ). (1.10) 
 Eq.(1.10) implies that the investor-dealer’s price, ݌௜଴ , is proportional to the inter-dealer’s 
price, ݌௜. In other words, when dealer ݅ realizes that he can unload the extra inventory at a higher 
price in the inter-dealer market, he is more inclined to fill the investor’s order at a higher price. 
 If there is no inter-dealer trade at date 2, then the order-filling dealer’s final risky holding is 
ܫ + ݖ. This indicates that the order-filling dealer obtains ܧݑ൫ܹ(ܫ + ݖ)൯ − ܧݑ൫ܹ(ܫ)൯ in gains 
from trade, which equals ݖ ቀ̅ݒ − ߩߪଶ ቀܫ + ௭
ଶ
ቁ − ݌௜
଴ቁ . Under this case, the solution of the 
bargaining problem is  
                                                                                                                                                       
execution efficiency. 
8 For tractability, I assume that ݍ is such that ଶ
ଵି௤
 is an integer. 
9 One can replace this reduced-form assumption by explicitly modeling the seller’s decision; e.g., a seller having a 
liquidity shock maximizes his mean-variance preference. This setting does not change the result of the model, but it 
adds considerable complexity and introduces more parameters. 
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݌௜
଴ = (1 − ݍ)ቆ̅ݒ − ߩߪଶ ቀܫ + ݖ2ቁቇ + ݍ(ܯ଴ −ܯଵߪଶ). (1.11) 
 In all, 
 ݌௜଴ = (1.12) 
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧(1 − ݍ)൭ݒ − ߩߪଶ ൬ܫ + ݖ
݊௜ + 1൰൱ + ݍ(ܯ଴ −ܯଵߪଶ),when	there	exists	inter-dealer	trading,(1 − ݍ)ቆݒ − ߩߪଶ ቀܫ + ݖ2ቁቇ + ݍ(ܯ଴ −ܯଵߪଶ), when	there	is	no	inter-dealer	trading.  
1.3.4 Network Formation at Date 0 
In Sections 1.3.2 and 1.3.3, I show that the inter-dealer price, the investor-dealer price, and 
volumes of inter-dealer trades depend on the equilibrium number of a dealer’s links. In this 
section, I show that the equilibrium network determines the equilibrium number of a dealer’s 
links. In particular, I demonstrate how the trade-off between the risk-sharing benefit and the 
linking cost determines the equilibrium network, and hence prices and volumes in OTC trading. 
At date 0, dealers strategically form and sever links with each other. While it takes mutual 
consent to build a link, it takes just one side to sever a link. For every link the dealer adds, there 
is a cost. Specifically, the average cost of adding links is  
 Average	Cost(݊) = ܿ
݊ + 1, (1.13) 
in which ݊ is the total number of links and ܿ captures the magnitude of the average cost. The 
average cost function captures the idea of economies of scale. That is, the average cost decreases 
when more links are built. In reality, the linking cost for a dealer comes from the cost of 
managing counterparty risk such as the funding cost of preparing collateral, the cost of 
telecommunication, fees to inter-dealer brokers for obtaining other dealers’ quotes and trading 
 16 
through inter-dealer brokers, and the opportunity cost of maintaining the additional link. Some 
portion of a dealer’s linking cost is similar to a fixed cost, e.g., the telecommunication cost. 
Those fixed costs are spread out when dealers build more links. Thus, it is reasonable to assume 
that the linking cost exhibits economies of scale. 
 A natural approach to modeling network formation is defining a non-cooperative game 
among dealers, and such a non-cooperative game generates an equilibrium outcome as a graph. 
An equilibrium network is such a graph, consisting of a set of nodes and pairs of links that 
connect those nodes. Hence, the equilibrium network ܩ is written as (ࣨ, ℰ). ࣨ is the set of all 
dealers, i.e., ࣨ = {1, 2, 3, … ,ܰ}, and ℰ  is the set of all links among those dealers, i.e., ℰ ={݆݅:	for	some	݅, ݆ ∈ ࣨ}. 
 Although it is appealing to study network formation within a game-theoretical framework, 
there are problems. There are, for example, various ways to specify such a game, such as the 
simultaneous link-announcement game in Myerson (1977) and the sequential link-announcement 
game in Aumann and Myerson (1988). In addition, as pointed out by Jackson and Wolinsky 
(1996), some standard game-theoretic equilibrium notions are not suitable for the study of 
network formation, since those notions do not reflect communication and coordination in the 
formation of networks. 
 To circumvent the abovementioned problems, network theorists study properties of networks 
that are of interest to them and can be satisfied in the equilibria of some network-formation 
games. In this spirit, I define an equilibrium inter-dealer network formed at date 0 using the 
strong stability concept from Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005): 
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Definition 1.1 
A network ܩ′ is obtainable from ܩ via deviation by ࣨ′ ⊂ ࣨ if 
i) ݆݅ ∈ ܩ′ and ݆݅ ∉ ܩ implies {݅, ݆} ⊂ ࣨ′, and 
ii) ݆݅ ∈ ܩ and ݆݅ ∉ ܩ′ implies {݅, ݆} ∩ࣨᇱ ≠ ∅. 
In the above, ݆݅ ∈ ܩ means that ݅ and ݆ are linked in network ܩ, whereas ݆݅ ∉ ܩ means that ݅ 
and ݆ are not linked in network ܩ. 
 Definition 1.1 says that changes in a network can be made by a coalition ࣨ′ without the 
consent of any dealers outside of ࣨ′. Specifically, i) indicates that any new links that are built 
involve only dealers in ࣨ′; ii) indicates that at least one dealer involved in any deleted link is in 
ࣨ′. 
Definition 1.2 
Let ௜ܷ(ܩ) be the payoff for dealer ݅ in network ܩ. Network ܩ is strongly stable if, for any 
ࣨ′ ⊂ ࣨ, ܩ′ is obtainable from ܩ via deviations by ࣨ′, and ݅ ∈ ࣨ′ such that ௜ܷ(ܩ′) > ௜ܷ(ܩ), 
there exists ݆ ∈ ࣨ′ such that ௝ܷ(ܩᇱ) < ௝ܷ(ܩ). 
 Definition 1.2 states that one cannot find a coalitional deviation from a strongly stable 
network in which all relevant dealers are better off and with some are strictly better off. Strong 
stability requires that the network formed be coalition-proof. That is, a coalitional move from 
any subset of dealers cannot make all of them better off without hurting some dealers in this 
subset. 
 Requiring that a network exhibit strong stability imposes a requirement that is stricter than 
most other network stability requirements, since a strongly stable network makes tighter 
predictions due to coalitional considerations. Thus, strong stability is more robust than other 
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definitions of an equilibrium network. In addition, the concept of being coalition-proof, which is 
used for cases in which players can communicate before they play a game, is particularly 
applicable to describing the equilibrium of an inter-dealer network. In an inter-dealer market, 
communications among dealers are almost inevitable. 
 Another appealing feature of strong stability is that a strongly stable network is the outcome 
of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium from Myerson's (1977) simultaneous link-announcement 
game. More importantly, such a strongly stable network is the Pareto-efficient outcome of this 
simultaneous link-announcement game (see Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) and Jackson 
(2008)). 
 To simplify the notation, let ܿ∗ = ௖
ఘఙమ௭మ
 be the relative cost. Given a network ܩ, dealer ݅’s 
payoff ௜ܷ(ܩ) is  
 
௜ܷ(ܩ) = ߣܧݑ ቀܹ( ௜ܺ஺)ቁᇩᇭᇭᇭᇪᇭᇭᇭᇫ௜	fills	the	order + ෍ ߣܧݑ ቀܹ൫ ௝ܺ஻ + ܫ൯ቁ
௝:௜௝∈ீ
ᇩᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇪᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇫ
௜ᇲs	connected	dealer	fills	the	order
+ ቌ1 − ߣ − ෍ ߣ
௝:௜௝∈ீ ቍܧݑ൫ܹ(ܫ)൯
ᇩᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇪᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇫ
neither	௜	nor	his	connected	dealers	fill	the	order
−
ܿ݊௜
݊௜ + 1ᇩᇪᇫtotal	cost	of	links 
(1.14) 
=
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
ߩߪଶݖଶ൮
ܿ∗ − ߣݍ
݊௜ + 1 + ෍ ߣ 12 ௝݊ − 1	௝݊ଶ൫ ௝݊ + 1൯௝:௜௝∈ீ ૚ൣ௡ೕஹଶ൧ + ൬ߣݍ2 − ܿ∗൰൲ + ଴ܷ, ݊௜ ≥ 1
଴ܷ, ݊௜ = 0, 
where ݊௜ is the number of links dealer ݅ has in network ܩ, ૚ൣ௡ೕஹଶ൧ is an indicator function that 
takes 1 when ௝݊ ≥ 2 and 0 otherwise, and ଴ܷ is the payoff when dealer ݅ has no link,  
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଴ܷ = ߣݍݖ(ݒ − ߩߪଶܫ − ܯ଴ + ܯଵߪଶ) + ܧݑ൫ܹ(ܫ)൯ − 12 ߣߩߪଶݍݖଶ. (1.15) 
 Since all dealers are identical ex-ante, a strongly stable network in equilibrium should be 
symmetric. That is, all dealers should obtain the same level of payoff. If not, then some dealers 
enjoy higher payoffs than others. In such cases, dealers with lower payoffs could deviate together 
with those connected to a higher payoff dealer to provide an improving deviation. Thus, the 
original network would not be strongly stable. Proposition 1.1 formalizes this intuition. 
Proposition 1.1 
Let a connected component be a sub-graph in which any two nodes are either directly 
connected or indirectly connected through a path consisting of several links. In a strongly stable 
network, all dealers in the same connected component, which has more than one connection, 
have the same number of connections. If such a strongly stable network consists of more than 
one connected component, then dealers in distinct components obtain identical payoffs. 
 The symmetry of a strongly stable network suggests that the total number of dealers, ܰ, 
affects the existence of such a network. For example, when ܰ is 6, symmetric networks are those 
in which every dealer has 2, 3, or 5 links. Any discontinuity between links in a symmetric 
network implies that no strongly stable network involving those links exists. In the above case, 
when ܰ is 6, there is no strongly stable network in which every dealer has 4 links. To avoid such 
a discontinuity, I assume that ܰ equals 2௞, where ݇ is an integer greater than one. Under this 
assumption, a symmetric network can have links the number of which equals any integer 
between 2 and 2௞ − 1. 
 In Proposition 1.2, I characterize a strongly stable network in equilibrium. Together with 
Eq.(1.2), Eq.(1.3) and Eq.(1.4), which characterize the inter-dealer equilibrium, and Eq.(1.10), 
which characterizes the price of the investor-dealer trade, Proposition 1.2 describes the 
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equilibrium of the model. 
Proposition 1.2 
The following describes a strongly stable network in equilibrium. 
i) If ܿ∗ > ఒ(ଵା௤)మ
଼
, then the strongly stable network is an empty network. 
ii) If ܿ∗ < min ቄߣ ቀ ଶேିଵ
ଶ(ேିଵ)మ + ݍ − ଵଶቁ , ఒ(ଵା௤)మ଼ ቅ , then the strongly stable network is a 
complete network.  
iii) If ߣ ቀ ଶேିଵ
ଶ(ேିଵ)మ + ݍ − ଵଶቁ ≤ ܿ∗ ≤ ఒ(ଵା௤)మ଼ , the strongly stable network is such that all 
dealers have the same number of links, and the number equals ቬ
1+ට2൬ܿ∗ߣ−ݍ+12൰+12൬ܿ∗ߣ−ݍ+12൰ ቭ.10  
iv) If none of the above conditions is satisfied, then there is no strongly stable network in 
equilibrium. 
In equilibrium, risky asset holdings, the inter-dealer price, and the investor-dealer price 
depend on the number of dealers’ links. Specifically, under i), there is no inter-dealer network. 
Hence, there is no inter-dealer trade. The investor-dealer price is  
 
݌௜)଴ = (1 − ݍ)ቆݒ − ߩߪଶ ቀܫ + ݖ2ቁቇ + ݍ(ܯ଴ −ܯଵߪଶ). (1.16) 
Under ii), the price in the inter-dealer trade is  
 ݌௜௜) = ݒ − ߩߪଶ ቀܫ + ݖܰቁ, (1.17) 
and the price in the investor-dealer trade is  
                                               
10  ቬ
ଵାටଶቀ
೎∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
ቁାଵ
ଶቀ
೎∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
ቁ
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௡∈൞ඎ
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ଶ
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ଵ
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ቨ
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 ݌௜௜)଴ = (1 − ݍ)݌௜௜) + ݍ(ܯ଴ −ܯଵߪଶ). (1.18) 
Under iii), the inter-dealer price is 
 
݌௜௜௜) = ݒ − ߩߪଶ
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎛
ܫ + ݖ
൶
1 + ට2 ቀܿ∗
ߣ
− ݍ + 12ቁ + 12 ቀܿ∗
ߣ
− ݍ + 12ቁ ൺ + 1⎠⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎞, 
(1.19) 
and the price in the investor-dealer trade is  
 ݌௜௜௜)଴ = (1 − ݍ)݌௜௜௜) + ݍ(ܯ଴ −ܯଵߪଶ). (1.20) 
 Figure 1.2 shows a complete network as an equilibrium network corresponding to 
Proposition 1.2 (ii), while Figure 1.3 shows a 4-link symmetric network as an equilibrium 
network, which corresponds to Proposition 1.2 (iii). The total number of dealers in Figure 1.2 
and 1.3 is eight. 
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Figure 1.2: A Strongly Stable Network that is Complete 
The above figure shows an equilibrium network that is complete. In the complete network all dealers are connected. 
Every dealer has seven links. 
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Figure 1.3: A Strongly Stable Network with Four Links 
The above figure shows an equilibrium network in which every dealer has four links 
 Proposition 1.2 indicates that the trade-off between the linking cost and the risk-sharing 
benefit determines the equilibrium of a network. A dealer becomes more connected when the 
benefit from risk-sharing increases or when the linking cost decreases. The following proposition 
formalizes this statement. 
Proposition 1.3 
The number of links made by a dealer increases when the relative cost ܿ∗ decreases, that is, 
i) when the order size increases, ceteris paribus; ii) when volatility increases, ceteris paribus; or 
iii) when the linking cost decreases, ceteris paribus. 
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Figure 1.4: Equilibrium Number of Links and Relative Cost 
Figure 1.4 depicts the relationship between the equilibrium number of links and the relative cost. The relative cost is 
ܿ∗ = ௖
ఘఙమ௭మ
. Parameters chosen are ܰ = 8,ߣ = ଵ
଼
,ߩ = 1, ߪ = 1, ݖ = 1, and ݍ = ଵ
ଶ
. 
 Figure 1.4 shows the negative relationship between the number of links and the relative cost 
as stated in Proposition 1.3. Proposition 1.3 implies that larger orders give rise to more 
connected inter-dealer markets. This seems to be consistent with anecdotal evidence from dealer 
markets. For example, in the foreign exchange market, the bulk of the trading volume comes 
from inter-dealer trades, and those trades usually consist of larger orders. In stock trading, the 
upstairs market, where broker-dealer firms trade with each other, almost exclusively carries out 
block trades. Proposition 1.3 provides a testable empirical prediction pertaining to the inter-
dealer network of an OTC market. The connectedness of an inter-dealer network is positively 
related to order sizes and volatility in an OTC market. 
1.4 Comparative Statics Analysis of an Inter-Dealer Network 
Proposition 1.3 suggests two ways, or layers, in which primitives such as order sizes and 
volatility can affect equilibrium. At the first layer, primitives change equilibrium outcomes when 
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an equilibrium network does not change. At the second layer, primitives change the equilibrium 
network, which then changes equilibrium outcomes. I refer to the first layer as the local property 
and the second layer as the global property. In the following sections, I first show the results of a 
comparative analysis of the local property and then illustrate results regarding the global 
property. Finally, I discuss the connection between local and global properties. 
1.4.1 The Local Property of an Inter-Dealer Network 
To investigate the local property of an equilibrium network, I fix the equilibrium network and 
then investigate how order sizes and volatility affect equilibrium prices. An important 
equilibrium price is the markup for an order-filling dealer. The markup measures the order-filling 
dealer’s profitability in making the market for investors. The markup is the price difference 
between the price at which the order-filling dealer buys an asset from an investor and the price at 
which he sells it to other dealers. That is, 
 markup = ݌௜ − ݌௜଴ = ݍ(݌௜ −ܯ଴ + ܯଵߪଶ). (1.21) 
Proposition 1.4 
Given an equilibrium network, the inter-dealer price, the investor-dealer price, and the 
markup decrease with the order size. 
 When the order size increases, inventory risk also increases. Meanwhile, the order-filling 
dealer’s risk-sharing ability is fixed insofar as the network is fixed. To unload extra inventory, 
the order-filling dealer has to sell it at a lower price in the inter-dealer market. The lower inter-
dealer price reduces the investor-dealer price. The order-filling dealer decreases his price when 
buying an asset from an investor in the anticipation of a lower price for off-loading a large order 
in the inter-dealer market. However, due to bargaining, the order-filling dealer is not able to 
transfer completely the decrease in the inter-dealer price to the investor. This reduces the order-
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filling dealer’s profitability because he must accept a smaller markup. 
 The negative relationship between markups and order sizes conforms to empirical findings 
for corporate and municipal bond markets (see Randall (2013) and Green, Hollifield, and 
Schürhoff (2007)). More importantly, my model offers an alternative explanation to those offered 
in past studies. Past studies argue that larger orders are from sophisticated investors who have 
greater bargaining power and hence lead to smaller markups for dealers. I show that, even if 
dealers have the same bargaining power as investors (when ݍ = ଵ
ଶ
), the negative relationship 
between markups and order sizes persists because of the increasing cost to dealers of unloading 
large inventory volume in the inter-dealer market. That said, my explanation for this negative 
relationship does not contradict the explanation based on bargaining power. Eq.(1.10), makes it 
obvious that a decrease in dealers’ bargaining power, ݍ, decreases the markup. Thus, a larger 
order associated with a smaller dealer’s bargaining power decreases the markup. 
Proposition 1.5 
The inter-dealer price and the investor-dealer price decrease with volatility. If ܯଵ >
ߩ ቀܫ + ௭
௡೔ାଵ
ቁ,	then the markup increases with volatility; otherwise the markup decreases with 
volatility. 
 As the previous discussion of the relationship between inter-dealer prices and order sizes 
suggests, when volatility increases, a traded asset becomes more risky, which intensifies the 
order-filling dealer’s risk-sharing need. Consequently, the inter-dealer price decreases, which 
leads to a decrease in the investor-dealer price. However, the impact of volatility on the markup 
is different from the impact of an order size on the markup. Besides affecting the markup from 
the dealer side, volatility also affects the markup from the investor’s side. Specifically, when 
volatility increases the investor’s utility for holding the asset ܯ଴ −ܯଵߪଶ  decreases, which 
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implies that the investor is more willing to sell the asset. This results in a further decrease in the 
investor-dealer price. When the investor’s willingness to sell is relatively strong (when ܯଵ >
ߩ ቀܫ + ௭
௡೔ାଵ
ቁ), the drop in the investor-dealer price exceeds the drop in the inter-dealer price, and 
hence the markup increases. The relationship between price markups and volatility depends on 
the investor’s altitude towards risk. 
1.4.2 The Global Property of an Inter-Dealer Network 
In Section 1.4.1, I discussed relationships between equilibrium outcomes and order sizes and 
relationships between equilibrium outcomes and volatility within a fixed equilibrium network. In 
this section, I consider the global property of an equilibrium network. In other words, I examine 
what happens to equilibrium outcomes such as prices and trading volumes when the equilibrium 
network changes. 
Proposition 1.6 
If the number of links that an order-filling dealer has increases, he sells at a higher inter-
dealer price, buys at a higher investor-dealer price, and earns a larger markup. 
 In an inter-dealer trade, the order-filling dealer solicits bids from his connected dealers. If 
the network becomes more connected, the order-filling dealer links to more dealers. The bidding 
competition becomes more intense, and hence drives the inter-dealer price in favor of the order-
filling dealer. Consequently, the order-filling dealer is willing to buy at a higher price from the 
seller. However, the order-filling dealer increases the investor-dealer price only to the extent that 
his profit still increases. That is, his markup goes up. 
 Trading volumes for a dealer involve two parts. The first part is the trading volume when he 
is an order-filling dealer; the second part is the trading volume when one of his connected dealers 
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is an order-filling dealer. Specifically, dealer ݅′s expected number of trades is  
 ߣ + ෍ ߣ
௝:௜௝∈ீ = (݊௜ + 1)ߣ. (1.22) 
And dealer ݅’s expected trading volume is  
 
ߣ൫ܫ + ݖ − ௜ܺ஺൯ + ෍ ߣ ௝ܺ஻
௝:௜௝∈ீ = 2ߣ ൬1 − 2݊௜ + 1൰ ݖ. (1.23) 
 In the above, both equalities are obtained as ݊௜ = ௝݊ because dealer ݅ and dealer ݆ have the 
same number of links when they are connected in an equilibrium network (see Proposition 1.1). 
Proposition 1.7 
The more links a dealer has in an inter-dealer network, the more trades he makes and the 
greater is his trading volumes. 
 Proposition 1.7 states that more trades take place when the network becomes more 
connected. This is not surprising, as more links increase a dealer’s probability of participating in 
risk-sharing trades with other dealers. 
 To see if a more connected network improves risk-sharing, I examine the risk of a dealer’s 
inventory in equilibrium. The expected risky holding for dealer ݅ is  
 
ܧ ௜ܺ = ߣ ௜ܺ஺ + ෍ ߣ൫ܫ + ௝ܺ஻൯
௝:௜௝∈ீ + ቌ1 − ߣ − ෍ ߣ௝:௜௝∈ீ ቍ ܫ (1.24) 
And the variance of the risky holding is  
 
ܸܽݎ( ௜ܺ) = ߣ ூܺ஺ଶ + ෍ ߣ൫ܫ + ௝ܺ஻൯ଶ
௝:௜௝∈ீ + ቌ1 − ߣ − ෍ ߣ௝:௜௝∈ீ ቍ ܫଶ
− (ܧ ௜ܺ)ଶ 
(1.25) 
 
 29 
Proposition 1.8 
The variance of a risky holding decreases as the number of links a dealer has increases. 
 Based on Proposition 1.8, a more connected network reduces dealers’ inventory risks. 
Together, Proposition 1.7 and 1.8 imply that a more connected network achieves better risk-
sharing among dealers, which accompanies higher trading volumes in the inter-dealer market. 
The positive relationship between a network’s connectedness and trading volumes and the 
negative relationship between connectedness and inventory risks yield two testable empirical 
predictions from my model. 
1.4.3 The Connection between Local Properties and Global Properties 
As discussed at the beginning of Section 1.4, changes in primitives have two layers of impacts on 
equilibrium. One affects equilibrium outcomes directly, while the other exerts influence through 
changing the equilibrium network’s structure. Because of the second impact, the local property 
of the network is not stable. In other words, relationships between prices and order sizes, or 
between prices and volatility, can exhibit structural breaks as variations in order sizes and 
volatility can also change the structure of the equilibrium network.  
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Figure 1.5: The Relationship between Prices and Order Sizes 
Figure 1.5 depicts structural breaks in the negative relationship between inter-dealer prices and order sizes, and the 
negative relationship between markups and order sizes. Parameters chosen are ܿ = 9,ߣ = ଵ
଼
,ߩ = 1,ߪ = 1, ܫ =1, ݒ = 30,ݍ = ଵ
ଶ
,ܯ଴ = 0,ܯଵ = 1, and ݖ ∈ [16, 22]. The structural break occurs at ݖ = 18.09, 19.97, and 21.69. 
 Figure 1.5 shows that the negative relationship between markups and order sizes exhibits 
jumps as the order size increases. Such jumps occur when the network becomes more connected, 
i.e., the number of a dealer’s links increases. As shown in Proposition 1.6, the markup and the 
inter-dealer price increase when the network becomes more connected, and the jumps shown in 
Figure 1.5 reflect this increase. The same pattern exists in relationships between prices and 
volatility (see Figure 1.6). 
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Figure 1.6: The Relationship between Volatility and Order Sizes 
Figure 1.6 depicts structural breaks in the negative relationship between inter-dealer prices and volatility, and the 
negative relationship between markups and volatility. Parameters chosen are ܿ = 9, ߣ = ଵ
଼
, ߩ = 1, ݖ = 1, ܫ = 1,ݒ =30, ݍ = ଵ
ଶ
,ܯ଴ = 482,ܯଵ = 1, and ߪ ∈ [16, 22]. The structural break occurs at ߪ = 18.09, 19.97, and 21.69. 
 The above discussion suggests that empirical research on OTC markets should take into 
account the stability of the underlying network. Otherwise, the regression model used runs the 
risk of model misspecification, since the regression model may suffer from structural breaks. For 
example, empirical research should include a measure of a network’s connectedness as an 
additional control variable interacting with other important explanatory variables in a regression 
model. In Section 1.7, I discuss this empirical implication more thoroughly, together with other 
implications of the model. 
1.5 Core-Periphery Inter-Dealer Networks  
In the previous model I assume that dealers are homogeneous. This assumption reduces the 
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model’s complexity. In the model dealers have to decide only how many links to make, but they 
do not have to decide with whom they should connect, since all dealers are the same ex-ante. In 
this section, I introduce heterogeneity among dealers into the model. Dealers are different in their 
capacity of providing liquidity to investors. Specifically, there are three types of dealers. The first 
type consists of dealers with small capacity ݏௌ = ݖ. Those dealers are small or regional banks 
who can only accommodate retail-sized orders, i.e., the size of the order is no larger than ݖ. The 
second type consists of dealers with medium capacity ݖ + ݏெ . The third type dealer has large 
capacity ݖ + ݏ௅. Large-capacity dealers are those big banks who are able to provide liquidity to 
both retail investors (with small orders) and institutional investors (with huge orders).  
 In addition to introducing differences in dealers’ capacity of liquidity provision, I relax the 
assumption that the size of the investor order is constant. I assume that the size of the investor 
order is random and follows a Pareto distribution.11 This assumption together with the above 
assumption that dealers have different capacity determines a dealer’s probability of trading with 
an investor. Specifically, at date 1, an investor arrives and wants to trade an order of size 
ݖ ∼ ܲܽݎ݁ݐ݋൫ݖ, 1൯.12 The investor meets with one dealer in the network with probability ߣ. If the 
order size ݖ is smaller than the chosen dealer’s capacity, then the dealer fills the investor order. 
Otherwise, no investor-dealer trade occurs. Hence, for a large-capacity dealer, his probability of 
trading with an investor equals ߣ× Prൣݖ ≤ ݖ + ݏ௅൧ = ߣ ቀ1 − ௭௭ା௦ಽቁ ; for a medium-capacity 
                                               
11 The assumption that the order size follows a Pareto distribution does not affect any implication in the model. For 
any distribution, large capacity dealers always have the highest probability of trading with an investor, since large 
capacity dealers are able to accommodate any orders that medium or small capacity dealers accommodate. The 
probability of trading is the key driver that gives rise to the core-periphery equilibrium network. That being said, 
using Pareto distribution significantly reduces redundancy in the mathematical derivation. 
12 ݖ~ܲܽݎ݁ݐ݋(ݖ, 1) means that ݖ follows a Pareto distribution with a scale parameter ݖ and a shape parameter 1. The 
probability density function for ݖ is 
݂(ݖ) = ൝ ݖݖଶ ,	if	ݖ ≥ ݖ0,	otherwise. 
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dealer, his probability of trading with an investor equals ߣ ቀ1 − ௭
௭ା௦ಾ
ቁ; for a low-capacity dealer, 
his probability of trading with an investor is zero. 
 
Figure 1.7: The Timeline of the Extended Model 
Figure 1.7 gives the timeline of the extended model. At date 0, dealers form an inter-dealer network. At date 1, a 
randomly selected dealer meets with the investor. They trade if the order size is smaller than the dealer’s capacity. 
Otherwise, they don’t trade. At date 2, the dealer who fills the order at date 1 starts to re-trade through his inter-
dealer network. At date 3, the asset’s value is realized 
 Figure 1.7 gives the timeline of this extended model. It is similar to the model in Section 1.3 
except for two differences. The first difference is that the size of the investor order is random, 
and it follows a Pareto distribution. The second difference is that at date 1, an investor-dealer 
trade occurs if the order size is smaller than the capacity of the selected dealer. Otherwise, no 
investor-dealer trade occurs. All the rest is the same as the benchmark model (see Figure 1.1). 
 With capacity as the only device of heterogeneity that differentiates dealers, I show that the 
equilibrium network is asymmetric. An asymmetric network means that dealers do not have the 
Date 0:
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same number of links. The core-periphery structure is a special case of this asymmetric network. 
Additionally, I show that differences in capacity create a vacillating relationship between 
investor-dealer prices and dealers’ centrality (measured by the number of a dealers’ links). 
Denote ܿ̃ = ௖
ఒఘఙమ௭
. Given a network ܩ, the payoff for dealer ݅ is, ݖ 
 ௜ܷ(ܩ)
= න ൮ߣ૚ൣ௭ஸ௭ା௦೔൧ܧݑ ቀܹ( ௜ܺ஺)ቁᇩᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇪᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇫ௜	fills	the	order∞
௭
+ ෍ ߣ૚ൣ௭ஸ௭ା௦ೕ൧ܧݑ ቀܹ൫ ௝ܺ஻ + ܫ൯ቁ
௝:௜௝∈ீ
ᇩᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇪᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇫ
௜ᇲs	connected	dealer	fills	the	order
൲݂(ݖ)݀ݖ
+ ቌ1 − ߣ ቆ1 − ݖ
ݖ + ݏ௜ቇ − ෍ ߣቆ1 − ݖݖ + ݏ௝ቇ
௝:௜௝∈ீ ቍܧݑ൫ܹ(ܫ)൯
ᇩᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇪᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇫ
neither	௜	nor	his	connected	dealers	fill	the	order
−
ܿ݊௜
݊௜ + 1ᇩᇪᇫtotal	cost	of	links 
(1.26) 
=
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
ߣߩߪଶݖ൮
ܿ̃ − ݏ௜ݍ
݊௜ + 1 + ෍ 12 ݏ௝ ௝݊ − 1	௝݊ଶ൫ ௝݊ + 1൯௝:௜௝∈ீ ૚ൣ௡ೕஹଶ൧ + ቀݏ௜ݍ2 − ܿ̃ቁ൲ + ଴ܷ, ݊௜ ≥ 1
଴ܷ, ݊௜ = 0, 
and where ଴ܷ is dealer ݅’s payoff when he has no link. ଴ܷ is defined as follows, 
 
଴ܷ = ߣݍ(ݒ − ߩߪଶܫ − ܯ଴ + ܯଵߪଶ) ln ݖ + ݏ௜ݖ + ܧݑ൫ܹ(ܫ)൯
− ݏ௜
ߣߩߪଶݍݖ2 . 
(1.27) 
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Proposition 1.9 
Let ݊௦ಽ , ݊௦ಾ, and ݊௦ೄ  be the number of links for large-capacity dealers, medium-capacity 
dealers, and small-capacity dealers, respectively. Then, in a strongly stable network,  
 ݊௦ಽ ≥ ݊௦ಾ ≥ ݊௦ೄ . (1.28) 
 Proposition 1.9 indicates that the equilibrium network when dealers have different capacity 
in providing liquidity is asymmetric. Some dealers have more links than others. I show that 
centrality measured by the number of links a dealer has is positively determined by the dealer’s 
capacity. A dealer who has larger capacity and is more capable of accommodating investors’ 
orders has more links. The dealer with large capacity has greater risk-sharing needs, since he has 
a greater likelihood of facing a liquidity shock. Such a liquidity shock occurs if the dealer fills 
the order from an incoming investor. As a result, the large-capacity dealer is inclined to build 
more links. At the same time, connecting with the large-capacity dealer implies more chances for 
other dealers to participate in risk-sharing activities, which means greater benefits. Hence, other 
types of dealers are also inclined to connect to the large-capacity dealer. This mutual consent 
leads to the equilibrium in which the large-capacity dealer has the greatest number of links. 
 Since the core-periphery network is a special case of the asymmetric network, Proposition 
1.9 explains the core-periphery structure of the inter-dealer network found in empirical studies 
(Hollifield, Neklyudov, and Spatt (2012) and Li and Schurhoff (2012)). In a core-periphery 
network, some dealers operate at the core of the network, connecting to all dealers, while 
peripheral dealers connect to no one but those at the core. Consequently, core dealers have more 
links than peripheral dealers. Proposition 1.9 suggests that large-capacity dealers comprise the 
core and have more links than peripheral dealers, who are those small-capacity dealers. 
 As a large-capacity dealer has a higher probability of trading than other dealers, Proposition 
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1.9 also justifies the model in Neklyudov (2012). In that paper, the author studies the impact of 
the core-periphery structure using a dealer’s matching rate, which is essentially a dealer’s 
probability of trading, as the proxy for a dealer’s centrality in the network. My model supports 
this idea of approximating a dealer’s centrality with his matching rate. I show that dealers with 
high matching rates have higher centrality than dealers with low matching rates, which is an 
equilibrium consequence of strategic network formation.  
 To focus on the core-periphery network and illustrate the vacillating relationship between 
investor-dealer prices and dealers’ centrality, I restrict ܿ̃  such that 
ݏெݍ ≤ ܿ̃ ≤ ݏ௅ min ቊݍ, ଵଶ ேೞಽିଶ൫ேೞಽିଵ൯మேೞಽቋ. ௦ܰಽ  is the total number of large-capacity dealers. ௦ܰಾ =2௞	(݇ ≥ 1) is the total number of medium-capacity dealers, and ௦ܰಾ > ௦ܰಽ > 2. 
Proposition 1.10 
When dealers have varying capacity ݏ௅, ݏெ, and ݏௌ, a strongly stable network in equilibrium 
is as follows. Dealers with the large capacity ݏ௅ form the core of the network and connect to all 
dealers; dealers with the small capacity ݏௌ form the periphery and connect only to those at the 
core; dealers with the medium capacity ݏெ  connect to all large-capacity dealers and other 
݊௦ಾ
∗ − ௦ܰಽ  medium-capacity dealers. ݊௦ಾ
∗  is  
 
݊௦ಾ
∗ = arg max
௡ೞಾ∈ℕ
ቆܿ̃ − ݏெݍ + ݏெ2
− ݏெ
݊௦ಾ൫ ௦ܰಽ + 1൯ − ௦ܰಽ2݊௦ಾଶ ቇ 1݊௦ಾ + 1. 
(1.29)  
 Proposition 1.10 shows the equilibrium network that exhibits the core-periphery structure as 
found in empirical studies. Figure 1.8 gives an example of this core-periphery network. In Figure 
1.8, there are 20 dealers (3 large-capacity dealers, 8 medium-capacity dealers, and 9 small-
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capacity dealers). Only large-capacity dealers operate at the core of the network, while small-
capacity dealers are the periphery of the network. 
 
Figure 1.8: A Core-Periphery Network 
Figure 1.8 shows a core-periphery network in which large-capacity dealers comprise the core of the network and 
small-capacity dealers become the periphery. L represents the large-capacity dealer, M represents the medium-
capacity dealer, and S represents the small-capacity dealer. In equilibrium, each L has 19 links, each M has 7 links, 
and each S has only 3 links. 
 In the core-periphery network, core dealers do not necessarily offer more favorable prices to 
investors. Two opposite forces affect the investor-dealer price that a core dealer offers. On one 
side, a core dealer has more links, thereby greater market power in inter-dealer trading. Greater 
market power in the inter-dealer market enables the core dealer to sell at a higher price, and 
hence to buy from an investor at a higher price. On the other side, a dealer becomes the core 
because of his large capacity, which implies he fills larger orders than other dealers. Larger 
orders overburden the dealer’s inventory rebalancing in inter-dealer trading, and hence worsen 
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the dealer’s price in the inter-dealer market. Consequently, the large-capacity dealer buys from 
an investor at a lower price. In short, the cross-sectional relationship between investor-dealer 
prices and dealers’ centrality is ambiguous. Proposition 1.11 illustrates this undetermined 
relationship. 
Proposition 1.11 
Denote ݌̅௦ಽ
଴  and ݌̅௦ಾ
଴  as the average investor-dealer price from large-capacity dealers and 
medium-capacity dealers, respectively. If
൬ଵା
೥
ೞಽ
൰୪୬൬ଵା
ೞಽ
೥
൰
൬ଵା
೥
ೞಾ
൰ ୪୬൬ଵା
ೞಾ
೥
൰
≤
ே
௡ೞಾ
∗ ାଵ
, then ݌̅௦ಽ
଴ ≥ ݌̅௦ಾ
଴ . 
Otherwise, ݌̅௦ಽ
଴ < ݌̅௦ಾ଴ . In the above, ݊௦ಾ∗  is defined in Proposition 1.10 and ܰ is the total number 
of dealers. 
 Proposition 1.11 gives the condition under which large-capacity dealers buy from investors 
at higher prices, and under which large-capacity dealers buy at lower prices. Since a dealer’s 
capacity positively determines his centrality, Proposition 1.11 suggests that the relationship 
between investor-dealer prices and dealers’ centrality vacillates between positive and negative. 
Figure 1.9 further illustrates this ambiguous relationship between investor-dealer prices and 
dealers’ centrality by following the example in Figure 1.8. In the figure, a medium-capacity 
dealer has 7 links and a large-capacity dealer has 19 links in equilibrium. The large-capacity 
dealer has higher centrality than the medium-capacity dealer. In the upper panel of the figure, the 
relationship investor-dealer prices and centrality is positive. This occurs when the difference in 
capacity between high centrality dealers and low centrality dealers is small. That is, 
൬ଵା
೥
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೥
൰
൬ଵା
೥
ೞಾ
൰ ୪୬൬ଵା
ೞಾ
೥
൰
≤
ே
௡ೞಾ
∗ ାଵ
. However, when the difference in capacity is big, the relationship 
becomes negative, which is illustrated in the bottom panel of the figure. This occurs when 
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Figure 1.9: The Relationship between Investor-Dealer Prices and Centrality 
Figure 1.9 shows that the relationship between investor-dealer prices and dealers’ centrality (which measures how 
central a dealer is in the network) is undetermined. In the upper panel of the figure, the relationship is positive. This 
occurs when the difference in capacity between high centrality dealers and low centrality dealers is small. That is, 
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. However, when the difference in capacity is big, the relationship between investor-dealer 
prices and centrality is negative. This occurs when 
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.	 Parameters chosen are = 20, ௦ܰಽ =3, ௦ܰಾ = 8, ܿ = 20,ߣ = ଵଷ଺ ,ݍ = ଵଵ଴ ,ߩ = 1, ܫ = 1,ݒ = 31,ܯ଴ = 10,ܯଵ = 0,  ߪ = 6 , ݖ ∼ ܲܽݎ݁ݐ݋(20, 1), ݏெ = 9 , 
ݏ௅(small) = 10 and ݏ௅(large) = 380. Based on Proposition 1.10, this set of parameters implies that ݊௦ಾ∗ = 7. 
 Though the relationship between investor-dealer prices and dealers’ centrality is 
undetermined, the conditional relationship between them is determined. When conditioning on 
the size of the investor order, high-centrality dealers offer better prices than low-centrality 
dealers. That is, when ݖ௜  is fixed, ݌௜଴ = (1 − ݍ)ቆ̅ݒ − ߩߪଶ ቀܫ + ௭೔௡೔ାଵቁቇ + ݍ(ܯ଴ −ܯଵߪଶ)  is 
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positively determined by ݊௜. This is consistent with Hollifield, Neklyudov, and Spatt (2012), 
which shows that investors get more favorable prices when trading with core dealers. The above 
suggests that the size of the investor order is an important control variable in determining how 
dealers’ centrality is related to investor-dealer prices. 
1.6  “Hot Potato” Trading in an Inter-Dealer Market 
So far in this study, transactions among dealers take place only when an order-filling dealer 
initiates an auction in the inter-dealer market. This setup helps to demonstrate that risk-sharing 
drives network formation, since the sole role played by dealers in the inter-dealer market is risk-
sharing. However, such one-shot trading limits the analysis of strategies that could be deployed 
by dealers, since dealers who connect to the order-filling dealer can only be buyers when the 
order-filling dealer sells (or sellers when the order-filling dealer buys). In reality, one of the 
strategies deployed by dealers is intermediary or “hot potato” trading. “Hot potato” trading 
occurs when a dealer who has traded with the order-filling dealer continues to trade with other 
dealers who do not connect with the order-filling dealer. In so doing, this dealer serves as the 
intermediary between the order-filling dealer and dealers who are not in the order-filling dealer’s 
network. 
 To analyze “hot potato” trading in an inter-dealer network, I relax the one-shot trading 
assumption, and allow dealers who trade with the order-filling dealer to also trade in their own 
networks simultaneously. Specifically, let dealer ݅ be the order-filling dealer and dealer ݆ be one 
of ݅’s connected dealers. When dealer ݅ starts an auction, dealer ݆ not only submits his orders to ݅, 
he also solicits bids from his connected dealers ݆ᇱ (to focus sharply on “hot potato” trading, I 
consider only the case in which ݆ᇱ does not connect to dealer ݅). Similarly, dealer ݆ᇱ submits his 
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orders to ݆, and in the meantime solicits bids from his connected dealers, and so forth. One can 
visualize this setup as consisting of multiple rounds of trading that occur instantaneously. That is, 
in a short period of time the order-filling dealer trades with his connected dealers in the first 
round, and then those order-filling-connected dealers trade in their own networks in the second 
round, and so forth. 
 Unlike the model with one-shot trading only, the above setup allows dealers to continue 
trading in an inter-dealer network. However, this general setup complicates the analysis of the 
equilibrium at date 2. Since trades continue through the network, a dealer’s strategy depends not 
only on who he connects to (as in the one-shot setup) but also on who his connected dealers 
connect to and who his connected dealers connected dealers connect to, and so forth. Fortunately, 
the equilibrium at date 2 is still solvable, and it is characterized on another network derived from 
the inter-dealer network. Let us denote this derived network as the “trading-sets network.” 
Definition 1.3 and 1.4 show how a “trading-sets network” is derived from an inter-dealer 
network. 
Definition 1.3 
 Given the flow of trades in an inter-dealer network, dealers in an inter-dealer network are 
grouped into various trading sets. In each trading set, there is a dealer, called the initiator, who 
trades in the previous round of trading, and there are other dealers, called participants, who do 
not participate in previous rounds but participate in the current round initiated by the initiator. 
Furthermore, if a trading set has only one participant who is not a participant in any other 
trading set, then the trading set is considered as an empty set. If this unique participant in the 
trading set is also the only participant in other trading sets, then these trading sets are grouped 
into one set consisting of only one participant but many initiators. 
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 Definition 1.3 indicates that a trading set can take only two forms. One form includes many 
participants but a unique initiator; the other has many initiators but a unique participant. Figure 
1.10 provides an example of the grouping for a symmetric network with three links. In those 
trading sets, numbers before the semicolons stand for initiators and numbers after the semicolons 
stand for participants. In Figure 1.10, the arrow on a link indicates the flow of trades.  
 
Figure 1.10: Trading Sets derived from a Symmetric Network with Three Links 
Figure 1.10 provides an example of dealers in an inter-dealer network that is grouped into trading sets. In the 
figure, the arrow represents the direction of the flow of trades. The thickest line represents the first round of trading. 
The dashed line represents the second round of trading. The thinnest line represents the final round of trading. In the 
trading set brackets, the numbers before the semicolons stand for the initiator and the numbers after the semicolons 
stand for the participants 
Trading Set1 = {1; 2, 3, 4} 
 
Trading Set2 = {2; 5, 6} 
 
Trading Set3 = {3; 5, 7} 
 
Trading Set4 = {4; 6, 7} 
 
Trading Set5 = {5, 6, 7; 8} 
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Figure 1.11: A “Trading-Sets Network"  derived from an Inter-Dealer Network 
Figure 1.11 shows a “trading-sets network” that is derived from the inter-dealer network shown in Figure 8. In 
Figure 8, trading set 1 connects to trading set 2 but not to trading set 5, since the intersection between trading set 1 
and 2 contains a common dealer, dealer 2, but the intersection between trading set 1 and trading set 5 is empty 
Definition 1.4 
Two trading sets are connected if their intersection is not empty. 
 While Definition 1.3 defines how nodes (trading sets) in a “trading-sets network” are 
derived from an inter-dealer network, Definition 1.4 defines how links in a “trading-sets 
network” are derived. Figure 1.11 gives an example of a “trading-sets network” derived from an 
inter-dealer network. It is obvious that with a given flow of trades in an inter-dealer network the 
grouping of trading sets is unique. Since links between trading sets are determined only by 
members of those sets, a “trading-sets network” is uniquely derived from an inter-dealer network 
through Definition 1.3 and Definition 1.4. This means that characterizing the date 2 equilibrium 
 44 
when dealers continually trade along an inter-dealer network is equivalent to characterizing the 
equilibrium when dealers trade in the derived “trading-sets network.” 
 As in Section 1.3.2, initiators trade with participants strategically in each trading set. When 
the market in each trading set clears, it generates a unique price associated with the 
corresponding trading set. In other words, inter-dealer trading occurs in various fragmented 
markets (trading sets), and these fragmented markets are linked when they have common 
members (dealers). 
 In each of these trading sets dealers are divided into two classes, initiators and participants. 
This fits the model description in Malamud and Rostek (2013), in which exactly two classes of 
dealers trade in each trading set.13 In fact, Definition 1.3 and Definition 1.4 map the dealers’ 
network into the “trading-sets network” which is first studied by Malamud and Rostek (2013). 
 The equilibrium in inter-dealer trading is that every dealer (say dealer ݇) submits a vector of 
demand schedules (ݍ௞) to all trading sets (say ॸ௞  sets) he belongs to, and his vector of demand 
schedules is 
ݍ௞(߉௞) = ൫ߩߪଶॴॸೖ×ॸೖ + ߉௞൯ିଵ൫̅ݒॴॸೖ×ଵ − ঐॸೖ×ଵ − ߩߪଶܫ଴ॴॸೖ×ॸೖ൯, 
where ߉௞  is dealer ݇’s price impact and ঐॸೖ	×ଵ is a vector of equilibrium prices in ॸ௞  sets.14 To 
be more specific, ߉௞  is the ॸ௞ × ॸ௞  Jacobian matrix ܦ௤ঐ, in which entry (ݎ, ݏ) stands for the 
price change in set ݏ caused by a demand change in set ݎ. In equilibrium, ߉௞  is determined by 
the market-clearing condition. Although solving the equilibrium is equivalent to finding every 
dealer’s price impact, the actual work of solving for those price impacts (solving ܰ matrices with 
ॸ௞ × ॸ௞  dimensions) is non-trivial, let along specifying how the network and ߉௞  are jointly 
                                               
13 See Example 1 (ii) in Malamud and Rostek (2013). 
14 ॴॸೖ×ॸೖ  is an ॸ௞ by ॸ௞ matrix with all entries equal to 1. 
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determined in the network formation process. 
 To circumvent this difficulty, I focus on the property regarding “hot potato” trading that is 
persistent in any strongly stable network. 
Proposition 1.12 
Denote a dealer as a monopolistic dealer if his connected dealers belong to distinct 
connected components. In any strongly stable network, monopolistic dealers always buy and sell 
at different prices gaining non-zero markups in “hot potato” trading. In contrast, if a pair of 
dealers has more than two unconnected common neighbors, then this pair of dealers and all 
their common neighbors receive zero markups in “hot potato” trading.15 
 Proposition 1.12 identifies which dealer in the inter-dealer network receives non-zero 
markups for “hot potato” trading. Interestingly, the dealer with the most links does not 
necessarily enjoy non-zero markups. In fact, this dealer may receive zero markups for “hot 
potato” trading. For example, in Figure 1.12, dealer 6 has the highest number of links but he 
always receives zero markups since he has exactly two common neighbors with every dealer he 
connects to. The dealer who always receives non-zero markups is the one who reaches different 
groups of dealers, for example dealer 7 in Figure 1.12. This dealer is called the monopolistic 
dealer, as his ability to access unconnected parts of the inter-dealer network provides him with 
local monopoly power in “hot potato” trading.  
                                               
15 Neighbors of a dealer are his connected dealers. 
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Figure 1.12: An Inter-Dealer Network in which Dealer 7 is the Monopolistic Dealer 
In Figure 1.12, if there is “hot potato” trading, dealer 7 is the monopolistic dealer with non-zero markups, even 
though he has fewer links than dealer 6. In fact, dealer 6 gets zero markups in “hot potato” trading. 
 Proposition 1.12 is an extension of the study by Malamud and Rostek (2013). Their model 
implies that a dealer who acts as a “monopolistic bridge” in a “trading-sets network” is the one 
with non-zero markups. Proposition 1.12 extends their results to identify the “monopolistic 
bridge” in an inter-dealer network. This helps empirical research to identify which dealer has 
local monopoly power in “hot potato” trading. 
1.7 Empirical Implications 
My model offers novel testable hypotheses in addition to confirming findings from past 
empirical studies. As an inter-dealer network is formed to share risks among dealers, the 
connectedness of the network is closely related to volatility and order sizes that characterize 
dealers’ inventory risks. 
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Hypothesis 1.1: 
An asset with high volatility has a more connected inter-dealer network than an asset with 
low volatility. 
Hypothesis 1.2: 
An asset traded in large order sizes has a more connected inter-dealer network than an asset 
traded in small order sizes. 
 The above hypotheses are novel empirical predictions obtained from endogenizing the 
formation of an inter-dealer network. However, the empirical design involved in testing those 
hypotheses requires statistics that measure the connectedness of an inter-dealer network. In the 
network literature, several statistics have been proposed to describe the connectedness of a 
network including average path length, cliquishness, a clustering coefficient, cohesiveness, etc.16 
In econometrics, Diebold and Yilmaz (2011) propose statistics based on variance decompositions 
to measure the connectedness of a network of financial firms. 
 Based on my model, the connectedness of an inter-dealer network determines prices and 
trading volumes in an inter-dealer market. In a more connected inter-dealer market, dealers trade 
more and gain higher markups. This yields the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1.3: 
In a more connected inter-dealer network, dealers generate larger trading volumes and face 
smaller inventory risks. 
Hypothesis 1.4: 
In a more connected inter-dealer network, dealers earn higher markups. 
 My model explains the observational finding regarding core-periphery networks in OTC 
                                               
16 See Jackson (2008) and Easley and Kleinberg (2010) for more details. 
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markets with varying capacity of providing liquidity among dealers. Dealers with large capacity 
of providing liquidity are more central in a network than dealers with small capacity. As a result, 
my model provides an additional testable implication: 
Hypothesis 1.5: 
A dealer with larger capacity of liquidity provision has higher centrality. 
 As mentioned above, here the empirical design would entail constructing measures for each 
dealer’s centrality in a network. Past studies in the network literature have used degree centrality, 
closeness centrality, betweenness centrality, eigenvector related measures, etc., to capture 
dealers’ centrality.17 One proxy for a dealer’s capacity would be the size of the dealer. A large 
dealer is more likely to be capable of accommodating huge orders than a small dealer. 
 An important empirical implication of the model pertains to sudden jumps in relationships 
between prices and primitive parameters, e.g., volatility and order sizes. Such jumps occur as an 
inter-dealer network changes along with continuous changes in primitive parameters (see Figures 
1.5 and 1.6). This implies that when an asset whose volatility or order sizes change over time is 
involved, empirical studies should consider testing for structural breaks since the corresponding 
inter-dealer network may have changed over time. The potential structural break in an inter-
dealer network implies that time-series data on prices and trading volumes may not be stationary. 
With respect to cross-sectional studies, my model implies that an inter-dealer network entails 
another layer of heterogeneity that should be controlled for. For example, assets traded in larger 
orders differ from assets traded in smaller orders not only in terms of the order size but also in 
terms of the structure of corresponding inter-dealer networks. Thus, statistics that describe inter-
                                               
17 Hollifield, Neklyudov, and Spatt (2012) and Li and Schürhoff (2012) use degree centrality, closeness centrality, 
betweenness centrality, and eigenvector centrality to measure dealers’ centrality in the inter-dealer network. Refer to 
Jackson (2008) for further elaboration of centrality measures in network studies. 
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dealer networks, e.g., the clustering coefficient, should be included as additional control 
variables in a regression model. In all, the structure of the inter-dealer network is an important 
state variable that should not be overlooked in empirical OTC studies. 
1.8 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I investigate inter-dealer network formation in an OTC market. I assume that 
dealers form inter-dealer networks to share inventory risks. In equilibrium, the benefit from such 
risk-sharing and the cost of linking determine the shape of a network. An equilibrium network 
pins down outcomes such as prices and trading volumes. Furthermore, I show that differences in 
dealers’ capacity of liquidity provision imply that dealers with large capacity have high 
centrality, whereas dealers with small capacity have low centrality. Hence, an equilibrium 
network exhibits the core-periphery structure. My model not only matches empirical findings in 
OTC markets, it also generates novel empirical implications. I demonstrate that empirical models 
that fail to control for the connectedness of an inter-dealer network may suffer from structural 
breaks.  
 In my model, dealers strategically form an inter-dealer network to share inventory risks. The 
inter-dealer network serves as the channel for dealers to rebalance their inventory. This feature 
differs from Babus and Kondor (2012), in which they assume that dealers use the network to 
share information. In reality, dealers are likely to use the inter-dealer network for both risk-
sharing and information-sharing purposes. As a result, future research should emphasize the 
interaction between the inventory model and the information model in the formation of an inter-
dealer network as well as the trading in this network market. 
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Chapter 2 Reducing Opacity in Over-the-Counter 
Markets 
2.1 Introduction 
OTC markets are often opaque, meaning that they fail to publicly disclose information regarding 
trades. In the 2008-2009 financial crisis, opacity in OTC derivative markets was blamed for 
hampering the price discovery process, thereby deterring investors from trading. Having 
experienced the detrimental impact of opacity, in the post crisis era many policy makers call for 
reforms to reduce opacity in OTC markets.18 One of the ongoing reforms is to trade standard 
OTC products in centralized markets.19 This can lead to the coexistence of centralized and OTC 
                                               
18 See G20 Pittsburgh Summit Declaration, September 2009, G20 Toronto Summit Declaration, June 2010, and 
Communiqué of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of the G20, October 2011. 
19 In the United States, the Dodd-Frank act requires trading standard swaps in “swap execution facilities”, where 
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trading. How does this coexistence affect market making and trading in OTC markets? 
Furthermore, as dealers may benefit from opacity (see Madhavan (1995) and Yin (2005)), does a 
centralized market provide an incentive for dealers to reduce opacity (as it is supposed to)? These 
questions are important for understanding the economics of transparency as well as for guiding 
reforms that attempt to increase transparency in OTC markets.  
 I develop a model where a centralized market operates simultaneously with an opaque OTC 
market. In the centralized market, a finite number of market makers compete for order flows by 
posting bid-ask spreads. In a competitive centralized market, the winning market maker sets his 
spread to deter potential entrance of other market makers. On the other hand, in a noncompetitive 
centralized market, the winning market maker, who is not bound by the potential entrance of 
other maker makers, sets his spread to maximize profits. I find that whether the centralized 
market is competitive or not generates different impacts on the OTC market. While a competitive 
centralized market causes dealers’ profits to decrease under greater opacity, a noncompetitive 
centralized market leads to the opposite result. The change in the relation between opacity and 
dealers’ profits is due to the change in the relation between the centralized market and the OTC 
market. Specifically, when the centralized market is noncompetitive, there are opportunities for 
cooperation between these two markets. Based on these findings, I suggest that regulators should 
adopt market structures that boost competition among market makers, e.g., the electronic limit 
order book, as the primary industrial organization for the centralized market.  
 The model developed in this chapter extends Spulber (1996) and Rust and Hall (2003) by 
incorporating opacity in the OTC market. In the benchmark model, I analyze an economy that 
consists of the OTC market only. I show that greater opacity leads to larger bid-ask spreads in the 
                                                                                                                                                       
multiple participants can trade on publicly available prices made by other participants. In Europe, the MiFID II 
requires trading derivatives on organized venues, known as “organized trading facilities.” 
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OTC market. This result implies that reducing opacity decreases trading costs, thereby increasing 
market efficiency. However, the welfare analysis indicates that dealers oppose reducing opacity 
because of smaller profits. The driving force behind these results is that opacity makes investors’ 
outside options ambiguous, and hence, reduces the value of search. Thus investors search less. 
Fewer searches lead to increases in investors’ trading costs. Since investors’ losses are dealers’ 
gains, dealers profit from opacity. 
 To explore the impact of centralized trading, I extend the benchmark model to include an 
additional market –– a centralized market. When the centralized market is competitive, the bid-
ask spread in it depends only on the transaction costs of other market makers, and hence, is 
independent of OTC trading. As a result, the centralized market attracts investors who have to 
trade but would like to avoid trading ambiguously in the OTC market. Under greater opacity, 
dealers lose their customers to the centralized market, which decreases their profits. 
 However, the noncompetitive centralized market changes the above relation between 
dealers’ profits and opacity. The natural monopoly in the centralized market adjusts its bid-ask 
spread along with changes in dealers’ bid-ask spreads. Specifically, the bid-ask spread in the 
noncompetitive centralized market is positively correlated with the bid-ask spreads in the OTC 
market. This dependence implies that dealers and the monopoly can collude to increase 
investors’ trading costs so as to profit from opacity.  
 In addition, I explore how opacity affects the survival of both the centralized market and the 
OTC market. I find that greater opacity increases the ability of the centralized market to survive 
regardless of its competitiveness. However, opacity is not the key determinant of the viability of 
the OTC market. The comparison between transaction costs in the OTC market and the 
centralized market (both competitive and noncompetitive) determines if the OTC market is 
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eliminated in the case of a centralized market. In short, when market makers in the centralized 
market have substantially lower transaction costs than dealers in the OTC market, the OTC 
market cannot survive in equilibrium. 
 I model opacity in OTC markets by Knightian uncertainty, meaning that the odds of future 
states are unknown. Knightian uncertainty assumes that the decision maker has a set of priors 
rather than a unique prior. Thus, the degree of Knightian uncertainty can be measured by the size 
of the set of priors. Past studies have shown that Knightian uncertainty may arise if the decision 
maker has vague information (Ellsberg (1961)); if the decision maker has insufficient knowledge 
(Easley and O’Hara (2009, 2010a, 2010b)); or if the decision maker has adopted incorrect 
models (Hansen and Sargent (2001)). Since opacity means that some trading information (e.g. 
quotes, prices, and order flows) is unavailable or unreliable, investors in OTC markets only have 
vague information, and hence, face Knightian uncertainty.  
 I describe trading in OTC markets with a search model.20 First, most OTC markets are dealer 
markets. In dealer markets, trades are conducted through bilateral negotiations with investors. As 
terms of bilateral trades are not public, investors have to search among dealers for price 
information. Hence, a model in which economic agents search for the optimal deal captures these 
bilateral trades. Second, Yin (2005) shows that search costs are crucial in analyzing fragmented 
markets, which include OTC markets, even for infinitesimal amounts. This is because the friction 
created by search significantly changes price behaviors between fragmented markets and 
centralized markets. 
 Dealers in my model adjust their bid-ask spreads to maximize profits under inventory 
                                               
20 Spulber (1996) and Rust and Hall (2003) use the same framework to describe trading in dealership markets, of 
which OTC markets are special examples. Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005, 2007), and Lagos and Rocheteau 
(2009) adopt a different search framework to model OTC trading. I discuss the differences in Section 2.2.  
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constraints. Hence, my model falls into the category of inventory-based market microstructure 
models (e.g. Amihud and Mendelson (1980), and Ho and Stoll (1981)), which is different from 
the information-based market microstructure models (e.g. Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and 
Easley and O’Hara (1987)). Investors in my model are “liquidity traders” rather than “informed 
traders.”  
 In the next section, I review the related literature. In Section 2.3, I set out the benchmark 
model, in which only an OTC market operates in the economy. In Section 2.4, I extend the 
benchmark model to include a centralized market. In Section 2.5, I discuss the empirical 
implications of my model and conclude. 
2.2 Related Literature 
Since OTC markets are typical examples of fragmented markets, my study builds on the market 
fragmentation and transparency literature. Biais (1993), de Frutos and Manzano (2002), and Yin 
(2005) compare equilibrium outcomes, such as spreads and investors’ strategies, between 
fragmented markets and centralized markets to investigate how transparency affects market 
trading. Madhavan (1995) shows how large investors can benefit from a fragmented market that 
requires less disclosure of trades. Pagano and Roell (1996) compare a market structure based on 
auctions with a dealer market and find that investors have lower transaction costs under greater 
transparency. Those studies consider fragmented markets as completely opaque, and study 
fragmented markets and the centralized market separately. Implications in those studies are 
obtained by comparing fragmented markets with the centralized market. Gehrig (1993) and Rust 
and Hall (2003) explore the implication under the coexistence of fragmented markets and a 
centralized market. However, they do not consider how the coexistence of two market structures 
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can improve transparency in fragmented markets, since they do not allow fragmented markets to 
have varying degrees of opacity. 
 This study also contributes to the growing literature on ambiguity or Knightian uncertainty 
in market microstructure research. In a series of papers, Easley and O’Hara (2009, 2010a, 2010b) 
show how Knightian uncertainty can affect market trading, and how certain designs of the 
market microstructure can lessen Knightian uncertainty, and hence, increases market 
participation and liquidity. Easley, O’Hara, and Yang (2012) model opacity in hedge funds 
trading with ambiguity and demonstrate how regulations over opaque trading affect the welfare 
of market participants. 
 My work also links to search models that characterize OTC markets. Duffie, Garleanu, and 
Pedersen (2005, 2007) model bilateral trading in OTC markets with a search and bargaining 
model. Lagos and Rocheteau (2009) further extend the search and bargaining model to allow for 
different trade sizes. In those models, both investors and dealers search and prices are set through 
bilateral negotiations. On the other hand, Spulber (1996) and Rust and Hall (2003) provide 
another line of search models that characterizes OTC trading. In their models, only investors 
search and prices are dealers’ quotes. Though differ in modeling details, both types of models 
capture OTC trading with a search mechanism that assumes investors search in the market to 
trade. 
2.3 The Search Equilibrium in an OTC Market 
In this section, I extend the search model in Spulber (1996) by adding Knightian uncertainty. 
This extended model is used as the benchmark to characterize the OTC market. In the 
benchmark, only the OTC market operates. The economy consists of a continuum of buying 
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investors (buyers) and a continuum of selling investors (sellers). Investors’ types depend on their 
valuations of the asset. Denote ߥ஻  as the buyer’s valuation and ߥௌ as the seller’s valuation, and 
assume both ߥ஻and ߥௌ follow the uniform distribution over [0, 1]. This assumption summarizes 
the heterogeneity of the investors. I do not explore this heterogeneity, since the paper focuses on 
the trading structure not the asset valuation. The economy also consists of a continuum of 
dealers. Dealers connect the buys and sells in the OTC market, and are heterogeneous in their 
transaction costs. Denoting the dealer’s transaction cost with ݇, I assume ݇ follows a uniform 
distribution over [݇, 1] , where ݇  denotes the transaction cost for the most efficient dealer. 
Heterogeneity among transaction costs reflects the fact that dealers adopt different technologies, 
or use different pricing models for assets traded, or have different costs to finding counterparties 
for unloading extra inventory.21 
 Investors engage in a sequential search process due to fragmentation in the OTC market. 
Furthermore, they search with Knightian uncertainty due to opacity in the OTC market. That is, 
investors’ prior knowledge is a set of distributions over dealers’ quotes. In addition, investors 
adopt maxmin preferences to make their trading decisions. An alternative approach would be to 
consider opacity as risk over investors’ search processes. However, this alternative approach 
requires investors to have a prior over all possible distributions of dealers’ quotes. As investors 
rarely observe any dealer’s quote, let alone the distribution of dealers’ quotes, this alternative 
approach seems less realistic. In addition, the assumption of Knightian uncertainty and maxmin 
preferences has the interpretation that investors’ adopt robustness over their decisions. That is, 
since investors are aware of opacity in the market, they control their risk of model 
misspecification by choosing the worst outcome derived from the set of priors. 
                                               
21 In Chapter 1, I show that a dealer’s location and connectedness in the inter-dealer network affects his cost of 
unloading inventory. A more connected dealer faces less cost in unloading inventory as his markup increases with 
his numbers of links. 
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 The set of priors for investors is an ߳-contamination of historical distributions over bid and 
ask prices.22 In particular, for any given ߳, buyers have the following set of priors, 
 ࡼ࡮(߳) ≡ {(1 − ߳) ௔ܲ + ߳ߤ ∶ ߤ ∈ ࡹ},                                                  (2.1)  
where ௔ܲ	is the historical distribution of ask prices and ࡹ is the set of all probability measures on 
the Borel set of real numbers. Sellers have the following set of priors, 
 ࡼࡿ(߳) ≡ {(1 − ߳) ௕ܲ + ߳ߤ ∶ ߤ ∈ ࡹ},                                                  (2.2)  
where ௕ܲ is the historical distribution of bid prices. In either ࡼ࡮(߳) or ࡼࡿ(߳), when ߳ is zero, the 
set reduces to a unique prior, which indicates no Knightian uncertainty, and as ߳  grows, the 
degree of Knightian uncertainty increases. As Knightian uncertainty represents opacity in the 
OTC market, ߳ becomes the measure of opacity in the OTC market. Larger ߳ indicates greater 
opacity. In addition, since the core of the ߳-contamination set is the distribution of historical 
prices, the ߳ -contamination set implies that investors construct their priors by reducing the 
accountability of historical prices. The more opaque the OTC market is, the less informative 
historical prices are, and hence, investors reduce the accountability of historical prices by 
enlarging the set of priors.23 
2.3.1 Investors' Decisions 
For any given	ϵ, a buyer maximizes his minimal expected future payoff, 
 min ൜න ܫ(ܽ)݀ܲ :ܲ ∈ ࡼ࡮(߳)ൠ, (2.3)  
where ܫ(ܽ) is the discounted future payoff. More specifically, 
                                               
22 The ߳-contamination refers to the procedure of introducing a set of priors, which indicates that an ߳ × 100% 
chances the hypothetical prior is wrong. To be more specific, the set of priors ࡼ(߳) is 
 ࡼ(߳) ≡ {(1 − ߳) ଴ܲ + ߳ߤ ∶ ߤ ∈ ࡹ},  
where ଴ܲ is the hypothetical prior and ߤ is any probability distribution in the relevant space. 
23 The model assumes that the ϵ-contamination equates to Knightian uncertainty, though the former is a special case 
of the latter. 
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ܫ(ܽ) = 	 ൜ߚ௧(ߥ஻ − ܽ), if	he	trades	at	time	ݐ;0 , otherwise,  (2.4)  
in which ߚ is the discount factor. 
 By Schmeidler (1989), the buyer’s objective function equals the Choquet integral of 
discounted future payoff ܫ(ܽ) with respect to a convex probability capacity ߠ௔, which means 
 min ൜න ܫ(ܽ)݀ܲ :ܲ ∈ ࡼ࡮(߳)ൠ = නܫ(ܽ)݀ߠ௔ . (2.5)  
ߠ௔ is, for any given measurable set ܧ, 
 ߠ௔(ܧ) = ൜(1 − ߳) ௔ܲ(ܧ), if	ܧ ≠ ߗ;1 , if	ܧ = ߗ , (2.6)  
in which Ω represents all asks. 
 As shown in Nishimura and Ozaki (2004), the Bellman equation associated with the above 
problem is, 
 
ܸ஻(ܽ, ߥ஻) = max ൜0, ߥ஻ − ܽ	,ߚනܸ஻( ොܽ, ߥ஻)݀ߠ௔ൠ . (2.7)  
In Eq.(2.7), ܸ஻(ܽ) is the value function for the buyer who has an ask offer ܽ at hand, and ොܽ is his 
next randomly received ask if he continues to search. ܸ஻(ܽ) reflects the choices that the buyer 
has: (i) do nothing; (ii) accept the dealer's ask; (iii) reject the ask price and continue to search. 
Obviously, if the buyer has ߥ஻ ≤ ܽ (ܽ is the lower bound of the ask prices offered by dealers), he 
will never trade or search.24 When ߥ஻ > 	 ܽ, the optimal search strategy for the buyer is to accept 
any ask greater than his reservation buying price. The reservation buying price ݎ஻(ߥ஻) is the 
solution to the following equation, 
                                               
24 For technical reasons, I assume that when a trader is indifferent between trading in the market or not, he chooses 
not to trade. That is, when a buyer has valuation ߥ஻ = ܽ he quits, and when a seller has valuation ߥௌ = 	 ܾ he quits. ܾ 
is the upper bound of bids offered by dealers.  
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ߥ஻ = ݎ஻(ߥ஻) + ߚ1 − ߚන ߠ௔[ܽ ≤ ොܽ]݀ ොܽ௥ಳ൫ఔಳ൯௔ . (2.8)  
 According to Nishimura and Ozaki (2004), Eq.(2.8) is equal to the following equation, 
 
ߥ஻ = ݎ஻(ߥ஻) + ߚ(1 − ߳)1 − ߚ න ௔ܲ[ܽ ≤ ොܽ]݀ ොܽ௥ಳ൫ఔಳ൯௔ . (2.9)  
Applying the Implicit Function Theorem, ݎ஻(ߥ஻) is a strictly increasing function of ߥ஻on the 
interval	൫ߥ஻ , 1൧. The lower bound of the interval ߥ஻ denotes  the valuation of the marginal buyer 
whose gain from trading is zero, i.e., ߥ஻ = ܽ = ݎ஻൫ߥ஻൯.	  
 Similarly, I derive the seller’s reservation price, which is the solution of the following 
equation 
 
ߥௌ = ݎௌ(ߥௌ) − ߚ(1 − ߳)1 − ߚ න ௕ܲൣܾ ≥ ෠ܾ൧݀ ෠ܾ௕௥ೄ൫ఔೄ൯ . (2.10)  
 ݎௌ(ߥௌ) strictly increases on the interval	ൣ0, ߥௌ൯, ߥௌ denotes the valuation of the marginal seller 
whose gain from trading is zero, i.e., ߥௌ = 	 ܾ 	= 	 ݎௌ൫ߥௌ൯.  
2.3.2 Dealers' Decisions 
Since ߥ஻  is uniformly distributed on ൫ߥ஻ , 1൧ and ݎ஻(ߥ஻) is monotone on the interval ൫ߥ஻ , 1൧, by 
change of variables, the density of the reservation buying prices is 
 ݂஻(ݎ஻) = ଵିఉାிೌ ൫௥ಳ൯(ଵିఢ)ఉ(ଵିఉ)൫ଵିఔಳ൯ . (2.11)  
Analogously, the density of the reservation selling prices is  
 
݂ௌ(ݎௌ) = ଵିఉାቀଵିி್൫௥ೄ൯ቁ(ଵିఢ)ఉ(ଵିఉ)ఔೄ . (2.12)  
 A dealer posts stationary bid and ask to maximize his expected discounted profits. In the 
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meantime, the dealer has to maintain his inventory position, which means that his expected 
demand must equal his expected supply.25  
 As ܰ is the total population of dealers operating in the market, ଵିఔ
ಳ
ே
݂஻(ݎ஻) represents the 
density of buyers for every dealer. The number of buyers who have reservation price ݎ஻ visiting 
the dealer is as follows: 1 at date-0, ௔ܲ[ܽ ≥ ݎ஻] at date-1, ௔ܲଶ[ܽ ≥ ݎ஻] at date-2, ..., ௔ܲ௧[ܽ ≥ ݎ஻] 
at date-ݐ. If the dealer sets the ask to ܽ, then the market demand at time ݐ is 
 
ܦ௧(ܽ) = 1 − ߥ஻ܰ න ௔ܲ௧[ܽ ≥ ݎ஻]݂஻(ݎ஻)݀ݎ஻௔௔
= 1ܰ න ൫1 − ܨ௔(ݎ஻)൯௧(1 − ߚ + ܨ௔(ݎ஻)(1 − ߳)ߚ)1 − ߚ ݀ݎ஻௔௔ , 
(2.13)  
in which ܽ is the upper bound of asks in the OTC market. 
 By an analogous derivation, the date-ݐ supply associated with the bid price ܾ is, 
 
௧ܵ(ܾ) = 1ܰ න ܨ௕௧(ݎௌ)൫1 − ߚ + ൫1 − ܨ௕(ݎௌ)൯(1 − ߳)ߚ൯1 − ߚ ݀ݎௌ௕௕ , (2.14)  
where ܾ is the lower bound of bids in OTC markets. 
 Given demand ܦ௧(ܽ) and supply 	 ௧ܵ(ܾ), the dealer's objective is 
 max
ୟ,ୠ ෍ߚ௧൫ܽܦ௧(ܽ) − (ܾ + ݇) ௧ܵ(ܾ)൯ஶ
௧ୀ଴
, (2.15)  
subject to 
 ܦ௧(ܽ) = ௧ܵ(ܾ). (2.16)  
In the above, the dealer matches his demand with his supply. The interpretation is that the dealer 
                                               
25 Spulber (1996), Rust and Hall (2003), Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005, (2007), and Lagos and Rocheteau 
(2009) use the same assumption in their search models. 
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tries to maintain a preferred inventory level. Whenever the dealer is off his preferred inventory 
level because of trading with investors, he tries to retain the preferred level by trading with 
investors on the opposite side of the market. 
2.3.3 The Stationary Search Equilibrium 
Proposition 2.1 describes the stationary search equilibrium in the OTC market, in which 
investors maximize their minimum expected payoffs, and dealers maximize their expected 
profits. 
Proposition 2.1 [The Benchmark Equilibrium] 
 For any given ߳, there exists a continuously differentiable symmetric equilibrium pricing 
policy, ܽ(݇),ܾ(݇), with ܽ(݇) increasing and ܾ(݇) decreasing in ݇ for all ݇ ≤ 	݇	 < 	 ݇∗, where 
݇∗ denotes the marginal dealer whose profit margin and trading volume are zeros. The pricing 
policy functions satisfy 
 
ܽ(݇) = ݁ି∫ ௒(௭)ௗ௭ೖ∗ೖ ቆ݇∗ + 12	
+ න ቆ−14 + 1 + ݖ2 ܻ(ݖ)ቇ ݁∫ ௒(௨)ௗ௨ೖ∗೥ ݀ݖ௞∗௞ ቇ,	 
(2.17)  
 ܾ(݇) = 1 − ܽ(݇), (2.18)  
 ݇∗ = ܽ(݇∗) − ܾ(݇∗), (2.19)  
in which 
 
ܻ(ݖ) = ߚ2൫݇∗ − ݇൯൮ 11 − ߚ(݇∗ − ݖ)݇∗ − ݇ − 1 − ߳1 − ߚ + ݖ − ݇݇∗ − ݇ (1 − ߳)ߚ൲, 
(2.20)  
and ݇∗ is the solution to the following equation 
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 1 = ݇∗ + 12 + ߚ(1 − ߳)1 − ߚ ቆ݇∗ + 12 − 1݇∗ − ݇න ܽ(݇)݀݇௞∗௞ ቇ. (2.21)  
 In the stationary equilibrium, the historical distributions of prices coincide with the 
equilibrium distributions of prices. The equilibrium obtained above is conceptually similar to the 
rational expectations equilibrium as the equilibrium prices confirm investors’ set of priors. 
However in terms of the equilibrium outcomes, the equilibrium is different from the rational 
expectations equilibrium. In equilibrium, investors’ predictions on prices systematically deviate 
from the equilibrium prices, whereas in the rational expectations equilibrium, investors’ 
predictions on prices are self-fulfilling. These systematic deviations in the equilibrium of this 
model depend on opacity in the OTC market. When the OTC market is fully transparent, the 
equilibrium becomes the rational expectations equilibrium obtained in Spulber (1996). 
2.3.4 Comparative Statics 
The price system in Proposition 2.1 is non-linear, and therefore, the analytical solution for the 
price system does not generally exist. Hence, I show the comparative statics numerically. Setting 
ߚ = 0.9 and ݇ = 0.005, I solve the equilibrium with ߳ ranging from 0 to 0.5.26  
                                               
26 I obtain similar results with other assigned parameter values. 
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Figure 2.1: Comparative Statics of the Average Bid-Ask Spread 
Figure 2.1 shows the comparative statics of the average bid-ask spread in the search equilibrium of Proposition 2.1 
with respect to ߳. The parameters are ߚ = 0.9, and ݇ = 0.005. 
 Figure 2.1 shows that the average bid-ask spread in the OTC market increases as ϵ increases. 
As ߳  represents the degree of opacity in the OTC market, the increasing ߳  indicates greater 
opacity in the OTC market. Thus, Figure 2.1 shows that when the OTC market becomes more 
opaque, the average bid-ask spread increases. 
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Figure 2.2: Comparative Statics of the Total Population of Dealers and Investors 
Figure 2.2 shows the comparative statics of the total population of dealers and investors in equilibrium of 
Proposition 1 with respect to ߳ . The parameters are the same as in Figure 2.1. The left panel plots the total 
population of dealers in equilibrium, and the right panel plots the total population of investors in equilibrium. 
 Figure 2.2 illustrates how changes in ߳ alter the demography in the economy. The left panel 
of Figure 2.2 shows that the total population of dealers in the OTC market increases as ߳ 
increases, whereas the right panel of Figure 2.2 shows the total population of investors in the 
OTC market decrease as ߳ increases. This means that the impact of opacity on the OTC market is 
two fold. On one hand, greater opacity encourages the participation of dealers; on the other hand, 
greater opacity discourages the participation of investors. 
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Figure 2.3: The Ask Price in the Opaque OTC Market versus in the Transparent OTC Market 
Figure 2.3 compares the equilibrium asks between the opaque OTC market (߳ = 0.5) and the transparent OTC 
market (߳ = 0). Solid lines illustrate the asks when the OTC market is opaque, while dashed lines show the asks 
when the OTC market is transparent. The left panel shows the equilibrium asks, and the right panel shows the 
empirical cumulative density functions of the asks. 
 To decompose comparative results in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2, I compare the ask prices 
when the OTC market is transparent (that is, when ߳ = 0) with the ask prices when the OTC 
market is opaque (that is, when	߳ > 0). Figure 2.3 shows the results from this comparison. In the 
right panel of Figure 2.3, I find that the cumulative density function of asks shifts toward the 
right when	߳ > 0. The shift means that buyers are more likely to receive higher asks from dealers 
when the OTC market is opaque, i.e., ߳ > 0. Since in equilibrium,	ܾ(݇) = 	1 − ܽ(݇), the dealer 
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who increases his ask also decreases his bid. Hence, when the OTC market is opaque, all 
operating dealers' bid-ask spreads become larger. Consequently, the increasing bid-ask spreads 
discourage investors to trade, since their trading costs increase. 
 
Figure 2.4: Reservation Prices in the Opaque OTC Market versus in the Transparent Market 
Figure 2.4 compares investors’ reservation values between the opaque OTC market (߳ = 0.5) and the transparent 
OTC market (߳ = 0). Solid lines show the reservation values when the OTC market is opaque, and dashed lines 
show the reservation values when the OTC market is transparent. The left panel illustrates buyers’ reservation 
buying prices, and the right panel illustrates sellers’ reservation selling prices 
 The force driving results in Figure 2.3 is the decrease of the search value in the opaque OTC 
market. In Figure 2.4, I compare investors’ reservation values between different opacity regimes 
in the OTC market. I show that buyers' reservation buying prices are higher, and sellers' 
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reservation selling prices are lower, when ߳ > 0. That is, buyers are willing to buy at higher 
prices and sellers are willing to sell at lower prices when the OTC market is opaque. These 
results imply that the search value is lower in the opaque OTC market. The OTC market opacity 
increases investors’ uncertainty on outside options.27 As investors become uncertain about their 
outside options, they are willing to accept worse offers. As a result , bid-ask spreads increase 
with the degree of opacity. 
2.3.5 The Welfare Analysis 
I define the gains from trade as the sum of investors' surplus 
 
න (ߥ஻ − ݎ஻(ߥ஻)݀ߥ஻ଵ
ఔಳ
+ න (ݎௌ(ߥௌ) − ߥௌ)݀ߥௌఔೄ
଴
. (2.22)  
 Figure 2.5 shows how changes in ߳ change investors’ total surplus and dealers’ total profits. 
The left panel of Figure 2.5 shows that as ߳ increases, investors' surplus decreases. This means 
that the gains from trade decrease under greater opacity. While investors suffer from opacity, 
dealers benefit from opacity. In the right panel of Figure 2.5, I show dealers' total profits increase 
as ߳ increases. The result that dealers are better off in the opaque OTC market is consistent with 
Madhavan (1995) and Yin (2005).  
                                               
27 Uncertainty here refers to Knightian uncertainty. 
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Figure 2.5: Comparative Statics on the Welfare of the Participants 
Figure 2.5 shows the comparative statics of the welfare in equilibrium of Proposition 2.1 with respect to ߳ . 
Parameters are the same as in Figure 2.1. The left panel plots investors’ surplus, and the right panel plots dealers’ 
total profits. 
 The welfare analysis indicates that though reducing opacity decreases trading costs and 
increases market efficiency, it harms the dealers in the OTC market. As a result, dealers who are 
vital in connecting buys and sells in the OTC market, oppose reducing opacity.  
2.4 Stationary Search Equilibriums with a Centralized Market 
In this section, I show that having a competitive centralized market to compete with the OTC 
market provides incentives for dealers to reduce the opacity of the latter. In the model, the 
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centralized market is a trading venue. On the venue, there are ݉ market makers with transaction 
costs ܭଵ,ܭଶ, … ,ܭ௠. To endogenize those market makers, I assume that those market makers are 
randomly chosen from OTC dealers to operate in the centralized market. It is convenient to 
visualize this assumption as policy makers grant some OTC dealers licenses to make market in 
the centralized market. Those dealers who receive permission set up two trading desks, with one 
in charge of OTC trading and the other in charge of centralized trading. Each trading desk 
maximizes its own profits. To differentiate dealers’ intermediary services on the centralized 
market from their intermediation services in the OTC market, the dealers’ trading desks on 
centralized trading are referred to as “market makers.” In the centralized market, market makers 
post publicly available asks and bids.  
2.4.1 Investors' Decisions under the Existence of the Centralized Market 
Investors have an additional option that is to trade in the centralized market. This additional 
option changes investors’ trading decisions. Specifically, a buyer who has not yet chosen to 
search has three options: (i) do nothing; (ii) buy a unit of asset in the centralized market at price 
ܽ௖; (iii) search for a better price in the OTC market. Hence, the buyer's value function before he 
searches is 
 
ܹ஻(ܽ௖ , ߥ஻) = max ൜0, ߥ஻ − ܽ௖ ,ߚනܸ஻( ොܽ, ܽ௖ , ߥ஻)݀ߠ௔ൠ, (2.23)  
in which ܸ஻( ොܽ, ܽ௖ , ߥ஻) denotes the value function for the buyer when he searches in the OTC 
market and ොܽ  is the next random ask received. Once the buyer starts to search in the OTC 
market, he has the fourth option of accepting the current ask, ܽ. The buyer’s value function when 
he searches is 
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ܸ஻(ܽ,ܽ௖ , ߥ஻) = max ൜0, ߥ஻ − ܽ, ߥ஻ − ܽ௖ ,ߚනܸ஻( ොܽ,ܽ௖ , ߥ஻)݀ߠ௔ൠ. (2.24)  
 Similarly, the seller’s value function before he searches is 
 
ܹௌ(ܾ௖ , ߥௌ) = max ൜0, ܾ௖ − ߥௌ ,ߚනܸௌ൫෠ܾ, ܾ௖ , ߥௌ൯݀ߠ௕ൠ , (2.25)  
in which ܸௌ൫෠ܾ, ܾ௖ , ߥௌ൯ denotes the value function for the seller if he decides to search in the OTC 
market and ෠ܾ is the next random bid received. And the seller’s value function when he searches 
is 
 
ܸௌ(ܾ, ܾ௖ , ߥௌ) = max ൜0,ܾ − ߥௌ , ܾ௖ − ߥௌ ,ߚනܸௌ൫෠ܾ, ܾ௖ , ߥௌ൯݀ߠ௕ൠ, (2.26)  
in which ܾ is the current bid. 
 From buyers and sellers’ value functions when they search (Eq.(2.24) and Eq.(2.26)), if all 
dealers' asks are lower than the centralized market’s ask, and if all bids are higher than the 
centralized market's bid, then in equilibrium no trader trades in the centralized market. On the 
other hand, if no dealer can offer an ask lower than the centralized market’s ask, and if no dealer 
can bid higher than the centralized market’s bid, then in equilibrium all investors trade in the 
centralized market. The intermediate stage is when some but not all dealers are able to offer 
lower asks and higher bids than the centralized market. In this case, some investors trade in the 
centralized market and some trade in the OTC market. I start the analysis from this intermediate 
stage equilibrium, since the other two are extreme cases of the intermediate stage equilibrium. 
2.4.2 The Equilibrium in which an OTC Market Coexists with a Centralized Market 
2.4.2.1 Investors’ Decisions 
As discussed above, no dealer can survive by posting an ask ܽ higher than the ask from the 
centralized market ܽ௖. Thus, ܽ௖ is the upper bound of asks in the OTC market. Let ܽ be the lower 
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bound of asks in the OTC market. The buyer’s value function when he searches (Eq.(2.24)) 
implies that any buyer with ߥ஻ ≤ ܽ will never trade. Hence, ܽ determines the marginal buyer. 
That is, ܽ = ߥ஻ where ߥ஻ is the marginal buyer's valuation of the asset. 
 For the buyer whose reservation value equals ܽ௖ when he searches, let ߥ
஻ be his valuation of 
the asset. Proposition 2.2 describes buyers' optimal strategies in choosing which market to trade 
in. 
Proposition 2.2 
A buyer's optimal strategy depending on his type ߥ஻  is as follows: 
i) if ߥ஻ ∈ ൣߥ஻ , 1൧, then it is optimal for the buyer to bypass the OTC market and purchase 
the asset immediately from the centralized market at the ask price ܽ௖; 
ii) if ߥ஻ ∈ ൫ߥ஻ , ߥ஻൯, then it is optimal for the buyer to trade in the  OTC market; 
iii) if ߥ஻ ∈ ൣ0, ߥ஻൧, then it is not optimal for the buyer to trade in the centralized market or 
in the  OTC market. 
 When ߥ஻ ∈ ൫ߥ஻ , ߥ஻൯, the buyer's optimal search strategy is a reservation price policy with 
the reservation price implicitly defined as 
 
ߥ஻ = ݎ஻(ߥ஻) + ߚ(1 − ߳)1 − ߚ න ௔ܲ[ܽ ≤ ොܽ]݀ ොܽ௥ಳ൫ఔಳ൯௔ . (2.27)  
By the Implicit Function Theorem, ݎ஻(ߥ஻) is monotone on ൫ߥ஻ , ߥ஻൯. Thus, Eq.(2.27) implies 
 
ߥ஻ = ܽ௖ + ߚ(1 − ߳)1 − ߚ න ௔ܲ[ܽ ≤ ොܽ]݀ ොܽ௔೎௔ . (2.28)  
 Likewise, Proposition 2.3 describes sellers’ optimal strategies in choosing which market to 
trade in. In Proposition 2.3, ߥௌ denotes the seller with reservation value equal to the centralized 
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market’s bid, ܾ௖, and ߥ
ௌ is the marginal seller whose gain from trading is zero. 
Proposition 2.3 
A seller's optimal strategy depending on his type ߥௌ is as follows: 
i) if ߥௌ ∈ ൣߥௌ , 1൧, then it is not optimal for the seller to trade in the centralized market nor 
in the OTC market; 
ii) if ߥௌ ∈ ൫ߥௌ, ߥௌ൯, then it is optimal for the seller to trade in the  OTC market; 
iii) if ߥௌ ∈ ൣ0, ߥௌ൧, then it is optimal for the seller to bypass the OTC market and sell the 
asset immediately in the centralized market at the bid price ܾ௖. 
 From the above, when ߥௌ ∈ ൫ߥௌ, ߥௌ൯, the seller's optimal search strategy is a reservation 
price policy, and the reservation price is implicitly defined as the follows, 
 
ߥௌ = ݎௌ(ߥௌ) − ߚ(1 − ߳)1 − ߚ න ௕ܲൣܾ ≥ ෠ܾ൧݀ ෠ܾ௕௥ೄ൫ఔೄ൯ . (2.29)  
Similarly, ݎௌ(ߥௌ) is a strictly increasing function of ߥௌ on the interval ൫ߥௌ, ߥௌ൯ by the Implicit 
Function Theorem. Thus, ߥௌ is defined as 
 
ߥௌ = ܾ௖ − ߚ(1 − ߳)1 − ߚ න ௕ܲൣܾ ≥ ෠ܾ൧݀ ෠ܾ௕௕೎ . (2.30)  
2.4.2.2 Dealers' Decisions 
With an analogous derivation in Section 2.3,  the demand and supply for a dealer at time ݐ are, 
 
ܦ௧
஽(ܽ) = 1ܰ஽න ൫1 − ܨ௔(ݎ஻)൯௧൫1 − ߚ + ܨ௔(ݎ஻)൯(1 − ߳)ߚ1 − ߚ ݀ݎ஻௔೎௔ , (2.31)  
 
௧ܵ
஽(ܾ) = 1ܰ஽න ܨ௕௧(ݎௌ) ቀ1 − ߚ + ൫1 − ܨ௕(ݎௌ)൯ቁ (1 − ߳)ߚ1 − ߚ ݀ݎௌ௕௕೎ , (2.32)  
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in which ܰ஽  is the total population of the surviving dealers. With the constraint of keeping 
demand equal to supply, a dealer  maximizes his expected discounted profits. That is, 
 max
௔,௕ ෍ߚ௧൫ܽܦ௧஽(ܽ) − (ܾ + ݇) ௧ܵ஽(ܾ)൯,ஶ
௧ୀ଴
 
(2.33)  
subject to 
 ܦ௧஽(ܽ) = ௧ܵ஽(ܾ). (2.34)  
2.4.2.3 Market Makers’ Decisions and the Competitiveness of the Centralized Market 
All market makers post asks and bids in the centralized market, and all asks and bids are public. 
Publicly available prices imply that only one market maker intermediates in the centralized 
market. The most efficient market maker (who has the lowest transaction cost) charges a bid-ask 
spread that is less than or equal to the next most efficient market maker’s transaction cost to 
become the single market maker in the centralized market. Call this single market maker the 
“winning market maker.” Denoting ܭ(ଶ) as the second order statistic of {ܭଵ,ܭଶ, … ,ܭ௠}, the bid-
ask spread in the centralized market satisfies the following condition, 
 ܽ௖ − ܾ௖ ≤ ܭ(ଶ). (2.35)  
 From Proposition 2.2, market demand for the centralized market is, 
 
ܦ஼(ܽ௖) = 1 − ߥ஻൫ܽ,ܽ௖൯ = 1 − ܽ௖ − ߚ(1 − ߳)1 − ߚ න ௔ܲ[ܽ < ොܽ]݀ ොܽ௔೎௔ . (2.36)  
From Proposition 2.3, market supply for the centralized market is, 
 
ܵ஼(ܾ௖) = ߥௌ൫ܾ௖ , ܾ൯ = ܾ௖ − ߚ(1 − ߳)1 − ߚ න ௕ܲൣܾ > ෠ܾ൧݀ ෠ܾ௕௕೎ . (2.37)  
 The winning market maker chooses ܽ௖ and ܾ௖ to maximize his expected discounted profits. 
That is, 
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 max
௔೎,௕೎ ܽ௖ܦ஼(ܽ௖) − ൫ܾ௖ + ܭ(ଵ)൯ܵ஼(ܾ௖), (2.38)  
subject to 
 ܦ஼(ܽ௖) = ܵ஼(ܾ௖), (2.39)  
 ܽ௖ − ܾ௖ ≤ ܭ(ଶ), (2.40)  
in which ܭ(ଵ)  , the winning market maker’s transaction cost, is the first order statistic of {ܭଵ,ܭଶ, … ,ܭ௠}. 
 Two sets of solutions arise from the above maximization problem. The first set is the corner 
solution, in which the inequality (2.40) binds. This indicates that the centralized market is 
competitive. The winning market maker has to post a bid-ask spread equaling ܭ(ଶ) to deter the 
entry of other market makers. The second set is the interior solution, in which the inequality 
(2.40) is not binding. This indicates that the centralized market is not competitive. The most 
efficient market maker, the winning market maker, becomes a natural monopoly whose action 
does not depend on other market makers. Unlike the corner solution where the bid-ask spread 
equals ܭ(ଶ), the bid-ask spread in this case depends on ܭ(ଵ). Hence, given ݇, ߳, and ߚ, whether 
the winning market maker’s profit maximization is the corner solution or the interior solution 
depends on ܭ(ଵ)	and	ܭ(ଶ). 
2.4.2.4 Stationary Search Equilibriums 
Depending on market makers’ transaction costs, there are two equilibriums. In the following, I 
first describe the equilibrium when the winning market maker is forced to choose the corner 
solution because of competition. I then show the equilibrium when the winning market maker 
chooses the interior solution, as the centralized market is not competitive. Finally, I compare 
these two equilibriums. 
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 Proposition 2.4 characterizes the equilibrium when the winning market maker’s profit 
maximization generates the corner solution. 
Proposition 2.4 [The Corner Equilibrium] 
For any given ߳, there exists a continuously differentiable symmetric equilibrium pricing 
policy, ܽ(݇) and ܾ(݇), with ܽ(݇) increasing and ܾ(݇) decreasing in ݇ for all ݇ ≤ ݇ < ܭ(ଶ). The 
pricing policy functions satisfy, 
 
ܽ(݇) = ݁ି∫ ௒(௭)ௗ௭	಼(మ)ೖ ቆܭ(ଶ) + 12
+ න ൭− 14 + (1 + ݖ)2 ܻ(ݖ)൱݁∫ ௒(௨)ௗ௨಼(మ)೥ ݀ݖ௄(మ)௞೏ ቇ, 
(2.41)  
 ܾ(݇) = 1 − ܽ(݇), (2.42)  
in which 
 
ܻ(ݖ) = ߚ2൫ܭ(ଶ) − ݇൯
⎝
⎜
⎛ 11 − ߚ൫ܭ(ଶ) − ݖ൯ܭ(ଶ) − ݇
−
1 − ߳1 − ߚ + ݖ − ݇ܭ(ଶ) − ݇ (1 − ߳)ߚ⎠⎟
⎞, 
(2.43)  
The centralized market prices are 
 
ܽ௖ = ܭ(ଶ) + 12 , (2.44)  
 ܾ௖ = 1 − ܽ௖ . (2.45)  
 Proposition 2.5 characterizes the equilibrium where the winner’s profit maximization 
generates the interior solution. 
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Proposition 2.5 [The Interior Equilibrium] 
For any given ߳ , there exists a continuously differentiable symmetric equilibrium pricing 
policy, ܽ(݇)  and ܾ(݇) , with ܽ(݇)  increasing and ܾ(݇)  decreasing in ݇  for all ݇ ≤ ݇ < ݇∗∗ , 
where ݇∗∗ denotes the marginal dealer whose profit and trading volumes are zero. The pricing 
policy functions satisfy, 
 
ܽ(݇) = ݁ି∫ ௒(௭)ௗ௭	ೖ∗∗ೖ ቆ݇∗∗ + 12
+ න ൭− 14 + (1 + ݖ)2 ܻ(ݖ)൱݁∫ ௒(௨)ௗ௨ೖ∗∗೥ ݀ݖ௞∗∗௞೏ ቇ, 
(2.46)  
 ܾ(݇) = 1 − ܽ(݇), (2.47)  
 ݇∗∗ = ܽ(݇∗∗) − ܾ(݇∗∗), (2.48)  
in which 
 
ܻ(ݖ) = ߚ2൫݇∗∗ − ݇൯൮ 11 − ߚ(݇∗∗ − ݖ)݇∗∗ − ݇
−
1 − ߳1 − ߚ + ݖ − ݇݇∗∗ − ݇ (1 − ߳)ߚ൲. 
(2.49)  
The centralized market prices are 
 ܽ௖ = ܽ(݇∗∗), (2.50)  
 ܾ௖ = 1 − ܽ௖ . (2.51)  
݇∗∗ is defined as follows 
 77 
 
݇∗∗ = arg max
௞෨ ∈൫௞,௄(మ)൯൫෨݇ − ܭ(ଵ)൯ ቌ1 − ෨݇ + 12
−
ߚ(1 − ߳)1 − ߚ ቆ෨݇ + 12 − 1෨݇ − ݇න ܽ(݇)݀݇௞෨௞ ቇቍ, 
(2.52)  
in which ෨݇  represents the winning market maker’s bid-ask spread. 
 To determine cases under which each equilibrium will manifest, I first solve the interior 
equilibrium but without the competitive constraint, i.e., ܽ௖ − ܾ௖ ≤ ܭ(ଶ) . Let ݇௨∗∗  denote the 
solution. If ݇௨∗∗ ≥ ܭ(ଶ), then the corner equilibrium will manifest, as other market makers can 
undercut the winning market maker’s unconstrained spread ݇௨∗∗. If ݇௨∗∗ < ܭ(ଶ), then the interior 
equilibrium will manifest. 
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Figure 2.6: Equilibrium Selection when the Centralized Market Coexists with the OTC Market 
Figure 2.6 shows equilibrium selection when both the OTC market and the centralized market operate in the 
economy. When ܭ(ଵ) and ܭ(ଶ) lie in the green region, the equilibrium is the corner equilibrium. When ܭ(ଵ) and ܭ(ଶ) 
lie in the yellow region, the equilibrium is the interior equilibrium. Parameters are ߳ = 0.5,ߚ = 0.9. 
 Given ݇, ߳, and ߚ fixed, ݇௨∗∗ depends only on ܭ(ଵ). Thus, the pair of ܭ(ଵ) and ܭ(ଶ) determines 
which equilibrium emerges. With ߳ = 0.5,݇ = 0.005, and ߚ = 0.9, Figure 2.6 shows for which 
pairs of ܭ(ଵ) and ܭ(ଶ) the corner equilibrium emerges, and for which pairs of ܭ(ଵ) and ܭ(ଶ) the 
interior equilibrium emerges.  
2.4.2.5 Comparative Statics in the Corner Equilibrium 
Setting ߚ = 0.9,݇ = 0.005,ܭ(ଵ) = 0.29, and ܭ(ଶ) = 0.3, I solve the equilibrium with ߳ ranging 
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from 0 to 0.5.28  
 
Figure 2.7: Comparative Statics of the Average Bid-Ask Spread in the Corner Equilibrium 
Figure 2.7 shows the comparative statics of the average bid-ask spread in corner equilibrium with respect to ߳. The 
parameters are ߚ = 0.9, ݇ = 0.005,ܭ(ଵ) = 0.29, and ܭ(ଶ) = 0.3. 
 Figure 2.7 shows that the average bid-ask spread in the OTC market decreases as ߳ 
increases. This means that the average spread shrinks when the OTC market becomes more 
opaque. This result differs from the finding in Section 2.3, where greater opacity enlarges the 
average spread (see Figure 2.1). 
                                               
28 Numerical results are robust to parameter choices. 
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Figure 2.8: Comparative Statics of the Demographics in the Corner Equilibrium 
Figure 2.8 shows the comparative statics of the demographics in the corner with respect to ߳. The parameters are 
the same as in Figure 2.7. The left panel plots the total population of dealers in equilibrium, and the right panel 
plots the total population of investors in equilibrium 
 In Figure 2.8, I show that how dealers and investors respond to changes in ߳. The left panel 
of  Figure 2.8 shows that the total population of dealers is independent of changes in ߳, while the 
right panel of Figure 2.8 shows that the total population of investors increases as ߳ increases. The 
increase in the total population of investors with larger ߳ implies that more investors participate 
in trading when the OTC market gets more opaque. These results again differ from the finding in 
Section 2.3, where greater opacity discourages investors to participate. 
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Figure 2.9: Comparative Statics of Investors' Participation in the Corner Equilibrium 
Figure 2.9 shows the comparative statics of investors’ distribution between the OTC market and the centralized 
market in the corner equilibrium with respect to ߳. The parameters are the same as in Figure 2.7. The left panel 
plots the total population of investors in the OTC market, and the right panel plots the total population of investors 
in the centralized market 
 To understand different results obtained here, I compute the distribution of investors 
between the OTC market and the centralized market under different degrees of opacity (߳). From 
the left panel in Figure 2.9, trades in the OTC market decrease as ߳ increases, whereas the right 
panel in Figure 2.9 shows that trades in the centralized market increase as ߳  increases. This 
implies that investors migrate to the centralized market when the OTC market gets more opaque. 
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Figure 2.10: Reservation Prices in the Corner Equilibrium 
Figure 2.10 compares investors’ reservation values between the opaque OTC market (߳ = 0.5) and the transparent 
OTC market (߳ = 0) in the corner equilibrium. Solid lines show the reservation values when the OTC market is 
opaque, and dashed lines show the reservation values when the OTC market is transparent. The left panel plots 
buyers’ reservation buying prices, and the right panel plots sellers’ reservation selling prices 
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Figure 2.11: The Ask and Bid Price in the Corner Equilibrium 
Figure 2.11 compares the asks and bids between the opaque OTC market (߳ = 0.5) and the transparent OTC market 
(߳ = 0) in the corner equilibrium. Solid lines are the asks and bids under the opaque OTC market, and dashed lines 
are the asks and bids under the transparent OTC market. The left part are the asks (the upper plot) and bids (the 
bottom part), and the right part are empirical cumulative density functions of the asks (the upper plot) and bids (the 
bottom part). 
 The migration of investors highlights how the existence of the centralized market affects 
equilibrium outcomes. Analogous to the benchmark model in Section 2.3, when the OTC market 
becomes more opaque, the value of search decreases which leads to changes in investors’ 
reservation values (as shown in Figure 2.10). However, in contrast to the benchmark model, 
investors here have an additional option –– trading in the centralized market. Thus, when the 
search value decreases, rather than negotiating with dealers under ambiguous outside options, 
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investors choose to trade in the centralized market. Furthermore, Figure 2.10 shows that high 
valuation buyers and low valuation sellers suffer the most from greater opacity. Hence, most 
migrants are high valuation buyers and low valuation sellers. The remaining buyers in the OTC 
market are with low valuations, and the remaining sellers are with high valuations. This forces 
dealers to lower their asks and increase their bids to accommodate the remaining investors. In 
addition, dealers want to attract more trading with smaller bid-ask spreads. Figure 2.11 verifies 
these changes in dealers’ asks and bids. 
 Defining the gains from trade as the sum of investors' surplus 
 
න (ߥ஻ − ܽ௖)݀ߥ஻ + න (ܾ௖ − ߥௌ)݀ߥௌఔೄ
଴
ଵ
ఔಳᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ீ௔௜௡௦	௙௥௢௠	்௥௔ௗ௜௡௚	௜௡	௧௛௘	஼௘௡௧௥௔௟௜௭௘ௗ	ெ௔௥௞௘௧
+ න ൫ߥ஻ − ݎ஻(ߥ஻)൯݀ߥ஻ఔಳ
ఔಳ
+ න (ݎௌ(ߥௌ) − ߥௌ)݀ߥௌఔೄ
ఔೄᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ீ௔௜௡௦	௙௥௢௠	்௥௔ௗ௜௡௚	௜௡	௧௛௘	ை்஼	ெ௔௥௞௘௧
, 
(2.53)  
I show the welfare changes of investors, dealers, and the winning market maker in Figure 2.12. 
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Figure 2.12: Comparative Statics of the Welfare in the Corner Equilibrium 
Figure 2.12 shows the comparative statics of the welfare in the corner equilibrium with respect to ߳. Parameters are 
the same as in Figure 2.7. The left panel plots investors’ surplus, the middle panel plots dealers’ total profits, and the 
right panel plots the market maker’s profits 
 The left panel of Figure 2.12 shows that the gains from trade decrease as ߳ increases. This is 
because opacity makes it more costly to trade. The middle panel of Figure 2.12 shows that 
dealers’ total profits decrease as ߳  increases. This is because dealers have less volume and 
smaller bid-ask spreads. The right panel of Figure 2.12 shows the winning market maker’s 
profits increase as ߳ increases. This is because more investors migrate to the centralized market 
due to greater opacity in the OTC market. These results indicate that when there is a competitive 
centralized market in equilibrium, greater opacity implies losses not only to investors, but also to 
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dealers. Hence, introducing a competitive centralized market to the economy is an effective 
approach to provide an incentive for dealers to reduce opacity in the OTC market. 
2.4.2.6 Comparative Statics for the Interior Equilibrium 
Setting ߚ = 0.9,݇ = 0.005,ܭ(ଵ) = 0.009, and ܭ(ଶ) = 0.3, I solve the equilibrium with ߳ ranging 
from 0 to 0.5.29  
 
Figure 2.13: Comparative Statics of the Average Bid-Ask Spread in the Interior Equilibrium 
Figure 2.13 shows the comparative statics of the average bid-ask spread in the interior equilibrium with respect to 
߳. The parameters are ߚ = 0.9,݇ = 0.005,ܭ(ଵ) = 0.009, and ܭ(ଶ) = 0.3. 
 Figure 2.13 shows that how the average bid-ask spread in the OTC market and the spread in 
                                               
29 Numerical results are robust to parameter choices. 
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the centralized market change with different ߳ . Unlike in the corner equilibrium, the OTC 
market’s average spread in the interior equilibrium increases under greater opacity. In addition, 
greater opacity increases the spread in the centralized market. 
 
Figure 2.14: Comparative Statics of the Demographics in the Interior Equilibrium 
Figure 2.14 shows the comparative statics of the demographics in the interior equilibrium with respect to ߳. The 
parameters are the same as in Figure 2.7. The left panel plots the total population of dealers in equilibrium, and the 
right panel plots the total population of investors in equilibrium. 
 In Figure 2.14, I show how dealers and investors respond to changes in ߳. Again, unlike 
findings in the corner solution equilibrium, in the interior equilibrium, greater opacity leads to 
less participation from investors, but more participation from dealers. 
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Figure 2.15: Comparative Statics of the Welfare in the Interior Equilibrium 
Figure 2.15 shows the comparative statics of the welfare in the interior equilibrium with respect to ߳. Parameters 
are the same as in Figure 2.7. The left panel plots investors’ surplus, the middle panel plots dealers’ total profits, 
and the right panel plots the market maker’s profits. 
 Figure 2.15 shows the changes in the welfare of investors, dealers, and the winning market 
maker. Similar to the corner solution equilibrium, investors’ total surplus decreases as ߳ increases 
(see the left panel of Figure 2.15). This is because the impact of opacity on investors is the same 
as before. The middle panel of Figure 2.15 shows that dealers’ total profits increase as ߳ 
increases. The right panel of Figure 2.15 shows the winning market maker’s profits increase as ߳ 
increases. These results indicate that when the centralized market is not competitive, its existence 
in equilibrium does not provide an incentive for dealers to reduce opacity in the OTC market.  
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2.4.2.7 Comparing the Corner Equilibrium with the Interior Equilibrium 
Different results obtained from the corner equilibrium and the interior equilibrium are due to the 
impact of opacity on the winning market maker. In the interior equilibrium, the winning market 
maker does not fear the entry of other market makers, which enables him to charge the 
unconstrained ask and bid with the spread equals ݇௨∗∗. This spread depends on spreads in the 
OTC market, and hence, opacity in the OTC market. This dependency offers opportunities for 
the winning market maker to collude with dealers in the OTC market. Under greater opacity, 
with the expectation that dealers in the OTC market would enlarge their bid-ask spreads, the 
winning market maker enlarges his bid-ask spread correspondingly. Increasing spreads in both 
the OTC market and the centralized market discourage investors to participate, whereas, in the 
corner solution equilibrium, the winning market maker’s spread is independent to dealers’. This 
makes the centralized market as a safe haven for investors to avoid opacity in the OTC market. 
As a result, under greater opacity, the OTC market loses market share to the centralized market. 
2.4.3 The Equilibrium in which the Centralized Market Fails to Survive 
As mentioned previously, the equilibrium in which the OTC market coexists with the centralized 
market is the intermediate stage equilibrium. It is possible that the centralized market loses all 
trades to the OTC market, and hence, fails to survive. In this equilibrium, establishing the 
centralized market is futile to incentivize dealers in the OTC market to reduce opacity, since the 
centralized market does not survive in equilibrium. 
 The condition for this equilibrium, in which the centralized market fails to survive, is 
illustrated by Proposition 2.6.   
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Proposition 2.6 
A centralized market fails to survive in equilibrium if and only if ܭ(ଵ) > ݇∗ , where ݇∗  is 
defined in Proposition 2.1. The equilibrium is the same as in Proposition 2.1. 
 Figure 2.1 shows that ݇∗ increases in ߳. As ݇∗ represents the upper bound for the centralized 
market to survive. This implies that greater opacity in the OTC market makes it easier for the 
centralized market to survive in equilibrium. More specifically, when the OTC market has high 
opacity, the centralized market survives even if market makers have high transaction costs.  
 Proposition 2.6 suggests that stricter regulations, which raise transaction costs, would not 
dominate the centralized market’s viability if the OTC market has great opacity. This sheds light 
on the dispute between regulators over the strictness of rules on Swap-Execution-Facilities 
(SEFs, henceforth).30 Some policy makers are afraid that stricter rules may impair the viability of 
SEFs as stricter rules raise transaction costs. According to Proposition 2.6, if OTC markets on 
swaps have great opacity, SEFs with stricter rules still survive in equilibrium. 
 Admittedly, the ultimate goal for SEFs is to replace OTC markets on standardized swaps, 
but is beyond the scope of this analysis. To understand how the centralized market, e.g., a SEF, 
can replace an OTC market, I analyze the other equilibrium, in which the OTC market fails to 
survive. 
2.4.4 The Equilibrium in which the OTC Market Fails to Survive 
In this subsection, I show the condition for the centralized market to replace the OTC market in 
equilibrium. The key determinant is the comparison of the transaction cost between the 
centralized market and the OTC market. However, in one special case, the opacity of the OTC 
                                               
30 SEFs are under the regulation of both the CFTC and the SEC. The two agencies have disagreed on rules over 
SEFs. In short, the industry deems the CFTC’s proposed rules to be stricter than the SEC’s. For example, the CFTC 
requests swap traders to obtain at least five quotes before they trade, whereas the SEC requests traders to obtain at 
least one quote. 
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market also has influence on the takeover. 
2.4.5 The OTC Market Fails to Survive in the Corner Equilibrium 
As shown in Subsection 2.4.2, when the centralized market is competitive, the winning market 
maker’s optimal choice is to post his bid-ask spread at the next most efficient market maker’s 
transaction cost, i.e., ܭ(ଶ) . The equilibrium is the corner equilibrium. The condition that the 
centralized market replaces the OTC market in the corner equilibrium is described as follows, 
Proposition 2.7 
In the corner equilibrium, the OTC markets fail to survive if and only if ݇ > ܭ(ଶ) . The 
equilibrium prices are 
 
ܽ௖ = 1 − ܾ௖ = ܭ(ଶ) + 12 . (2.54)  
 Proposition 2.7 implies that for a competitive centralized market to successfully replace the 
OTC market, market makers’ transaction costs must be lower than dealers’ transaction costs. 
More precisely, the next most efficient market maker’s transaction cost, which is the spread in 
the centralized market, must be lower than the most efficient dealer’s transaction cost. This 
suggests that to replace the OTC swap market with the SEF, which is a competitive market, 
market makers in the SEF must have lower transaction costs than dealers in the OTC swap 
market. From this perspective, stricter rules on the SEF do not favor the takeover, even though 
they do not impair the SEF’s viability. 
 As the OTC market fails to survive in equilibrium, and the winning market maker in the 
centralized market charges a fixed spread to deter the entrance of other market makers, opacity in 
the OTC market does not exert any influence on the equilibrium outcomes. However, opacity in 
the OTC market impacts the condition for the OTC market to survive, when the entrance threat 
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from another market maker is not credible, i.e., the centralized market is not competitive. 
2.4.6 The OTC Market Fails to Survive in the Interior Equilibrium 
When the centralized market is noncompetitive, the winning market maker faces no entrance 
threat from other market makers. The winning market maker posts a bid-ask spread that is his 
interior solution for profit maximization. The equilibrium obtained is the interior equilibrium. 
The condition for the centralized market to replace the OTC market in the interior equilibrium is 
more complex. As shown in Rust and Hall (2003), when the OTC market fails to survive in the 
interior equilibrium, two pricing strategies arise for the winning market maker in the centralized 
market. The first is that the winning market maker charges a price which equals the lower bound 
of dealers’ transaction costs to deter the entrance of dealers. This is known as the limited price. 
The second is that the winning market maker charges the price that does not consider the impact 
on OTC dealers. In this scenario, the winning market maker ignores OTC dealers’ strategies, 
since the threat of OTC dealers’ entrances is not credible. The equilibrium selection depends only 
on the lower bound of dealers’ transaction costs, and is known as the unlimited price. 
Proposition 2.8 [Limited Prices by the Market Maker] 
In the interior equilibrium, the OTC market fails to survive if and only if 
 
൫݇∗∗ − ܭ(ଵ)൯ ቆ1 − ݇∗∗ + 12 − ߚ(1 − ߳)1 − ߚ න ܽ(݇)݀݇௞∗∗௞ ቇ
≤
൫݇ − ܭ(ଵ)൯൫1 − ݇൯2 , 
(2.55)  
in which ݇∗∗ is defined in Proposition 2.5. Under the condition (2.25), the equilibrium prices are 
 
ܽ௖ = 1 − ܾ௖ = ݇ + 12 . (2.56)  
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Proposition 2.9 [Unlimited Prices by the Market Maker] 
If and only if  ௄(భ)ାଵ
ଶ
< min൛݇,ܭ(ଶ)ൟ, then the equilibrium prices are 
 
ܽ௖ = 1 − ܾ௖ = ܭ(ଵ) + 34 . (2.57)  
 The upper panel of Figure 2.16 shows the region of the lower bound of dealers’ transaction 
costs, ݇, for the OTC market to survive in the interior equilibrium. In addition, the upper panel of 
Figure 2.16 illustrates the equilibrium selection when the OTC market fails to survive. The lower 
panel of Figure 2.16 shows how changes in ߳  affects the viability of the OTC market. 
Specifically, the OTC market survives with higher transaction costs when ߳ is large. When the 
OTC market has great opacity, the noncompetitive centralized market is less likely to replace it, 
since the noncompetitive centralized market prefers to keep the OTC market in order to profit 
from opacity. However, when transaction costs in the OTC market are substantially larger than 
transaction costs in the centralized market, the centralized market finds it more profitable to 
replace the OTC market (see the upper panel of Figure 2.16). 
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Figure 2.16: Equilibrium Selection on when the OTC Survives and when it Fails to Survive 
The upper panel of Figure 2.16 shows the equilibrium selection when the OTC market survives or fails to survive in 
the economy (߳ = 0.5). The lower panel shows the comparative statics of the lower bound of dealers transaction 
costs, with which the OTC market can survive. Let ܭ(ଶ) = 1  to focus on the interior equilibrium. ܭ(ଵ) =0.009	and	ߚ = 0.9. 
 The analysis on the viability of the OTC market under the noncompetitive centralized 
market sheds lights on the OTC corporate bond market. In the OTC corporate bond market, 
banks are major dealers that provide intermediary services. The “Volker Rule,” which limits the 
proprietary trading from banks, increases banks transaction costs. As a result, transaction costs in 
the OTC corporate bond market increases once the “Volker Rule” is enforced. From the upper 
panel of Figure 2.16, the increase in transaction costs in the OTC corporate bond market 
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increases the likelihood that a noncompetitive centralized market replaces the OTC market on 
the corporate bond. In fact, BlackRock has recently planned to launch its “Aladdin” matching 
platform on trading corporate bonds, which is likely to be a noncompetitive centralized market, 
to compete with the OTC corporate bond market.31 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
Based on this chapter, I suggest that setting up a centralized market may be an efficient way to 
provide an incentive for dealers to choose for less opaque OTC markets. This is because the 
migration of order flows to the centralized market under greater opacity leads to smaller profits 
for dealers in OTC markets. However, the centralized market has to be competitive to generate 
competitive pressure on OTC markets. Results support recent reforms in OTC derivative markets 
aiming to reduce opacity in those markets. 
 My model provides some empirical implications. First, when an OTC market is the only 
intermediary in the economy, greater opacity in the OTC market increases the average bid-ask 
spread. Second, when a centralized market and an OTC market coexist in the economy, the 
correlation between degrees of opacity and prices can be used to test if the centralized market 
competes or colludes with the OTC market. Specifically, the centralized market, which competes 
with the OTC market, predicts that greater opacity decreases the average bid-ask spread in the 
OTC market, but does not change the bid-ask spread in the centralized market. Conversely, the 
centralized market, which colludes with the OTC market, predicts that greater opacity increases 
both the OTC market and the centralized market's bid-ask spreads.  
 To test these empirical implications, one needs to construct proxies to measure opacity. The 
                                               
31 BlackRock Inc. is planning to launch a trading platform this year that would let the world's largest money manager 
and its peers bypass Wall Street and trade bonds directly with one another (see Wall Street Journal, Apr 12th, 2012).  
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availability of an OTC asset’s pre-trade and post-trade information is a good proxy for opacity. 
But, this approach is likely to be plagued by endogeneity, since the availability of information is 
an endogenous choice of relevant agencies. Alternatively, one can use the complexity of an OTC 
asset. The more complex an asset is, the larger opacity it adds to investors because investors face 
more uncertainty in both valuing the asset and searching for counterparties. 
 There are some limitations of this model. Investors in the model are liquidity investors rather 
than informed investors. This limits my model to analyze information asymmetry in OTC 
trading. Also there are continuum investors and dealers in my model. In reality, most OTC trades 
occurred among finitely many large institutions. Accommodating those limitations could 
potentially provide additional insights on OTC trading. 
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Chapter 3 Pre-Trade Transparency in Over-the-Counter 
Markets: An Empirical Test in the Corporate Bond 
Markets32 
3.1 Introduction 
The availability of quote information, which is defined as pre-trade transparency, is very limited 
to investors in OTC markets. Consequently, the search process can be potentially costly to 
investors in OTC markets because of the sequential search and bilateral bargaining that 
characterizes consummation of trades (see Duffie (2010, 2012)). However, little evidence exists 
as to whether, and if so, how pre-trade transparency/opacity influences information search costs, 
and thus the transaction costs in OTC markets. In this chapter, we study a specific but an 
                                               
32 This chapter is adapted from the paper I collaborate with Fan Chen from University of Oklahoma. 
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important type of OTC markets, the corporate bond markets. We examine the impact of pre-trade 
transparency on corporate bond transaction costs. By doing so, our research adds to the 
understanding of the influence of pre-trade transparency on OTC markets. 
 To guide our empirical research and explain the pre-trade transparency mechanism 
influencing OTC trading, we use the search model constructed in Chapter 2. In the model, 
traders’ lack of pre-trade information is modeled as traders facing Knightian uncertainty. Unlike 
risk, where the odds of future states are known, Knightian uncertainty refers to the situation in 
which the odds of future states are unknown. The lack of pre-trade information and the 
awareness of this deficiency in OTC markets indicates the vagueness of information possessed 
by traders, which gives credence to Knightian uncertainty in this search process. In Chapter 2, 
the model shows that pre-trade information enhances a traders’ willingness to search, which 
implicitly improves their bargaining capabilities. As a result, dealers have to lower their ask 
prices and increase their bid prices in order to secure trades. In other words, dealers have to 
compete for traders more aggressively. This results in not only smaller bid-ask spreads, but also 
less dispersion among bid-ask spreads. We test these model implications through an empirical 
study on U.S. corporate bonds using the OTC bond transaction data from TRACE. 
 In the U.S., the majority of corporate bonds are traded in OTC markets, but some are traded 
on both OTC and NYSE markets. The NYSE’s Bonds (previously known as the Automated 
Bond System) operates the largest centralized corporate bond market in the U.S. and is organized 
as an electronic limit order book system providing comprehensive pre-trade transparency. Thus, 
bonds traded both on OTC and NYSE markets are more pre-trade transparent relative to bonds 
that are only traded in OTC markets. Bond traders benefit from the pre-trade quote information 
in NYSE Bonds since their bargaining power increases when they trade with dealers. 
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Accordingly, the increases in bargaining power benefits bond traders on the OTC market by 
reducing their transaction costs. 
 Based on this feature we conduct an observational study. First, we construct a group of 
bonds traded on both OTC and NYSE, identified as the OTC-NYSE group, and then we employ 
propensity score matching to identify a matched group of bonds that trade only in OTC, namely 
OTC-only group. Since we focus only on bond transactions occurred on the OTC market, the 
availability of the pre-trade quote, which is provided by the limit order book, is the only one 
relevant difference between these two groups of bonds in regards of trading environments. 
Finally, we analyze the transaction costs, variances of transaction costs, and yields between these 
two groups.  
 Consistent with model implications, we find smaller bond bid-ask spreads and smaller 
standard deviation of bid-ask spreads in the OTC-NYSE group compared to OTC-only group. 
Our findings are robust to a multitude of tests. In the univariate analysis, where bonds are 
matched by issuers, the OTC-NYSE group has on average 24 basis points smaller effective bid-
ask spreads than the OTC-only group. The standard deviation of bid-ask spreads are also 
significantly smaller for the OTC-NYSE group of bonds. These findings are consistent across 
different rating categories. After acquiring a sample of OTC-only bonds with firm and bond 
characteristics similar to OTC-NYSE bonds via propensity score matching, the mean and 
standard deviation of bid-ask spreads of the OTC-NYSE group remain statistically and 
economically lower than the matched OTC-only group.  The average effective bid-ask spread is 
10 basis points lower on OTC-NYSE group of bonds. In our sample period from 2008 to 2011, 
OTC-only bond transactions between dealers and traders are roughly $1,058 billion per year. 
Therefore, if NYSE pre-trade transparency had been offered as part of OTC trading, traders 
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would have saved approximately $1,058 million per year on transaction costs. A potential 
endogeneity issue for our empirical design of matching groups is that firms may choose to list 
bonds with smaller transaction costs on both OTC and NYSE markets. We address this concern 
with two-stage least square regressions utilizing a firm’s accounting standard and the listing 
status of a firm’s equity as instruments. Those factors affect a firm’s decision on where to list its 
bonds but are not likely to correlate with bonds’ bid-ask spreads. Our regression results provide 
evidence that bonds’ transaction costs, as measured by bid-ask spreads, are negatively correlated 
with the presence of NYSE pre-trade transparency with a p-value less than 0.01. 
 The reduction in bond transaction costs is also significant for sophisticated institutional 
traders. In a truncated sample, we focus specifically on institutional sized trades (trade 
size>$100,000) and find that bonds’ bid-ask spreads are negatively related to whether a bond is 
listed on both OTC and NYSE. As institutional traders are likely to be informed traders, this 
suggests that improving pre-trade information favors traders over dealers. 33  Pre-trade 
information is more likely to help traders enhance their bargaining capabilities than to help 
dealers to discern informed trading. If it were the latter that dominated, then we should observe a 
positive relation between bonds’ bid-ask spreads and whether a bond is listed on both OTC and 
NYSE, which we did not. 
 Furthermore, NYSE pre-trade transparent bonds tend to have lower yields, suggesting that 
an improvement in pre-trade transparency causes a significant reduction in bond yields and thus 
adds value to bonds. Pre-trade transparency reduces bonds’ transaction costs, thereby increasing 
bonds’ liquidity. The increase of bond value associated with improving pre-trade transparency is 
the premium of improved liquidity.  
                                               
33 Anand, Chakravarty, and Martell (2005) argue that institutional traders are more likely to be informed traders in 
the corporate bond markets. 
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 We are aware of other papers that have examined the impact of trade transparency on 
transaction costs in the corporate bond markets (see Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkataraman 
(2006), Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007), and Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2007)). Our 
paper differs from these recent papers in the following aspects. First, these studies use the 
introduction of TRACE reporting system to test the relation between corporate bonds trading and 
market transparency. More specifically, they focus on the influence of improving post-trade 
transparency, which is the release of transaction information following a trade. However, the 
focus of our study is on the influence of improving pre-trade transparency, which is the release of 
quote information. Given the bilateral trading nature in OTC markets, it is critical to examine 
whether and if so, how the pre-trade transparency impacts transaction costs in OTC markets. 
Second, Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007) show a regression result that listing on the NYSE 
can reduce bonds’ transaction costs, but they do not discuss it in details nor adjust for the 
endogeneity problem, as it is not the focus of their paper. We extend their study by resolving the 
endogeneity issue with the propensity score matching method and an instrumental regression. 
Lastly, we show that the improved pre-trade transparency in corporate bond markets favors 
traders over dealers as both volatility of bid-ask spreads and institutional sized trades’ bid-ask 
spreads decrease, indicating more competition among dealers and that potential informed traders 
face smaller bid-ask spreads. 
 The next section provides a review of related literature. In Section 3.3, we conduct an 
empirical study on the corporate bond market to test the implications of our model. Sections 3.4 
and 3.5 provide further discussions of our paper’s implications. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes 
this chapter.  
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3.2 Related Literature 
The relationship between pre-trade transparency and market quality is important to the design of 
markets. This relationship provides implications on market liquidity, informational efficiency, 
inter-market competition, and ultimately the welfare of market participants. However, academia 
has yet to reach a consensus on major issues in these areas. Baruch (2005) develops a model in 
which liquidity demanders and suppliers have differing degrees of access to the limit order book. 
The model predicts that liquidity demanders benefit from access to the book while liquidity 
suppliers benefit when the book is closed. Boehmer, Saar, and Yu (2005) find that the 
introduction of the NYSE’s OpenBook service, which provides limit order book information, 
decreases the price impact of orders and improves the informational efficiency of prices. Eom, 
Ok, and Park (2007) find that market stability and informational efficiency of the price are 
improved when the Korea Exchange increases the number of publicly disclosed quotes. On the 
other hand, Madhavan, Porter, and Weaver (2005) find that increased pre-trade transparency 
leads to higher trading costs and volatility after the Toronto Stock Exchange disseminated real-
time information on its limit order book to the public.  
 The influence of pre-trade transparency has also been investigated via experimental studies. 
Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999) show that pre-trade transparency has no impact on informational 
efficiency, bid-ask spreads, and trader welfare. Whereas Flood et al. (1999) conclude that pre-
trade opacity leads to more dispersed opening spreads and lower trading volume due to higher 
search costs.  
 Besides studies on the equity market, past studies also examine the impact of transparency 
on OTC markets. Most of those research focus on the corporate bond markets. They use the 
release of the TRACE data as a natural experiment and find that transparency improves the OTC 
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market’s liquidity (see Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2006), Edwards, Harris, and 
Piwowar (2007), and Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2007)). TRACE contains only information 
related to traded prices but doesn’t contain information regarding quotes (pre-trade information), 
therefore, studies using TRACE focus specifically on post-trade transparency. Carrion (2009) 
studies how pre-trade transparency affects bond trading costs by comparing the costs on the 
NYSE versus those in OTC markets. 
3.3 An Empirical Study on the Corporate Bond Markets 
The search model in Chapter 2 illustrates that pre-trade transparency affects OTC trading through 
enhancing traders bargaining capability. We test the empirical implications resulting from the 
model. More specifically, we conduct an empirical analysis on the corporate bond markets to test 
if the average and standard deviation of bid-ask spread decrease as pre-trade transparency 
increases. 
3.3.1 Data and Sample 
Our initial sample ranges from November 1st, 2008, to March 31st, 2011, and includes 40,977 
bonds with 26,658,403 trades and $7.6 trillion of volume. Firm characteristics data is obtained 
from COMPUSTAT, bond transactions data from the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine 
(TRACE), and bond characteristics data from the Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database 
(FISD). An important file for the analysis is the “ISSUE EXCHANGE” master file that is 
retrieved from FISD. This file documents the exchange(s) (if any) where the bonds are listed. For 
a debt security to be listed on the NYSE, the debt issue must have a minimum market value or 
principal amount of $5,000,000. Additionally, the debt security must have an investment grade 
rating to a senior issue or a rating that is no lower than an S&P rating of “B”. The credit rating is 
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not required if the issuer of the debt security has equity securities listed on the NYSE. Through 
June 30, 2011, all bonds listed on NYSE Bonds are subject to an initial listing fee of $15,000. 
Effective July 1, 2011, all bonds listed on NYSE Bonds are subject to an initial listing fee of 
$5,000 and an annual listing fee of $5,000. According to NYSE Bonds trading guideline, any 
debt securities listed on the NYSE are eligible to trade on NYSE Bonds trading platform.34 
Based on the “ISSUE EXHANGE” file, we are able to identify OTC traded bonds also traded on 
the NYSE. Since TRACE reports trades with very few bond characteristics, Mergent’s FISD 
database is employed to secure comprehensive bond attributes, such as coupon, maturity, and 
ratings. FISD reports an exhaustive list of 35,779 bond characteristics that are available. Table 
3.1 describes the sample selection procedure. 
 
                                               
34 http://www.nyse.com/bonds/nysebonds/1095449059236.html 
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Table 3.1: Sample Composition 
The sample period is from November 1, 2008 to March 31, 2011. This table describes the composition of the final sample. From TRACE we collect bond trade 
data. Bond characteristics, such as coupon, maturity and ratings, are obtained from Mergent’s FISD database. The filtering conditions applied rule out bonds 
that are: (i) put-able; (ii) with abnormal prices (less than $10 or greater than $200); (iii) subsequently corrected; (iv) affected by price reversions and (v) traded 
less than 9 times over the sample period. To estimate a bond’s daily bid-ask spread, we further require bonds to have at least one buy and one sell within a day. 
Lastly, all but NYSE listed bonds are discarded. 
  # of Bonds # of Trades Size($s) Yield(%) Coupon(%) Dollar Volume (Billions) 
Data downloaded from TRACE(Starting from Nov 1, 2008 to 
March 31, 2011) 40,977 26,658,403 285,916.96 8.98 N.A. 7,621.94 
After filtering conditions: 25,884 24,958,872 276,633.09 8.04 5.90 6,904.32 
Sell 25,146 9,058,715 279,239.83 6.90 5.90 2,529.54 
Inter-Dealer 25,167 10,019,697 206,389.84 8.32 5.92 2,067.92 
Buy  24,263 5,880,460 392,306.06 9.35 5.85 2,306.86 
Sample(only buy and sell plus NYSE)             
OTC-only 16,670 8,776,241 291,459.79 8.83 5.03 2,557.92 
OTC-NYSE 4,187 4,698,929 396,650.13 5.91 6.10 1,863.83 
Sell 20,857 8,225,185 280,275.13 6.89 5.90 2,305.31 
Buy 20,857 5,249,985 403,132.08 9.23 5.88 2,116.44 
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 We filter the data by eliminating 739 put-able bonds, 869 bonds with abnormal prices (prices 
greater than $200 or less than $10), bond trading with subsequent corrections, bonds’ trading side 
are not indicated, and bond trading affected by price reversions. 35  To exclude rarely traded 
bonds, we require the bond trade at least 9 times during the sample period, which eliminates 
8,287 bonds from our sample. These filtering conditions leave a sample of 25,884 bonds and 
24,958,872 trades. To compute same-bond-same-day effective bid-ask spreads, we further 
require bonds to have at least one buy and one sell transaction within a day as in Hong and 
Warga (2000), Chakravarty and Sarkar (2003) and Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2007). Bonds 
that cannot be identified in the “ISSUE EXCHANGE” master file are also excluded from the 
sample. Lastly, we drop all inter-dealer transactions and bonds listed on an exchange other than 
the NYSE.36 The final sample used for the empirical analysis contains 20,857 bonds responsible 
for 13,475,170 trades and roughly $4.4 trillion of volume. Table 3.2 provides descriptive 
statistics for the 20,857 bonds in the sample.  
 
                                               
35 Note the bond return from time ݐ to time ݐ + 1 as ܴ௧௧ାଵ ; a price reversal happens if ܴିଵ଴ < 	−10%	and ܴ଴ଵ >
	−0.5ܴିଵ଴  or if ܴିଵ଴ > 10%  and ܴ଴ଵ < 	−0.5ܴିଵ଴ . We adjust our filter rule from Bessembinder et al. (2009). 
Bessembinder et al. (2009) define large return reversals as 20% or more price change which is reversed over 20% in 
the next observation. Our results are qualitatively the same when applying their rules to our sample. 
36 The empirical results are not affected at all even if we include those bonds listed on exchanges other than the 
NYSE, e.g., the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and the Luxembourg Stock Exchange. 
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Table 3.2: Sample Summary Statistics 
This table presents the number of observations, mean, median, and standard deviation of all variables in the main 
sample. Definitions of variables can be seen in the Appendix B. 
Variable # of Obs Mean Median Std Dev 
Bid-ask Spread 20,857 0.0097 0.01 0.01 
Firm size (log millions) 17,889 11.4508 11.49 2.30 
Leverage 17,886 0.2229 0.17 0.19 
Firms' accounting standard-IFRS 20,857 0.0284 0.00 0.17 
Firms' accounting standard-Domestic 20,857 0.8002 1.00 0.40 
Issuer is in finance industry 20,857 0.6574 1.00 0.47 
Issuer is a utility 20,857 0.0610 0.00 0.24 
Issuers' equity is private 20,857 0.1425 0.00 0.35 
Issue size (sq. root of millions) 20,857 11.0846 5.43 11.22 
Moody's bond rating 20,857 9.8220 7.00 7.56 
Years to maturity (years) 20,857 11.8303 10.00 9.51 
Global bond 20,857 0.1166 0.00 0.32 
Variable rate bond 20,857 0.1334 0.00 0.34 
Foreign bond 20,857 0.0001 0.00 0.01 
Senior bond 20,857 0.0770 0.00 0.27 
Rule144a bond 20,857 0.0021 0.00 0.05 
 
 The average (median) bid-ask spread is 97 basis points. 66% (6%) of bond issuers are 
classified as finance (utilities), though bond issuers are from a wide array of industries. Thus, we 
partition the bonds into three industry categories: Finance, Utilities, and Other for the multiple 
regression analysis. Private companies are able to issue publicly traded debt if they satisfy 
disclosure requirements similar to public companies. We identify public companies by matching 
the issuer’s CUSIP in TRACE to equity’s first 6-digit NCUSIP in the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) data set.37 In aggregate, we classify only 14.3% of sample bonds are 
issued by private firms. The mean (median) maturity of the sample bonds is 11.8 (10.0) years.  
                                               
37 Unlike CUSIPs for stocks, CUSIPs for bond is somehow permanent. Cusip for issuer could be changed through 
the time, for many reasons, such as a slight change in company name. However, when issuers changed their name, 
the cusips for their bonds will not change (cusips for their stocks will change though.) In Mergent, issuer_cusip 
reflects the historical value. In CRSP, NCUSIP is a security’s historical cusip. 
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3.3.2 The Estimation of Effective Bid-ask Spreads 
Since the quotation data for corporate bond trading is generally unobtainable, we are forced to 
estimate effective bid-ask spreads using transaction records. Hong and Warga (2000), 
Chakravarty and Sarkar (2003) and Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2007) all calculate the 
“traded bid-ask spreads” over a one-day window in the corporate bond market. Specifically, this 
approach takes the average of the differences between selling prices and buying prices on the 
same day as the effective bid-ask spread. We estimate the effective bid-ask spread for a particular 
bond as the time series average of its traded bid-ask spreads in a one-day window. The traded 
bid-ask spread is the difference between the average daily selling price and average daily buying 
price divided by their sum: 
1. Denoting ݅ to each individual bond and ݐ to time periods, we have  
 
ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௜௧ = ݈݈ܵ݁௜௧ − ܤݑݕ௜௧
݈݈ܵ݁௜௧ + ܤݑݕ௜௧, (3.1)  
where ݈݈ܵ݁௜௧ 	and	ܤݑݕ௜௧ are the average daily selling price and buying price, respectively.  
2. Taking the time series average of ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௜௧, we have 
 
ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௜ = ෍ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௜௧
௜ܶ
்೔
௧ୀଵ
, (3.2)  
where ௜ܶ is the time length of the bonds in our sample. 
3.3.3 The Empirical Design 
Though the OTC market of corporate bonds has achieved greater post-trade transparency since 
the unveiling of the TRACE reporting system on July 01, 2002, the market still lacks of pre-trade 
transparency. There is no centralized and extensive report of pre-trade information such as real-
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time quote data in this market before NYSE Bonds is introduced.38 In contrast to the OTC 
market’s bilateral trading feature, NYSE Bonds is the largest centralized corporate bond market 
in the U.S. functioning through an electronic limit order book system. 39  The NYSE Bonds 
trading platform provides real-time full market-by-order depth, best limit quotes, and trades to all 
its participants. Pre-trade pricing data on individual corporate bonds is updated every 10 seconds. 
Firm and executable bids and offers entered by members or sponsored participants are displayed 
on a full order book (NYSE BondBook) with full depth of market.  
 The NYSE Bonds system provides the opportunity to test if pre-trade transparency has any 
effect on OTC trading. We design an observational study by constructing two groups of bonds. 
The first group, which is the treatment group (the OTC-NYSE group), consists of bonds traded 
on both OTC and NYSE markets. The second group, which is the control group (the OTC-only 
group), consists of bonds traded only in the OTC market.  The objective is to compare effective 
bid-ask spreads and variance of the effective bid-ask spread between these two groups. As with 
all observational studies, our main challenge in drawing conclusions from this comparison is the 
endogeneity problem, as the assignment of bonds into the treatment and the control groups is not 
random. Therefore, we need to control for the endogeneity that bonds with smaller spreads are 
chosen by their issuers to trade on both OTC and NYSE markets. We address this concern in the 
next subsection. Based on the model in Chapter 2, our null hypothesis is, 
 
                                               
38 There are some potential data sources providing quote data, like proprietary market information vendors (e.g., 
Bloomberg Trade Order Management Solutions (TOMS)) or private electronic trading networks (e.g., Tradeweb, 
MarketAxess, Goldman Sachs GSessions, and BlackRock Aladdin Trading Network). These data sources are 
fragmented and have other limitations.  For example, GSessions only operates each Tuesday and Thursday, in two 
five-minute sessions each day. The quotes provided in these systems are representative rather than firm. The depth at 
each quote is not informative to investors and investors are not identical since it is costly to purchase access to these 
trading systems. 
39 The NYSE conducts two daily bond auctions – an Opening Bond Auction at 4:00 a.m. ET and a Core Bond 
Auction at 9:30 a.m. ET. Orders not executed in either auction become eligible for continuous trading immediately 
after the auction. 
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Hypothesis 3.1  
The average and standard deviation of effective bid-ask spreads in the OTC-NYSE group are 
smaller than the average and standard deviation of effective bid-ask spreads in the OTC-only 
group. 
3.3.4 Empirical Results on the Difference in Bid-ask Spreads between Bonds with and 
without NYSE Pre-Trade Information 
In this subsection, we report univariate and regression results of comparing the mean and 
standard deviation of bid-ask spreads of the OTC-NYSE and the OTC-only group. We address 
sample selection bias in several different ways. First, we focus on bonds issued by the same firm 
to control for firm characteristics. Second, propensity score matching is used to reduce selection 
bias by equating the OTC-NYSE and OTC-only group of bonds based on individual firm and 
bond characteristics.  The advantage of this method is the ability to compare the difference in the 
mean and standard deviation of bonds’ bid-ask spreads between OTC-NYSE and OTC-only 
bonds when controlling for firm and bond characteristics. Finally, we conduct multiple 
regression analysis to examine the statistical significance of the relationship between the NYSE 
pre-trade transparency and the size of bond bid-ask spreads. Estimates are provided for two-stage 
least squares estimation with a firm’s accounting standard and the equality listing status of a firm 
as instrumental variables. We find consistent results for all the procedures above. Our results 
suggest that pre-trade transparency reduces the mean and standard deviation of effective bid-ask 
spreads in corporate bond trading. This result is consistent with the model implications in 
Chapter 2. 
3.3.4.1 Bonds Issued by the Same Firm 
In Table 3.3, we compare the average effective bid-ask spreads of bonds issued by the same firm. 
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the average bid-ask spread for OTC-NYSE group bonds is 24 basis points lower than those of 
OTC-only group bonds, and the difference is statistically significant (p-value=0.00). In addition, 
we obtain consistent results across different credit rating categories. We find that the difference 
in the bid-ask spreads of non-investment-grade bonds is 51 basis points, which is much greater 
than the difference in superior bonds (difference of 22 basis points) and other investment-grade 
bonds (difference of 20 basis points). Both differences are significant with p-values less than 
0.01. 
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Table 3.3: Effective Bid-Ask Spreads Matched by Issuers 
This table presents the differences of bid-ask spreads between OTC-only bonds with OTC-NYSE bonds, at the issuer level across ratings. Moody’s bond ratings 
are used to measure a bond’s credit rating. If bonds are unrated by Moody’s, S&P ratings are used in their place. OTC-only (OTC-NYSE) bonds indicate bonds 
listed in the over-the-counter markets (both over-the-counter market and the NYSE market). The bid-ask spread is estimated as the time series average of its 
traded bid-ask spreads in a one-day window. For each bond, the effective (traded) bid-ask spread is the difference between the average daily selling price and 
average daily buying price divided by their sum. Superior bonds include bonds that have a moody rating of Aaa, Aa1, Aa and Aa2 during the sample period. 
Other investment grade bonds consist of bonds that have a rating between Baa3 and Aa3. Bonds rated as or below Baa3 belong to non-investment grade bonds 
category. The bid-ask spread is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. tt-test (Wilcoxon) is used to test the difference of mean (median) bid-ask spreads 
between the two groups of bonds. Anova and Kruskal Wallis tests are used to test the difference of standard deviation of bid-ask spreads. The p-value of each test 
is reported. 
 OTC-only OTC-NYSE Difference (P-Value) 
 # of Bonds 
Mean 
(bps) 
Std Dev 
(10ିଶ) Coupon (%) # of Bonds Mean (bps) Std Dev (10ିଶ) Coupon (%) tt-test Wilcoxn Anova Kruskal Wallis 
Total 9,487 105 0.74 4.95 3,061 81 0.56 5.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Superior Bonds 
(Aa2 and up) 635 79 0.76 3.29 124 47 0.42 4.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Investment Bonds 
(Aa3-Baa3) 6,064 100 0.63 5.03 2,092 80 0.53 5.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Non-Investment 
Bonds 1,826 131 1.02 5.37 533 80 0.71 7.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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 Results in Table 3.3 suggest that pre-trade information decreases bid-ask spreads in 
corporate bond trading. This reduction is more evident for low-credit-rating bonds relative to 
high-credit-rating bonds. In addition, we also find the same pattern for the standard deviation of 
bid-ask spreads. On average, the standard deviation is significantly smaller for OTC-NYSE 
bonds than OTC-only bonds across different rating categories in Table 3.3. The difference of bid-
ask spreads is more significant for non-investment rating bonds than other bonds.  
 The number of bonds within the OTC-only bonds in Table 3.3 is far greater than that of 
OTC-NYSE bonds, suggesting that fewer bonds are traded on the NYSE than in OTC markets. 
Also, the coupon rate between the OTC-only group and OTC-NYSE group differs dramatically. 
It could be that firms choose bonds that are more liquid to trade on the NYSE. These findings 
suggest that the lower level and standard deviation for OTC-NYSE group of bonds may be due 
to the significant difference of bond characteristics between the two groups.  In the next 
subsection, we use propensity-score matching to control for both bond and firm features. 
3.3.4.2 Bonds Matched by Propensity Scores 
We utilize propensity-score matching to acquire a sample of bonds with characteristics similar to 
the bonds traded both in OTC markets and on the NYSE for the sample. First, we run a logistic 
regression to determine which factors influence firms’ listing decisions. Using the estimated 
coefficients, we can obtain the predicted probability (propensity score) for each bond. Then we 
match each OTC-NYSE bond to an OTC-only bond based on the closest propensity score. Table 
3.4 presents results of the logistic regression and propensity-score matching.  
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Table 3.4: Effective Bid-Ask Spreads Differences by Propensity Score Matching 
Panel A presents results of logistic regressions for the determinants of a firm’s listing decisions. The probability is 
modeled as 1 when a bond listed in both the OTC market and NYSE. Logistic represents the logistic model with a set 
of independent variables below. Definitions of independent variables can be found in the Appendix B. Using the 
estimated coefficients in Panel A, the predicted probability (propensity score) for each bond is estimated and used to 
acquire a sample of OTC-only bonds with characteristics similar to bonds (based on the closest propensity score) 
traded both in OTC markets and on the NYSE in Panel B. The mean and standard deviation of estimated bid-ask 
spreads are reported in Panel B. The bid-ask spread is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. tt-test (Wilcoxon) 
is used to test the difference of mean (median) bid-ask spreads between the two groups of bonds. Anova and Kruskal 
Wallis tests are used to test the difference of standard deviation of bid-ask spreads. The p-value of each test is 
reported. 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Listed on NYSE YES/NO 
Model: Logistic 
 Coefficient P-value 
Firm size (log millions) -0.19 0.00 
Leverage 0.21 0.10 
Firms' accounting standard-IFRS 1.16 0.00 
Firms' accounting standard-Domestic 0.52 0.00 
Issuer is in finance industry -0.14 0.02 
Issuer is a utility 0.16 0.03 
Issuers' equity is private 2.62 0.00 
Issuers' equity is listed in NYSE 2.08 0.00 
Issue size (sq. root of millions) 0.06 0.00 
Moody's bond rating -0.05 0.00 
Years to maturity 0.02 0.00 
Global bond 0.38 0.00 
Variable rate bond -2.80 0.00 
Foreign bond 0.60 0.71 
Senior bond -0.66 0.00 
Rule144a bond -1.70 0.03 
Intercept -2.13 0.00 
Pseudo R-square 0.20 
# of Bonds 17,886 
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Panel B: Propensity Scoring Matched Bid-ask Spread Difference 
 OTC-only OTC-NYSE 
Spread-Mean (bps) 87 77 
S.D. *10-2 0.63 0.54 
tt-test for differences 0.00 
Wilcoxon-test for differences 0.00 
ANOVA 0.00 
Kruskal-Wallis 0.00 
# of Bonds 3,843 
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 We attempt to model firms’ bond listing decisions from two avenues: firm characteristics 
and bond features. There has been no research on how firms decide to list bonds on the NYSE 
versus in OTC markets. Thus, we construct our model based on basic intuition and on studies of 
foreign firms’ preferences on the U.S. bond market. We control for the following firm 
characteristics: size, leverage ratio, equity listing status, and accounting standard. In Appendix B, 
we present our variables of choice and their definitions. 
 Panel A in Table 3.4 provides our logistic regression results of firms’ decisions to list bonds 
on the NYSE. The dependent variable is binary in nature with a value of 1 if a bond is listed on 
the NYSE and 0 otherwise. We find that firms who choose to list bonds on the NYSE are small 
firms or highly leveraged firms. Small or highly leveraged firms should experience more 
difficulty selling bonds in the debt market than large or low leverage firms. For instance, small 
firms have poorer information disclosure and less coverage than large companies (see Lang and 
Lundholm (1993, 1996)). This could increase the costs for small firms raising funds solely from 
OTC markets. Higher leverage firms pose greater risks to bond investors than low leverage 
firms. Therefore, these firms may attempt to promote the sale of their bonds by listing bonds 
both on the NYSE and in OTC markets to reach a greater number of investors. Gao (2011) finds 
that firms adopting International Financial Reporting Standards prefer to list bonds on the U.S. 
public bond market but she does not specify whether it is in OTC markets or on the NYSE. To 
investigate whether firms’ accounting standards impact firms’ listing choice in bond markets, we 
assign a dummy variable to firms adopting International Financial Reporting Standards in the 
logistic regressions. In Panel A of Table 3.4, we find that accounting standards have a positive 
effect on the choice to list debt on the NYSE given that both two coefficients are positive and 
highly significant. This result signifies that firms adopting International Financial Reporting 
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Standards are more likely to list their bonds on the exchange. Bond issuers’ industry category 
may affect bond-listing choice. Bond issuers in the utilities industry tend to issue bonds in the 
exchange, while issuers in the finance industry tend to issue bonds in the OTC markets. 
 The effect of a firm’s equity listing status affects its debt listing choice. We find that listing 
equities on the NYSE encourages firms to list their bonds on the NYSE since having equities on 
the NYSE may reduce the information disclosure cost of listing bonds on the NYSE. This 
evidence is consistent with the notions that (1) the NYSE may not place any additional 
disclosure requirements on firms who already trade equities on the exchange as they already 
satisfy NYSE disclosure requirements for listing stock, and (2) the additional reporting costs 
associated with stringent disclosure requirements on bonds imposed by the NYSE are marginal 
for firms with equities listed on the NYSE. In addition, we also find private firms are more likely 
to issue bonds on the NYSE. 
 We use the abovementioned variables to control for a firm’s characteristics in its bond-listing 
choice. We also control for a variety of a bond’s characteristics in modeling the listing choice of 
a bond. We find bonds with larger issuance sizes, longer maturity, higher credit ratings, or 
without variable rates are more likely to be listed on the NYSE. Besides that, global bonds are 
also more likely to be listed on the NYSE. Senior bonds and Rule 144a bonds are less likely to 
be listed on the NYSE. 
 Large or long-maturity debt offerings can be more costly and difficult to issue as issuers try 
to efficiently raise capital by selling debt. Apparently, listing bonds in both markets can help 
issuers raise funds more efficiently given the increase in investor base issuers can reach.  
 We find that the probability of listing bonds on the NYSE is negatively correlated with 
Moody’s bond rating. This correlation indicates that the probability increases as credit quality 
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increases. This relation continues to hold when we use an indicator variable for investment-grade 
bonds as a proxy for bonds’ credit quality. This reflects the clientele effect, as higher rated bonds 
are usually associated with lower risks, so they are more preferred by retail investors, who prefer 
to trade on the exchange.  
 Variable interest payment bonds, with coupon payments adjusting to a schedule or a 
reference index (for example, LIBOR or Treasury bond interest rates), are less likely to be listed 
on the NYSE. This finding indicates that typically bonds with complicated instruments that are 
more complex for retail investors to value are not traded on the NYSE. Since the majority of 
traders on the NYSE are retail investors, complex bonds might not be favored on the NYSE and 
hence will tend to suffer from a liquidity shortage. 
 A separating equilibrium can help to signal the quality of foreign firms who choose to access 
the U.S. capital markets (see Karolyi (2006)). We find evidence that global bonds are more likely 
to be listed on the NYSE than domestic bonds. However, not all types of bonds from foreign 
issuers are likely to be listed on the NYSE. Rule 144a bonds issued by foreign firms, which are 
traded only by large institutions (Qualified Institutional Buyers (QIBS)), are less likely to be 
listed on the exchange. This finding is consistent with the clientele effect as most institutional 
investors trade in OTC markets. 
 Panel B of Table 3.4 reports the comparison results after matching bonds by their propensity 
scores. We find that the average effective bid-ask spread for bonds traded both in OTC markets 
and on the NYSE is 10 basis points lower than bonds traded only in OTC markets. The 
difference is statistically significant. Our data shows that in the sample period, approximately 
$1,058 billion per year is traded on bonds for which pre-trade quote information is not 
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available.40 These results indicate that traders could save a minimum of $1,058 million per year 
on transaction costs if pre-trade transparency were to be enforced. In Panel B, we also find that 
the standard deviations of bid-ask spreads for bonds having NYSE pre-trade transparency are 
smaller than bonds without the pre-trade transparency. Both parametric and non-parametric tests 
indicate this difference is statistically significant. 
3.3.4.3 Multiple Regressions on the Impact of NYSE Pre-Trade Transparent Information 
In the previous subsection, we examine the economic significance of the bid-ask spread 
difference between bonds with and without NYSE pre-trade transparency.  In this subsection, we 
run multiple regressions to examine the statistical significance of the relation between the NYSE 
pre-trade transparency and bonds’ bid-ask spreads when controlling other factors that may 
influence bid-ask spreads. We start this analysis with an OLS regression in Table 3.5. In addition 
to the OLS specification, we provide regression results using two-stage least square estimation 
(2SLS). The dependent variables, except as noted, in the regression are effective bid-ask spreads 
which is the time-series average of the difference between the average daily selling price and 
average daily buying price divided by their sum. P-values of estimated coefficients are reported 
in parenthesis. Consistent with our theoretical model predictions, we find that NYSE pre-trade 
transparency is negatively correlated with bonds’ bid-ask spreads, all else being equal.41  
 
                                               
40 In the sample period from November 1, 2008 to March 31, 2011, the sum of buy- and sell-sized trading volume in 
the OTC markets is $2,558 billion. Thus, the annual trading volume is approximately $1,058 billion. 
41 To control the effect of trade size on bond spreads, we consider the impact of retail-sized investors’ trading on bid-
ask spreads in unreported results and find qualitatively similar results. We include the percentage of retail-sized 
trades and trading volume in our regressions, respectively. We find a positive relationship between bid-ask spreads 
and the proportion of retail-sized trades and trading volume, indicating that small trades occur at higher transaction 
costs than do trades of institutional investors. 
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Table 3.5: Effective Bid-Ask Spreads and NYSE Pre-Trade Transparency 
This table reports regression results for the relation between a bond’s effective bid-ask spread and whether a bond is listed on the NYSE. The sample period is 
from November 1, 2008 to March 31, 2011. The dependent variable, except as noted, is the estimated effective bid-ask spread, which is the time series average of 
the difference between the average daily selling price and average daily buying price divided by their sum. Prob of Being Listed on the NYSE is the propensity 
score computed from the logistic models in Table 3.4. All other independent variables are defined as in Appendix B. In the OLS model, we use a dummy variable 
of 1 to represent whether a bond is listed on the NYSE in the OLS regression. In the remaining table, we present regression estimates using a two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) method. All estimated coefficients reported are multiplied by 100. The bid-ask spread is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. P-values are 
reported in parentheses. 
Model OLS 2SLS-Logistic 
Dependent variable Bid-ask spread Listed on the NYSE=1/0 Bid-ask Spread 
Listed on the NYSE -0.10 (0.00) 
  
-0.16 (0.04) 
Prob of Beling Listed on the NYSE 
  
75.62 (0.00) 
  Firm size (log millions) 0.01 (0.00) -0.24 (0.16) 0.01 (0.00) 
Leverage 0.18 (0.00) 0.53 (0.74) 0.54 (0.00) 
Issuer is in finance industry -0.15 (0.00) -1.17 (0.18) 0.18 (0.00) 
Issuer is a utility -0.24 (0.07) 1.32 (0.31) -0.14 (0.00) 
Issuers' equity is private 0.54 (0.00) 3.65 (0.63) -0.23 (0.08) 
Issue size (log millions) -0.02 (0.00) 0.21 (0.00) -0.02 (0.00) 
Moody's bond rating -0.01 (0.00) -0.09 (0.02) -0.01 (0.00) 
Years to maturity 0.02 (0.00) 0.09 (0.01) 0.02 (0.00) 
Global bond -0.09 (0.00) 2.05 (0.04) -0.09 (0.00) 
Variable rate bond -0.11 (0.00) -4.57 (0.00) -0.12 (0.00) 
Foreign bond -0.72 (0.06) 1.43 (0.95) -0.71 (0.06) 
Senior bond -0.11 (0.00) -2.88 (0.02) -0.12 (0.00) 
Rule144a bond -0.33 (0.01) -6.21 (0.42) -0.35 (0.01) 
Intercept 0.58 (0.00) 6.55 (0.00) 0.60 (0.00) 
 Adj. R-square 0.23 0.19 0.22 
# of Bonds 17,886 17,886 
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 The first two regressors in Table 3.5 characterize the level of NYSE pre-trade transparency 
in corporate bond markets, respectively. From the OLS model, the effect of a bond being listed 
on the NYSE on the bid-ask spread is significantly negative. The coefficient for the issuance size 
is negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that large issues are cheaper to 
trade than small issues. This result is consistent with Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007). 
Bonds with a greater maturity are considered to possess greater risk compared to short term 
bonds, thus it should cost more to trade longer term bonds. We find consistent evidence with this 
notion, as long-term bonds have larger bid-ask spreads than short term bonds. Different types of 
bonds issued by the firm may also impact bond trading costs. The estimated coefficients for 
global bonds are significantly negative. The lower transaction costs for global bonds could be 
due to the competition of bond transactions across different countries. Senior bonds have a 
priority claim in firms’ residual assets when the firm faces bankruptcy and is more desired by 
investors. Therefore, a senior bond tends to have a lower transaction cost. Foreign bonds, issued 
by foreign firms, are more favored by investors in the market, which brings more liquidity to the 
bonds. This, in turn, makes foreign bonds cheaper to trade. 
 As discussed in Section 3.4.4.1, our findings of the difference of bid-ask spreads between 
the OTC-only and the OTC-NYSE group bonds could be due to the sample selection bias. This 
means that omitted factors could simultaneously determine both bid-ask spread and firms’ listing 
choice. Thus, we employ two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation to resolve the potential 
endogeneity issue. We use firms’ accounting standards and the listing status of a firm’s equity as 
the instrument variables. We believe those instruments are likely to affect a firm’s decision on 
listing its bonds, but are not likely to correlate with bonds’ spreads. The next paragraph details 
our procedure of estimation. 
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 We first estimate the logistic model as in our propensity score matching on firms’ bond 
listing decisions with instruments and other exogenous variables (results are in Panel A Table 
3.4).  Then we use the fitted probability as the new and the only instrument variable in our 2SLS 
estimation. The advantage of this method is that the misspecification of logistic model in the first 
stage regression is irrelevant in the IV regression provided that the dummy variable for NYSE 
listing is partially correlated with the fitted probabilities (see Wooldridge (2002) for detail 
discussion).  
 The 2SLS model in Table 3.5 examines the relation between bonds’ bid-ask spreads and the 
NYSE pre-trade transparency using the 2SLS specification. We first report results for the first 
stage regression predicting the fitted value of being listed on the NYSE using probability of 
bonds being listed on the NYSE from the logistic regression as the new instrumental variable. 
The instrument is positively significant, indicating relevance. The joint F-tests of significance is 
490 with p-values less than 0.01, indicating weak instruments are not a concern. Hausman tests 
indicate that the 2SLS regression provides more consistent estimated coefficients than the OLS 
regression.  
 In Table 3.5, Columns 5 and 6 report results from the second stage regression using 
probability estimated from the logistic model as the new instrumental variable. In this 
specification, the coefficient on bonds listed on the NYSE is negative with a p-value less than 
0.01, which confirms the causal interpretation of NYSE pre-trade transparency on a bond’s bid-
ask spread. In addition, we find that the magnitude of the coefficient estimates in 2SLS 
regressions ( −0.16 × 10ିଶ ) increases compared to estimated coefficients in OLS model 
(−0.10 × 10ିଶ). All other control variables except for dummy variables indicating if a firm is in 
finance industry and if a firm is private have the same signs as the OLS specification.  
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 Overall, regression results in Table 3.5 indicate that the NYSE pre-trade transparent bonds 
have lower transaction costs (smaller bid-ask spreads) compared to more opaque bonds even 
after controlling for other factors that impact bond transaction costs. 
3.4  The Empirical Implications for Informed Traders 
In the market microstructure literature, a sophisticated trader who has more information faces 
larger bid-ask spreads since dealers protect themselves against information asymmetry (see 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1987)). Following this intuition, Pagano 
and Roell (1996) show that pre-trade transparency decreases bid-ask spreads as information 
asymmetry is eased, though not necessarily for all trade sizes. While they emphasize that pre-
trade transparency enhances dealers’ ability to discern informed trading, the model in Chapter 2 
emphasizes that pre-trade transparency refines traders’ information sets, leading to more 
bargaining power. This difference leads to different empirical predictions. Given that institutional 
traders have superior information in trading, Pagano and Roell (1996) predict that institutional-
sized trades of pre-trade transparent bonds should have larger bid-ask spreads because 
institutional traders’ information rents are reduced when more pre-trade information is provided. 
In contrast, my model predicts the opposite as pre-trade information increases institutional 
traders’ bargaining ability, which implies smaller bid-ask spreads for them.  
 To test this prediction, we restrict the sample of bond transactions to institutional-sized 
trades (trade size>$100,000).42 On average, the institutional-sized trades have smaller bid-ask 
spread than total sample trades (compared with Panel A of Table 3.4). This finding may suggest 
that institutional traders negotiate better prices than do retail traders. In the Panel A of Table 3.6, 
                                               
42 We follow Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007) to define institutional-sized trades as trades with a size greater 
than $100,000. 
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we find that the average effective bid-ask spreads are smaller on OTC-NYSE bonds (NYSE pre-
trade transparent bonds) than OTC-only bonds for institutional-sized trades.  
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Table 3.6: Institutional Traders' Effective Bid-Ask Spreads and NYSE Pre-Trade Transparency 
This table reports results for the relation between a bond’s bid-ask spread and whether a bond is listed on the NYSE 
for the sample limiting to institutional-sized trades (trade size>$100,000). Panels A and B report propensity score 
matching and regression results, respectively. The estimated effective bid-ask spread in Panel A is computed as the 
time series average of the difference between the average daily selling price and average daily buying price divided 
by their sum. The bond bid-ask spread is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  tt-test (Wilcoxon) is used to test 
the difference of mean (median) bid-ask spreads between the two groups of bonds. Anova and Kruskal Wallis tests 
are used to test the difference of standard deviation of bid-ask spreads. Panel B reports regression estimates using a 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) method. Definitions of other independent variables can be seen in Appendix B. All 
estimated coefficients reported in Panel B have been multiplied by 100. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
Panel A: Propensity Scoring Matched Bid-ask Spread Difference  
  OTC-only OTC-NYSE 
Spread-Mean (bps) 39 37 
S.D.*10-2 0.39 0.38 
tt-test for differences 0.05 
Wilcoxon-test for differences 0.00 
ANOVA 0.00 
Kruskal Wallis 0.00 
# of Bonds 3,265 
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Panel B: Dependent Variable is Bid-ask Spread 
Model: OLS 2SLS-Logistic 
Dependent variable Bid-ask spread Listed on the NYSE=1/0 Bid-ask Spread 
Listed on the NYSE -0.02 (0.09) 
  
-0.08 (0.10) 
Prob of Beling Listed on the NYSE 
  
89.71 (0.00) 
  Firm size (log millions) 0.02 (0.00) -0.13 (0.58) 0.02 (0.00) 
Leverage 0.18 (0.00) -0.01 (1.00) 0.34 (0.00) 
Issuer is in finance industry -0.08 (0.00) -0.16 (0.89) 0.18 (0.00) 
Issuer is a utility -0.09 (0.47) 0.30 (0.85) -0.08 (0.00) 
Issuers' equity is private 0.34 (0.00) 1.14 (0.90) -0.09 (0.50) 
Issue size (log millions) -0.01 (0.00) 0.05 (0.32) -0.01 (0.00) 
Moody's bond rating 0.00 (0.34) -0.08 (0.25) 0.00 (0.73) 
Years to maturity 0.01 (0.00) 0.02 (0.56) 0.01 (0.00) 
Global bond -0.02 (0.21) 0.96 (0.43) -0.01 (0.40) 
Variable rate bond 0.00 (0.80) -2.84 (0.09) -0.02 (0.40) 
Foreign bond -0.42 (0.21) 0.32 (0.99) -0.42 (0.21) 
Senior bond -0.05 (0.05) -1.05 (0.55) -0.05 (0.03) 
Rule144a bond -0.03 (0.83) -2.60 (0.77) -0.04 (0.73) 
Intercept 0.14 (0.00) 4.69 (0.18) 0.16 (0.00) 
 Adj. R-square 0.14 0.19 0.13 
# of Bonds 10,748 10,748 
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 Consistent with our model prediction of smaller bid-ask spreads for institutional traders 
provided with more pre-trade information, we find smaller spreads in institutional sized trades. 
OTC-NYSE bonds are two basis points smaller than OTC-Only bonds in Panel A of Table 3.6. 
For informed traders (institutional traders), the standard deviation of bid-ask spreads of OTC-
NYSE bonds is also smaller than OTC-Only bonds. The standard deviation of bid-ask spreads is 
smaller for OTC-NYSE bonds. All of these differences are statistically significant. Panel B of 
Table 3.6 continues to provide support the finding that OTC-NYSE bonds are more liquid after 
controlling for the sample selection bias with the 2SLS regression. This finding is evidenced by 
the negatively significant coefficient for the indicator variable of bonds being listed on the NYSE 
in the second stage regressions. However, the impact is only significant at the 0.1 significance 
level. This suggests though institutional traders do benefit from pre-trade transparency, the effect 
is less prominent than other traders. Institutional traders are sophisticated enough so that pre-
trade information only enriches their information sets marginally. 
 Collectively, these results provide supporting evidence for our search model, while not 
finding any supporting evidence of the information asymmetry model. Thus, the primary 
mechanism of pre-trade transparency affecting bonds’ liquidity is through increasing traders’ 
bargaining ability rather than increasing dealers’ ability to discern informed orders. This implies 
that improving pre-trade transparency favors traders over dealers. 
3.5 Transparency and Valuation in the Corporate Bond Market 
In Section 3.3.4, we find that corporate bonds with NYSE pre-trade transparency have higher 
liquidity than those without NYSE pre-trade transparency. The increase in liquidity should add 
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value to NYSE pre-trade transparent bonds, since investors value liquidity.43 In Panel A of Table 
3.7, we find that OTC-NYSE bonds on average have lower yields (higher prices) than OTC-Only 
bonds in the propensity-score matching specifications. For instance, OTC-NYSE bonds have an 
average yield of 5.95%, which is significantly smaller than OTC-only bonds’ mean yield of 
7.27% in the propensity-score matched sample. The approximately 1.2% difference in yields 
between OTC-NYSE bonds and OTC-only bonds looks puzzling, as it implies too large of an 
economic importance. 44  This could imply that our propensity-score matching sample is not 
perfect. There are some unknown features that should be controlled are not controlled. 
 Though our propensity-score matching method is not perfect, it does not affect our 
conclusion on pre-trade transparency significantly lowers cost of debt capital than otherwise 
identical firms. Our 2SLS regression (using the same instrumental variables as in previous 
sections), which is immune to the misspecification of the logistic model (the propensity-score 
matching model), shows that OTC-NYSE bonds have significantly smaller yield than OTC-Only 
bonds. This is evidenced by the negatively significant coefficient for the indicator variable of 
bonds being listed on the NYSE. However, we should be cautious in interpreting the economic 
significance of pre-trade transparency on bonds’ value. 
 
                                               
43 Amihud and Mendelson (1986) find that illiquid securities should compensate security investors with a liquidity 
premium. Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang (2004) argue that illiquidity leads to lower security prices and larger yield 
spreads given the same future cash flows since investors demand an ex-ante risk premium. Chen, Lesmond, and Wei 
(2007) find that illiquid bondholders are compensated with higher yield spreads and bonds’ yield spreads decrease 
when liquidity improves.  44	The current yield difference between high-yield bonds and investment grade bonds is roughly 1.8% based on 
Bloomberg bond indices. 
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Table 3.7: Bond Yield Differences by Propensity Score Matching 
This table reports results for the relation between a bond’s yield and whether a bond is listed on the NYSE for the 
total sample. Panels A and B report propensity score matching and regression results, respectively. Using the 
logistic model as described in Panel A of Table 4, the predicted probability (propensity score) for each bond is 
estimated and used to acquire a sample of OTC-only bonds with characteristics similar to bonds (based on the 
closest propensity score) traded both in OTC markets and on the NYSE in Panel A. For the missing bond yields, we 
use the trade price reported on TRACE and coupon and maturity date from FISD to compute a bond’s yield-to-
maturity. For multiple bond trading occurring within the same day, we compute trade-size weighted average of bond 
yields. Bond yields are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. tt-test (Wilcoxon) is used to test the difference of 
mean (median) yields between the two groups of bonds. Anova and Kruskal Wallis tests are used to test the 
difference of standard deviation of yields. Panel B reports regression estimates using a two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) method. Definitions of other independent variables can be seen in Appendix B. Estimated coefficients 
reported in the first stage regressions of Panel B are multiplied by 100. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
Panel A: Propensity Scoring Matched Bond Yield Difference 
 
OTC-only OTC-NYSE 
Yield-Mean (%) 7.27 5.95 
S.D.× 100 8.47 4.89 
tt-test for differences 0.00 
Wilcoxon-test for differences 0.00 
ANOVA 0.00 
Kruskal Wallis 0.00 
# of Bonds 3,850 
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 Panel B: Dependent Variable is Bond Yields 
Model: OLS 2SLS-Logistic 
Dependent variable Bond Yield Listed on the NYSE=1/0 Bond Yield 
Listed on the NYSE -1.47 (0.00) 
  
-8.74 (0.00) 
Prob of Beling Listed on the NYSE 
  
76.04 (0.00) 
  Firm size (log millions) -0.04 (0.31) -0.25 (0.15) -0.12 (0.01) 
Leverage 0.94 (0.00) 0.56 (0.72) 8.38 (0.00) 
Issuer is in finance industry -2.45 (0.00) -1.05 (0.23) 0.63 (0.01) 
Issuer is a utility 0.43 (0.82) 1.34 (0.30) -2.04 (0.00) 
Issuers' equity is private 8.21 (0.00) 3.59 (0.64) 1.52 (0.44) 
Issue size (log millions) -0.04 (0.00) 0.21 (0.00) 0.02 (0.06) 
Moody's bond rating 0.34 (0.00) -0.09 (0.02) 0.31 (0.00) 
Years to maturity 0.06 (0.00) 0.09 (0.01) 0.09 (0.00) 
Global bond -0.88 (0.00) 2.09 (0.04) -0.24 (0.38) 
Variable rate bond -1.00 (0.00) -4.52 (0.00) -2.37 (0.00) 
Foreign bond 1.70 (0.75) 1.39 (0.95) 2.12 (0.70) 
Senior bond -0.10 (0.74) -2.87 (0.02) -0.97 (0.00) 
Rule144a bond -3.73 (0.04) -6.19 (0.39) -5.60 (0.00) 
Intercept 3.04 (0.04) 6.50 (0.00) 5.01 (0.00) 
 Adj. R-square 0.11 0.19 0.03 
# of Bonds 17,854 17,854 
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 In the model in Chapter 2, the mechanism that pre-trade transparency affects liquidity is 
through the reduction of traders’ perceived Knightian uncertainty. Hence, the result in Table 3.7 
implies that reducing Knightian uncertainty can increase the value of a bond. This provides an 
empirical support of Easley and O’Hara (2010) in which they show that an asset’s value 
increases when its associated Knightian uncertainty decreases. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Given the significant importance of OTC markets in financial markets and the bilateral trading 
nature in OTC markets, a motivating question arises, “Whether, and if so, how pre-trade 
transparency affects OTC trading?” Our empirical evidence from the corporate bond markets 
shows that pre-trade transparency in an OTC market decreases the mean and standard deviation 
of bid-ask spreads for traders who trade in the market.  
 Our empirical findings are robust to endogeneity of firms’ bond listing decisions on the 
NYSE. After controlling for endogeneity with propensity-score matching, the average effective 
bid-ask spread of OTC-NYSE bonds is 10 basis points smaller than the average effective bid-ask 
spread of OTC-only bonds. The 10-basis-point difference suggests that approximately $1,058 
million could be saved on transaction costs if pre-trade information were revealed in the 
corporate bond markets. Using a firm’s accounting standard and the equality listing status of a 
firm as instrumental variable, we still find bonds’ bid-ask spreads are negatively correlated with 
the presence of NYSE pre-trade transparency.  
 In contrast to the prediction of Pagano and Roell (1996), our empirical evidence shows that 
improved pre-trade transparency increases traders’ bargaining ability rather than dealers’ ability 
to discern informed orders. Bond bid-ask spreads for institutional-sized trades on OTC-NYSE 
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bonds are significantly smaller than OTC-only bonds after controlling bond and firm 
characteristics. This finding is robust across various univariate and multivariate tests.  
 Consistent with the notion that improved liquidity should add value to securities, we find 
that OTC-NYSE bonds have significantly lower bond yields than OTC-only bonds. Controlling 
for the endogeneity of firms’ bond listing decisions on the NYSE with an IV regression, we 
document a negative relationship between bond yields and NYSE pre-trade transparency. 
Therefore, the improved pre-trade transparency adds value to OTC-NYSE bonds. However, the 
economic magnitude of the yield difference (approximately 1.2%) is puzzling. This mystifying 
yield premium indicates a potential area for future research. 
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Appendix A: Proofs of Propositions in Chapter 1 and 2 
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Proof of Proposition 1.1 
Proof: 
 Suppose ܩ  is a strongly stable network, in which dealers in the same component have 
uneven links. Let dealer ݆ be the one with the maximal number of links in this component. Then 
there exists a pair of unconnected dealers ݅ and ݅ᇱ, both of whom are connected with ݆ and at least 
one of whom has fewer links than ݆ (let’s say ݅ has fewer links than ݆). Consider a deviation such 
that both ݅ and ݅ᇱ cut their connections with ݆ and then build a link between themselves. Denote 
the obtainable network via this deviation as ܩᇱ. Since 1 < ݊௜ < ௝݊ and 1 < ݊௜ᇲ ≤ ௝݊, 
 ௜ܷ(ܩᇱ) − ௜ܷ(ܩ)= 12 ݊௜ᇲ݊௜ᇲ + 1 ൬ 1݊௜ᇲ + 1 − 1݊௜ᇲ + 2൰
−
12 ௝݊௝݊ + 1ቆ 1௝݊ + 1 − 1௝݊ + 2ቇ ≥ 0 
(A1) 
and 
 ܷ௜ᇲ(ܩᇱ) −ܷ௜ᇲ(ܩ)= 12 ݊௜݊௜ + 1 ൬ 1݊௜ + 1 − 1݊௜ + 2൰
−
12 ௝݊௝݊ + 1ቆ 1௝݊ + 1 − 1௝݊ + 2ቇ > 0. 
(A2) 
The deviation is an improving deviation, since ݅ᇱ is strictly better off and ݅ is weakly better off. 
Hence, ܩ cannot be a strongly stable network. 
 The above shows that dealers in the same component have the same number of links. Now 
suppose that a strongly stable network ܩ෨ has components of varying sizes and that, for ݅	and	݅ᇱ 
from distinct components, ௜ܷ൫ܩ෨൯ > ܷ௜ᇲ൫ܩ෨൯. Consider a deviation such that ݅ᇱ cuts all his links, 
all ݅’s connected dealers (call them ݕ) cut their links with ݅, and ݅ᇱ then builds links with those ݕ 
dealers. The deviation replaces ݅’s position in the network with ݅ᇱ. The new network is called ܩ෨ ᇱ. 
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In ܩ෨ ᇱ , ௬ܷ൫ܩ෨ ᇱ൯ = ௬ܷ൫ܩ෨൯, since nothing is changed for them. But ܷ௜ᇲ൫ܩ෨ ᇱ൯ > ܷ௜ᇲ൫ܩ෨൯, since ݅ᇱ 
replaces ݅’s position in the network and ௜ܷ൫ܩ෨൯ > ܷ௜ᇲ൫ܩ෨൯. The deviation is an improvement, 
which contradicts to the proposition that ܩ෨ is a strongly stable network. 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 1.2 
Proof: 
 The following lemma is useful in my proof of Proposition 1.2. 
 
Lemma A.1 
 In a strongly stable network no connected dealer has exactly one link. 
 
Proof: 
 Suppose ܩ is a strongly stable network such that for connected dealers ݅ and ݆, ݊௜ = 1 and 
௝݊ ≥ 1. Since  
 ௝ܷ(ܩ) − ௝ܷ(ܩ − ݆݅) (A3) 
=
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧ߩߪଶݖଶ ൭(ߣݍ − ܿ∗)ቆ 1݊
௝
−
1
௝݊ + 1ቇ൱ , ௝݊ ≥ 2
ߩߪଶݖଶ ൬−
ܿ∗2 ൰ , ௝݊ = 1, 
if ௝݊ = 1 or ߣݍ < ܿ∗, then cutting the connection between ݅ and ݆ will be an improving deviation. 
The above indicates that ݊௜ = 1 and ௝݊ = 1 cannot exist in a strongly stable network. The above 
also indicates that when ߣݍ < ܿ∗, the network ܩ (with ݅ having only one link) cannot be strongly 
stable. 
 Based on the above discussion, the remaining case to consider if ܩ is strongly stable is one 
in which ߣݍ ≥ ܿ∗ and ௝݊ > 1. When ௝݊ > 1, let ݆ᇱ be another dealer connecting to ݆. Let ܩᇱ be an 
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obtainable network from ܩ  via the deviation of cutting the connection between ݆  and ݆ᇱ  and 
building the link between ݅ and ݆ᇱ. If ߣݍ ≥ ܿ∗, 
 ௜ܷ(ܩᇱ) − ௜ܷ(ܩ) (A4) = ߩߪଶݖଶ ൭(ߣݍ − ܿ∗) ൬12 − 13൰ + ߣ 12 ௝݊ᇲ௝݊ᇲ + 1ቆ 1௝݊ᇲ + 1 − 1௝݊ᇲ + 2ቇ૚ቂ௡ೕᇲାଵஹଶቃ൱ > 0, 
and  
 ௝ܷᇲ(ܩᇱ) − ௝ܷᇲ(ܩ) (A5) = ߣߩߪଶݖଶ ൭12 12 ൬12 − 13൰ − 12 ௝݊௝݊ + 1ቆ 1௝݊ + 1 − 1௝݊ + 2ቇ൱ ≥ 0. 
Thus, the deviation is an improving deviation, which indicates that ܩ cannot be a strongly stable 
network when ߣݍ ≥ ܿ∗ and ௝݊ > 1. 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma A.1 implies that a connected strongly stable network is such that all connected dealers 
have the same number of links and this number is greater than one. If ܩ is a strongly stable 
network, then ௜ܷ(ܩ) can be rewritten as 
 
൞
ߩߪଶݖଶ ൭൬ܿ∗ − ߣݍ + ߣ2 − ߣ2݊௜൰ 1݊௜ + 1 + ߣݍ2 − ܿ∗൱ + ଴ܷ, ݊௜ ≥ 2
଴ܷ, ݊௜ = 0, 
 
(A6) 
which implies 
 
௜ܷ(ܩ) − ଴ܷ = max ቊߩߪଶݖଶ ݊௜݊௜ + 1 	ቆ− ߣ2 ൬ 1݊௜ − 1 − ݍ2 ൰ଶ+ ߣ(1 + ݍ)ଶ8 − ܿ∗ቇ , 0ቋ. 
(A7) 
Based on Eq.(A7), for any ݊௜ , when ܿ∗ > ఒ(ଵା௤)మ଼ , ௜ܷ(ܩ) − ଴ܷ < 0 . Thus, a strongly stable 
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network should be an empty network when ܿ∗ > ఒ(ଵା௤)మ
଼
.  
 Now suppose the strongly stable network is an empty network when ܿ∗ < ఒ(ଵା௤)మ
଼
. Consider 
an obtainable deviation in virtue of which all dealers build ො݊ = ଶ
ଵି௤
 links. Then the change in a 
dealer’s payoff is ߩߪଶݖଶ ௡ො
௡ොାଵ
	ቀ
ఒ(ଵା௤)మ
଼
− ܿ∗ቁ > 0. Thus, the deviation is an improvement in those 
dealers’ payoffs. The discussion above proves that when ܿ∗ < ఒ(ଵା௤)మ
଼
, the empty network cannot 
be strongly stable. To find out the equilibrium number of links for each dealer in a connected 
network, we have to consider the following continuous function ܨ(݊): 
 
ܨ(݊) = ൬ܿ∗ − ߣݍ + ߣ2 − ߣ2݊൰ 1݊ + 1, (A8) 
and ݊ ∈ [0,ܰ − 1]. Taking the derivative of ܨ(݊), we have 
 ݀ܨ(݊)
݀݊
= ൬−2 ൬ܿ∗ − ߣݍ + ߣ2൰	݊ଶ + 2ߣ݊ + ߣ൰ 12݊ଶ(݊ + 1)ଶ. (A9) 
ܨ(݊)  achieves the maximum at ݊∗ = ఒାටଶఒቀ௖∗ିఒ௤ାഊమቁାఒమ
ଶቀ௖∗ିఒ௤ା
ഊ
మ
ቁ
, as ௗி(௡∗ష)
௡
> 0, ௗி൫௡∗శ൯
௡
< 0 , and 
ௗி(௡∗)
௡
= 0. In addition, we have  
 
݀݊∗
݀ܿ∗
= − ߣ
ට2ߣ ቀܿ∗ − ߣݍ + ߣ2ቁ + ߣଶ ቌ 12 ቀܿ∗ − ߣݍ + ߣ2ቁቍ
−
ߣ + ට2ߣ ቀܿ∗ − ߣݍ + ߣ2ቁ + ߣଶ	2 ቀܿ∗ − ߣݍ + ߣ2ቁଶ < 0. 
(A10) 
 Based on the analysis of ܨ(݊), when ܿ∗ < ఒ(ଵା௤)మ
଼
, the strongly stable network is such that 
every dealer has ቨ
ߣ+ට2ቀܿ∗−ߣݍ+ߣ2ቁ+ߣ2ቀܿ∗−ߣݍ+ߣ2ቁ ቩ  or ቨߣ+ට2ቀܿ∗−ߣݍ+
ߣ2ቁ+ߣ2ቀܿ∗−ߣݍ+ߣ2ቁ ቩ + 1  links, whichever gives the dealer 
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greater utility. 45  Formally speaking, the equilibrium number of links when ܿ∗ < ఒ(ଵା௤)మ
଼
 
isቬ
ଵାටଶቀ
೎∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
ቁାଵ
ଶቀ
೎∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
ቁ
ቭ, in which 
  
ቬ
ଵାටଶቀ
೎∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
ቁାଵ
ଶቀ
೎∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
ቁ
ቭ = argmax
௡∈ቐቨ
భశටమ൬
೎∗
ഊ ష೜శ
భ
మ൰శభ
మ൬
೎∗
ഊ ష೜శ
భ
మ൰
ቩ,ቨభశටమ൬೎∗ഊ ష೜శభమ൰శభ
మ൬
೎∗
ഊ ష೜శ
భ
మ൰
ቩାଵቑ
ቀܿ∗ −
ߣݍ + ఒ
ଶ
−
ఒ
ଶ௡
ቁ
ଵ
௡ାଵ
. 
(A11) 
 When ܿ∗ = ఒ(ଵା௤)మ
଼
, then ݊௜∗ = ଶଵି௤ and ௜ܷ(ܩ) = ଴ܷ. In this case, I define the strongly stable 
network as the connected network with ଶ
ଵି௤
 links for every dealer. 
 To close the proof, I summarize the shape of the strongly stable network and the condition 
for its existence as follows. If ቬ
ଵାටଶቀ
೎∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
ቁାଵ
ଶቀ
೎∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
ቁ
ቭ ≥ ܰ − 1  or ܿ∗ ≤ ఒ(ଵା௤)మ
଼
, i.e., ܿ∗ ≤
min ቄߣ ቀ ଶேିଵ
ଶ(ேିଵ)మ + ݍ − ଵଶቁ , ఒ(ଵା௤)మ଼ ቅ, then ܩ is a complete network. If ߣ ቀ ଶேିଵଶ(ேିଵ)మ + ݍ − ଵଶቁ ≤ ܿ∗ ≤
ఒ(ଵା௤)మ
଼
, then the strongly stable network ܩ has ቬ
ଵାටଶቀ
೎∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
ቁାଵ
ଶቀ
೎∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
ቁ
ቭ links. If ܿ∗ > ఒ(ଵା௤)మ
଼
, then the 
strongly stable network is an empty network. If none of the above conditions is satisfied, there is 
no strongly stable network. 
Q.E.D. 
 
                                               
45	ቨఒାටଶቀ௖∗ିఒ௤ାഊమቁାఒ
ଶቀ௖∗ିఒ௤ା
ഊ
మ
ቁ
ቩ	is	the	largest	integer	no	larger	than	
ఒାටଶቀ௖∗ିఒ௤ା
ഊ
మ
ቁାఒ
ଶቀ௖∗ିఒ௤ା
ഊ
మ
ቁ
. 
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Proof of Proposition 1.3 
Proof: 
 We first show that the equilibrium number of links weakly increases when the relative cost 
ܿ∗ decreases. From Proposition 1.2, we know when ܿ∗ > ఒ(ଵା௤)మ
଼
, the strongly stable network is 
an empty network. When ܿ∗  decreases such that ܿ∗ ≤ min ቄߣ ቀ ଶேିଵ
ଶ(ேିଵ)మ + ݍ − ଵଶቁ , ఒ(ଵା௤)మ଼ ቅ , the 
strongly stable network is the complete network. When ߣ ቀ ଶேିଵ
ଶ(ேିଵ)మ + ݍ − ଵଶቁ ≤ ܿ∗ ≤ ఒ(ଵା௤)మ଼ , 
every dealer has ቬ
ଵାටଶቀ
೎∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
ቁାଵ
ଶቀ
೎∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
ቁ
ቭ links. Thus, to show that the equilibrium number of links 
weakly increases when the relative cost decreases, we have to show only that ቬ
ଵାටଶቀ
೎∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
ቁାଵ
ଶቀ
೎∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
ቁ
ቭ 
weakly increases when ܿ∗ decreases. 
 Consider ܿଵ∗ < ܿ଴∗,  then Eq.(A10) shows that 
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢ଵାඨଶ൬೎భ
∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
൰ାଵ
ଶ൬
೎భ
∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
൰
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
≥
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢ଵାඨଶ൬೎బ
∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
൰ାଵ
ଶ൬
೎బ
∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
൰
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
. Due to 
the definition of ⟦. ⟧ , 
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢ଵାඨଶ൬೎భ
∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
൰ାଵ
ଶ൬
೎భ
∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
൰
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥ >
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢ଵାඨଶ൬೎బ
∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
൰ାଵ
ଶ൬
೎బ
∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
൰
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
 implies ൶
ଵାඨଶ൬
೎భ
∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
൰ାଵ
ଶ൬
೎భ
∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
൰
ൺ >
൶
ଵାඨଶ൬
೎బ
∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
൰ାଵ
ଶ൬
೎బ
∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
൰
ൺ. Hence, we focus on the case in which 
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢ଵାඨଶ൬೎భ
∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
൰ାଵ
ଶ൬
೎భ
∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
൰
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥ =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢ଵାඨଶ൬೎బ
∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
൰ାଵ
ଶ൬
೎బ
∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
൰
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
. 
Let ݊଴∗ =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢ଵାඨଶ൬೎బ
∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
൰ାଵ
ଶ൬
೎బ
∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
൰
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
. Suppose that when ߣ ቀ ଶேିଵ
ଶ(ேିଵ)మ + ݍ − ଵଶቁ ≤ ܿ∗ ≤ ఒ(ଵା௤)మ଼ , the 
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equilibrium number of links strictly increases in ܿ∗. Then ܿଵ∗ < ܿ଴∗ implies ൶ଵାඨଶ൬೎భ∗ഊ ି௤ାభమ൰ାଵ
ଶ൬
೎భ
∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
൰
ൺ <
൶
ଵାඨଶ൬
೎బ
∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
൰ାଵ
ଶ൬
೎బ
∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
൰
ൺ. Since 
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢ଵାඨଶ൬೎భ
∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
൰ାଵ
ଶ൬
೎భ
∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
൰
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥ =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢ଵାඨଶ൬೎బ
∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
൰ାଵ
ଶ൬
೎బ
∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
൰
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥ = ݊଴∗ , it has to be the case that 
൶
ଵାඨଶ൬
೎భ
∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
൰ାଵ
ଶ൬
೎భ
∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
൰
ൺ = ݊଴∗  and ൶ଵାඨଶ൬೎బ∗ഊ ି௤ାభమ൰ାଵ
ଶ൬
೎బ
∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
൰
ൺ = ݊଴∗ + 1. That is, the equilibrium number of links 
equals ݊଴∗  when the relative cost is ܿଵ∗ , but it equals ݊଴∗ + 1 when the relative cost is ܿ଴∗ . This 
implies that  
  
ቀܿଵ
∗ − ߣݍ + ఒ
ଶ
−
ఒ
ଶ௡బ
∗ቁ
ଵ
௡బ
∗ାଵ
> ቀܿଵ∗ − ߣݍ + ఒଶ − ఒଶ௡బ∗ାଶቁ ଵ௡బ∗ାଶ ⇔ ܿଵ∗ >
ଵ
௡బ
∗ , 
(A12) 
and 
  
ቀܿ଴
∗ − ߣݍ + ఒ
ଶ
−
ఒ
ଶ௡బ
∗ቁ
ଵ
௡బ
∗ାଵ
< ቀܿ଴∗ − ߣݍ + ఒଶ − ఒଶ௡బ∗ାଶቁ ଵ௡బ∗ାଶ ⇔ ܿ଴∗ <
ଵ
௡బ
∗ . 
(A13) 
Eq.(A12) and Eq.(A13) imply that ܿଵ∗ > ଵ௡బ∗ > ܿ଴∗ contradicting our set-up. Hence, when ܿଵ∗ < ܿ଴∗, 
൶
ଵାඨଶ൬
೎భ
∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
൰ାଵ
ଶ൬
೎భ
∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
൰
ൺ ≥ ൶
ଵାඨଶ൬
೎బ
∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
൰ାଵ
ଶ൬
೎బ
∗
ഊ
ି௤ା
భ
మ
൰
ൺ. 
 Overall, Proposition 1.2 implies that an equilibrium network becomes increasingly 
connected when ܿ∗ decreases. To prove Proposition 1.3, we have only to show that ܿ∗ decreases 
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when ߪ or ݖ increases, ceteris paribus, and ܿ∗ decreases when ܿ increases, ceteris paribus. This is 
true, since  
 ݀ܿ∗
݀ߪ
= − 2ܿ
ߩߪଷݖଶ
< 0, (A14) 
 ݀ܿ∗
݀ݖ
= − 2ܿ
ߩߪଶݖଷ
< 0, (A15) 
and  
 ݀ܿ∗
݀ܿ
= 1
ߩߪଶݖଶ
> 0. (A16) 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 1.4 
Proof: 
 Fixing an equilibrium network, we have  
 ݀݌௜
݀ݖ
= − ߩߪଶ
݊௜ + 1 < 0, (A17) 
 ݀݌௜଴
݀ݖ
= −(1 − ݍ) ߩߪଶ
݊௜ + 1 < 0, (A18) 
 ݀markup
݀ݖ
= −ݍ ߩߪଶ
݊௜ + 1 < 0. (A19) 
Q.E.D. 
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Proof of Proposition 1.5 
Proof: 
 Given a fixed equilibrium network, we have  
 ݀݌௜
݀ߪ
= −2ߩߪ ൬ܫ + ݖ
݊௜ + 1൰ < 0, (A20) 
 ݀݌௜଴
݀ߪ
= −2(1 − ݍ)ߩߪ ൬ܫ + ݖ
݊௜ + 1൰ < 0, (A21) 
 ݀markup
݀ߪ
= −2ݍߩߪ ൬ܫ + ݖ
݊௜ + 1൰ + 2ݍܯଵߪ. (A22) 
If ܯଵ ≥ ߩ ቀܫ + ௭௡೔ାଵቁ, then ௗmarkupௗఙ ≥ 0. Otherwise, ௗmarkupௗఙ < 0. 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 1.6 
Proof: 
 We want to show that ݌௜ , ݌௜଴, and the markup increase in ݊௜. Without loss of generality, we 
let ݊௜ < ݊௜ᇱ. Then  
 
݌௜(݊′௜) − ݌௜(݊௜) = ߣߩߪଶݖଶ ൬ 1݊௜ + 1 − 1݊ᇱ௜ + 1൰ > 0 ⇒ ݌௜(݊௜ᇱ)> ݌௜(݊௜). 
(A23) 
Since ݌௜଴ = (1 − ݍ)݌௜ + ݍ(ܯ଴ −ܯଵߪଶ) , it is obvious that ݌௜଴(݊௜ᇱ) > ݌௜଴(݊௜) . Similarly, as 
markup = ݍ(݌௜ −ܯ଴ + ܯଵߪଶ), markup(݊௜ᇱ) > markup(݊௜). 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 1.7 
Proof: 
 The number of trades is  
 ߣ + ෍ ߣ
௝:௜௝∈ீ	 = (݊௜ + 1)ߣ, (A24) 
which obviously increases in ݊௜. 
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 Since, in an equilibrium network, when dealer ݅ and dealer ݆ are linked they have the same 
number of links, the volume of trades is  
 
൫ܫ + ݖ − ௜ܺ஺൯ + ෍ ߣ ௝ܺ஻
௝:௜௝∈ீ = ߣ ൬1 − 2݊௜ + 1൰ ݖ + ݊௜ߣ ݊௜ − 1݊௜ ݖ݊௜ + 1= 2ߣ ൬1 − 2
݊௜ + 1൰ ݖ, 
(A25) 
which also increases in ݊௜. 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 1.8 
Proof: 
 The expected risky holding is  
 
ܧ ௜ܺ = ߣ ௜ܺ஺ + ෍ ߣ൫ܫ + ௝ܺ஻൯
௝:௜௝∈ீ + ቌ1 − ߣ − ෍ ߣ௝:௜௝∈ீ	 ቍ ܫ (A26) 
 = ߣ ൬ܫ + 2ݖ
݊௜ + 1൰+ ෍ ߣቆܫ + ௝݊ − 1
௝݊
ݖ
௝݊ + 1ቇ
௝:௜௝∈ீ
+ ቌ1 − ߣ − ෍ ߣ
௝:௜௝∈ீ ቍ ܫ 
 
 = ߣݖ + ܫ.  
The variance if the risky holding is  
 ܸܽݎ( ௜ܺ) = ܧ ௜ܺଶ − (ܧ ௜ܺ)ଶ (A27) 
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 = ߣ ൬ܫ + 2ݖ
݊௜ + 1൰ଶ+ ෍ ߣቆܫ + ௝݊ − 1
௝݊
ݖ
௝݊ + 1ቇଶ
௝:௜௝∈ீ
+ ቌ1 − ߣ − ෍ ߣ
௝:௜௝∈ீ ቍ ܫଶ − (ߣݖ + ܫ)ଶ 
 
 = ߣ ൬ܫ + 2ݖ
݊௜ + 1൰ଶ + ݊௜ ቆܫ + ௝݊ − 1௝݊ ݖ௝݊ + 1ቇଶ + (1 − ߣ − ݊௜ߣ)ܫଶ
− (ߣݖ + ܫ)ଶ. 
 
We have only to prove that the claim is true for ݊௜and ݊௜ + 1, and then by induction we infer that 
the claim is true for any ݊௜ < ௝݊. 
 ܸܽݎ൫ ௜ܺ(݊௜)൯ − ܸܽݎ൫ ௜ܺ(݊௜ + 1)൯ (A28) 
 = ߣ ൬ܫ + 2
݊௜ + 1 ݖ൰ଶ − ߣ ൬ܫ + 2݊௜ + 2 ݖ൰ଶ 
 +݊௜ߣ ቆ൬ܫ + ݊௜ − 1݊௜ ݖ݊௜ + 1൰ଶ − ൬ܫ + ݊௜݊௜ + 1 ݖ݊௜ + 2൰ଶቇ  
 
−ߣ ൬ܫ + ݊௜
݊௜ + 1 ݖ݊௜ + 2൰ଶ + ߣܫଶ.  
   
Since  
 
ߣ ൬ܫ + 2
݊௜ + 1 ݖ൰ଶ − ߣ ൬ܫ + 2݊௜ + 2	 ݖ൰ଶ= ߣݖ 2(݊௜ + 1)(݊௜ + 2) ൬2ܫ + 2ݖ 2݊௜ + 3(݊௜ + 1)(݊௜ + 2)൰, 
(A29) 
 
݊௜ߣ ቆ൬ܫ + ݊௜ − 1݊௜ ݖ݊௜ + 1൰ଶ − ൬ܫ + ݊௜݊௜ + 1 ݖ݊௜ + 2൰ଶቇ= ߣݖ ݊௜ − 2(݊௜ + 1)(݊௜ + 2)ቆ2ܫ + ݖ 2݊௜ଶ + ݊௜ − 2݊௜(݊௜ + 1)(݊௜ + 2)ቇ, 
(A30) 
and 
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−ߣ ൬ܫ + ݊௜
݊௜ + 1 ݖ݊௜ + 2൰ଶ + ߣܫଶ= −ߣݖ ݊௜(݊௜ + 1)(݊௜ + 2)൬2ܫ + ݖ ݊௜(݊௜ + 1)(݊௜ + 2)൰, 
(A31) 
we have  
 ܸܽݎ൫ ௜ܺ(݊௜)൯ − ܸܽݎ൫ ௜ܺ(݊௜ + 1)൯
ߣݖଶ
		 
(A32) 
 = 4 2݊௜ + 3(݊௜ + 1)ଶ(݊௜ + 2)ଶ + (݊௜ − 2)(2݊௜ଶ + ݊௜ − 2)݊௜(݊௜ + 1)ଶ(݊௜ + 2)ଶ
−
݊௜
ଶ(݊௜ + 1)ଶ(݊௜ + 2)ଶ 
 = ݊௜ଷ + 5݊௜ଶ + 2݊௜ + 4
݊௜(݊௜ + 1)ଶ(݊௜ + 2)ଶ > 0. 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 1.9 
Proof: 
 Obviously, a small-capacity dealer never connects to his own kind, as there is only a linking 
cost but no risk-sharing benefit. This implies that small-capacity dealers connect only to large-
capacity or medium-capacity dealers. Hence, ݊௦ೄ ≤ ݊௦ಾ ,݊௦ಽ . 
 Now, suppose that ܩ is a strongly stable network such that ݊௦ಾ > ݊௦ಽ . Let dealer ݅ be one of 
ݏெ’s connected dealers who does not connect to ݏ௅. Consider another network ܩ′ obtained via 
replacing the ݏெ݅ link with the ݏ௅݅ link. Then, we have 
 ௜ܷ(ܩᇱ) − ௜ܷ(ܩ)= ݏ௅ߣߩߪଶݖ	ቆ1 − 1݊௦ಽ + 1ቇቆ 1݊௦ಽ + 1 − 1݊௦ಽ + 2ቇ
− ݏெߣߩߪଶݖ ቆ1 − 1݊௦ಾ + 1ቇቆ 1݊௦ಾ + 1 − 1݊௦ಾ + 2ቇ> 0, 
(A33) 
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 ܷ௦ಽ(ܩᇱ) −ܷ௦ಽ(ܩ)= ߣߩߪଶݖ(ݏ௅ݍ − ܿ̃)ቆ 1݊௦ಽ + 1 − 1݊௦ಽ + 2ቇ+ ݏ௜ߣߩߪଶݖ2 ൬1 − 1݊௜ + 1൰ ൬ 1݊௜ + 1 − 1݊௜ + 2൰
≥ ߣߩߪଶݖ(ݏெݍ − ܿ̃)ቆ 1݊௦ಾ − 1݊௦ಾ + 1ቇ+ ݏ௜ߣߩߪଶݖ2 	൬1 − 1݊௜ + 1൰ ൬ 1݊௜ + 1 − 1݊௜ + 2൰. 
(A34) 
For ܩ to be a strongly stable network it has to be the case that cutting the link between ݏெ and ݅ 
cannot make ݏெ  better off. This means that ߣߩߪଶݖ(ݏெݍ − ܿ̃) ൬ ଵ௡ೞಾ − ଵ௡ೞಾାଵ൰ + ௦೔ఒఘఙమ௭ଶ 	ቀ1 −
ଵ
௡೔ାଵ
ቁ ቀ
ଵ
௡೔ାଵ
−
ଵ
௡೔ାଶ
ቁ > 0, which implies that ܷ௦ಽ(ܩᇱ) > ௦ܷಽ(ܩ). Thus, ܩ′ makes both ݏ௅  and ݅ 
better off, which means ܩ cannot be a strongly stable network. 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 1.10 
Proof: 
 The following lemma is helpful in the proof. 
 
Lemma A.2 
 In a strongly stable network, if large-capacity dealers connect to small-capacity dealers, 
then large-capacity dealers also connect to medium-capacity dealers. 
 
Proof: 
 Let dealer ݏ௅ be the large-capacity, dealer ݏெ be the medium-capacity, and dealer ݏௌ be the 
small-capacity. Suppose that ܩ is a strongly stable network, in which ݏ௅ and ݏௌ are connected but 
ݏ௅ and ݏெ are not connected. Let ݊௦ಽ , ݊௦ಾ , and ݊௦ೄ be the number of links ݏ௅, ݏெ, and ݏௌ have, 
respectively. Let ܩᇱ be an obtainable network from ܩ  via deviation of connecting ݏ௅  and ݏெ . 
 147 
Then, 
 ௦ܷಾ(ܩᇱ) − ௦ܷಾ(ܩ)= ߣߩߪଶݖ(ݏெݍ − ܿ̃)ቆ 1݊௦ಾ + 1 − 1݊௦ಾ + 2ቇ+ ݏ௅ߣߩߪଶݖ2 	ቆ1 − 1݊௦ಽ + 1ቇቆ 1݊௦ಽ + 1 − 1݊௦ಽ + 2ቇ 
(A35) 
 
≥ ߣߩߪଶݖ	ݏெݍ ቆ
1
݊௦ಾ + 1 − 1݊௦ಾ + 2ቇ+ ݏ௅ ߣߩߪଶݖ2 	ቆ1 − 1݊௦ಽ + 1ቇቆ 1݊௦ಽ + 1 − 1݊௦ಽ + 2ቇ
− ܿ̃ߣߩߪଶݖ	ቆ
1
݊௦ೄ + 1 − 1݊௦ೄ + 2ቇ. 
 Since ܩ is a strongly stable network. Consider ܩᇱᇱ, another network that is obtainable from ܩ 
via the deviation of cutting the link between ݏ௅ and ݏௌ. Then, 
 ௦ܷೄ(ܩᇱᇱ) −ܷ௦ೄ(ܩ)= −ݏ௅ ߣߩߪଶݖ2 	ቆ1 − 1݊௦ಽ + 1ቇቆ 1݊௦ಽ + 1 − 1݊௦ಽ + 2ቇ+ ܿ̃ߣߩߪଶݖ	ቆ 1
݊௦ೄ + 1 − 1݊௦ೄ + 2ቇ ≤ 0. 
(A36) 
Otherwise, ܩ is not strongly stable. Eq.(A36) implies that ௦ܷಾ(ܩᇱ) − ௦ܷಾ(ܩ) > 0 in Eq.(A35). 
That is, ݏெ is strictly better off with if deviates to ܩᇱ. As ܿ̃ ≤ ݏ௅ݍ implies that dealer ݏ௅ is also 
better off, that is, 
 ௦ܷಽ(ܩᇱ) − ௦ܷಽ(ܩ)= ߣߩߪଶݖ(ݏ௅ݍ − ܿ̃)ቆ 1݊௦ಽ + 1 − 1݊௦ಽ + 2ቇ+ ݏெ ߣߩߪଶݖ2 	ቆ1 − 1݊௦ಾ + 1ቇቆ 1݊௦ಾ + 1 − 1݊௦ಾ + 2ቇ
≥ 0, 
(A37) 
deviation from ܩ to ܩᇱ is an improving deviation. Hence, ܩ cannot be strongly stable. 
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Q.E.D. 
 Since ܿ̃ < ݏ௅ݍ , any two high-matching dealer must be connected in the strongly stable 
network. Thus, ݊௦ಽ ≥ ௦ܰಽ − 1, where ௦ܰಽ  is the number of large-capacity dealers. Since ܿ̃ <
௦ಽ
ଶ
ேೞಽିଶ
൫ேೞಽିଵ൯
మ
ேೞಽ
, low-capacity dealers always connect with large-capacity dealers. By Lemma A.2, 
any medium-capacity dealer must also connect with all large-capacity dealers. Therefore, large-
capacity dealers comprise the core of the network and connect to all dealers in the strongly stable 
network. 
 Since any medium-capacity dealer connects to all high-capacity dealers, all medium-
capacity dealers have at least ௦ܰಽ  links. Since all medium-capacity dealers are identical, 
Proposition 1.1 still applies. The payoff function for a medium-capacity dealer ݉ is 
 
ܷ௠(ܩ) = ߣߩߪଶݖ ቆܿ̃ − ݏெݍ + ݏெ2
− ݏெ
݊௦ಾ൫ ௦ܰಽ + 1൯ − ௦ܰಽ2݊௦ಾଶ ቇ 1݊௦ಾ + 1 − ܿ
− ܧݑ൫ܹ(ܫ)൯+ ݏ௅ ௦ܰಽ ߣߩߪଶݖ2 (ܰ − 2)(ܰ − 1)ଶܰ. 
(A38) 
 Let  
 
݊௦ಾ
∗ = arg max
௡ೞಾ∈ℕ
ቆܿ̃ − ݏெݍ + ݏெ2
− ݏெ
݊௦ಾ൫ ௦ܰಽ + 1൯ − ௦ܰಽ2݊௦ಾଶ ቇ 1݊௦ಾ + 1, 
(A39) 
where	݊௦ಾ
∗  is the number of links a medium-capacity dealer has in equilibrium. 
Q.E.D. 
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Proof of Proposition 1.11 
Proof: 
 Since  ݌̅௦ಽ
଴ − ݌̅௦ಾ
଴ = ቀ௭ା௦ಽ
௦ಽ
∫ ݌௦ಽ
଴ ݂(ݖ)݀ݖ௭ା௦ಽ
௭
−
௭ା௦ಾ
௦ಾ
∫ ݌௦ಾ
଴ ݂(ݖ)݀ݖ௭ା௦ಾ
௭
ቁ =
(1 − ݍ)ߩߪଶݖ ൭൬ଵା ೥ೞಾ൰ ୪୬൬ଵାೞಾ೥ ൰
௡ೞಾ
∗ ାଵ
−
൬ଵା
೥
ೞಽ
൰ ୪୬൬ଵା
ೞಽ
೥
൰
ே
൱ , it is obvious if ே
௡ೞಾ
∗ ାଵ
≥
൬ଵା
೥
ೞಽ
൰୪୬൬ଵା
ೞಽ
೥
൰
൬ଵା
೥
ೞಾ
൰ ୪୬൬ଵା
ೞಾ
೥
൰
, then 
݌௦ಽ
଴ ≥ ݌௦ಾ
଴ . Otherwise, ݌௦ಽ
଴ < ݌௦ಾ଴ . 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 1.12 
Proof: 
 
Definition A.1 
 A cycle in a “trading-sets network” is a path consisting of more than two non-repeated 
trading sets and the starting set is the same as the ending set. 
 
Lemma 3 [Theorem 4.2 in Malamud and Rostek (2013)] 
 Any two trading sets in the “trading-sets network” have the same prices if and only if these 
two sets are on the same cycle. 
 
Proof: 
 See Malamud and Rostek (2013). 
Q.E.D. 
 
Definition A.2 
 A link in a “trading-sets network” is a bridge if cutting it would cause its ending points to 
lie in separate components. 
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Lemma A.4 
 A monopolistic dealer in an inter-dealer network is a bridge in the “trading-sets network” 
derived from the inter-dealer network.  
 
Proof: 
 Suppose a monopolistic dealer is not a bridge in the “trading-sets network.” Then removing 
the monopolistic dealer does not increase the number of components in the “trading-sets 
network.” This means that all trading sets that include the monopolistic dealer are still connected, 
even when the monopolistic dealer is removed. To see if dealers in those trading-sets are 
connected in the inter-dealer network, we do the following. 
i) Label those trading-sets in sequence from 1 to ݉. 
ii) Start from set 1, and then find its connected sets.  
iii) Start from those connected sets identified in step 2, and then find their connected sets. 
iv) Repeat step 3 until all trading sets are exhausted. 
 Based on Definition 1.3 and 1.4, the above algorithm shows that dealers in the same trading 
set are connected, and dealers in trading sets identified in step 3 are also connected. Since all 
those trading sets are connected, step 4 eventually ends, which means that all dealers in those 
trading sets are connected. This contradicts the definition of the monopolistic dealer, whose 
neighbors belong to separate components. Hence, a monopolistic dealer is a bridge in the 
“trading-sets network.” 
Q.E.D. 
 Lemma A.3 is used to prove the second half of Proposition 1.12. If a pair of dealers have 
more than two unconnected common neighbors, then in the “trading-sets network” this pair of 
dealers and their unconnected common neighbors construct a cycle. By Lemma A.3, prices 
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along the cycle are the same, which means that any of those dealers buys and sells at the same 
price in distinct trading sets. That is, the markup for “hot potato” trading is zero. The first half of 
Proposition 1.12 is proved by Lemma A.4, which states that a monopolistic dealer is a bridge in 
the “trading-sets network.” Hence, the monopolistic dealer can never be in a cycle. Lemma A.3 
then implies that the monopolistic dealer always charges non-zero markups. 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 2.1 
Proof: 
  Denote ܦ(ܽ) = ∑ ߚ௧ܦ௧(ܽ)௧  and ܵ(ܾ) = ∑ ߚ௧ ௧ܵ(ܾ)௧ . Given that ܦ௧(ܽ)	is a continuous and 
decreasing function on [ܽ,ܽ], it is easy to see that ܦ(ܽ) is continuous and decreasing on [ܽ,ܽ]. 
We note that, from the value function of the buyers  
 
ܸ஻(ܽ) = max ൜0, ߥ஻ − ܽ,ߚනܸ஻( ොܽ)݀ߠ௔ൠ, (A40) 
ܽ = ߥ஻ and ܽ = ݎ஻(1). Similarly, we have ܵ(ܾ) continuous and increasing on ൣܾ, ܾ൧, in which 
ܾ = ݎௌ(0)  and ܾ = ߥௌ . As ܦ௧(ܽ) = ௧ܵ(ܾ) , we have ܦ(ܽ) = ܵ(ܾ) . Then, define the inverse 
functions ܣ(ݍ) and ܤ(ݍ) mapping from ݍ to prices.  
 From the inverse function theorem, we have 
 
ܣᇱ(ݍ) = ൬߲ܦ
߲ܽ
൰
ିଵ = ቌ− 1 − ߚ + ܨ௔(ܽ)(1 − ߳)ߚ
ܰ(1 − ߚ) ቀ1 − ߚ൫1 − ܨ௔(ܽ)൯ቁቍ
ିଵ, (A41) 
 
ܤᇱ(ݍ) = ൬߲ܵ
߲ܾ
൰
ିଵ = ቆ1 − ߚ + ൫1 − ܨ௕(ܾ)൯(1 − ߳)ߚ
ܰ(1 − ߚ)൫1 − ߚܨ௕(ܾ)൯ ቇିଵ. (A42) 
As ܽ(݇) increases in ݇ and ܾ(݇) decreases in ݇, we have 
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ܨ௔(ܽ) = ௔ܲ[ ොܽ < ܽ] = ௞ܲൣ ෠݇ < ݇൧ = ݇ − ݇݇∗ − ݇, (A43) 
 1 − ܨ௕(ܾ) = ௕ܲൣ ෠ܾ < ܾ൧ = ௞ܲൣ ෠݇ < ݇൧ = ݇ − ݇݇∗ − ݇, (A44) 
where ݇∗ is the marginal dealer whose profit margin and trading volume are zeros. Thus, the total 
population of dealer ܰ equals to ݇∗ − ݇.  
 Plugging ܨ௔(ܽ) and ܨ௕(ܾ) into ܣᇱ(ݍ) and ܤᇱ(ݍ) respectively, we obtain  
 
ܣᇱ(ݍ) = −ܤᇱ(ݍ) = ൮− 1 − ߚ + ݇ − ݇݇∗ − ݇ (1 − ߳)ߚ
ܰ(1 − ߚ) ൬1 − ߚ(݇∗ − ݇)݇∗ − ݇ ൰൲
ିଵ. (A45) 
For the dealer with transaction cost ݇, he chooses ݍ to maximize the expected profit (ܣ(ݍ) −
ܤ(ݍ) − ݇)ݍ. The optimality condition implies, 
 ܣ(ݍ) − ܤ(ݍ) − ݇ = ൫ܤᇱ(ݍ) − ܣᇱ(ݍ)൯ݍ. (A46) 
Thus, we obtain 
 ܣ൫ݍ(݇)൯ − ܤ൫ݍ(݇)൯ − ݇
= 2൫݇∗ − ݇൯(1 − ߚ) ൬1 − ߚ(݇∗ − ݇)݇∗ − ݇ ൰ ݍ(݇)1 − ߚ + ݇ − ݇݇∗ − ݇ (1 − ߳)ߚ − ݇. 
(A47) 
Substituting ݍ(݇) = ܦ൫ܽ(݇)൯ into Eq.(A47), we get 
 ܽ(݇) − ܾ(݇) − ݇
= 2 ൬1 − ߚ(݇∗ − ݇)݇∗ − ݇ ൰1 − ߚ + ݇ − ݇݇∗ − ݇ (1 − ߳)ߚ	න 1 − ߚ + ܨ௔(ݎ
஻)(1 − ߳)ߚ1 − ߚ൫1 − ܨ௔(ݎ஻)൯ ݀ݎ஻௥ಳ(ଵ)௔(௞)	 . 
(A48) 
Since, for any ݇, ܦ൫ܽ(݇)൯ = ܵ൫ܾ(݇)൯, it implies that డ஽
డ௞
= డௌ
డ௞
. Since ܣᇱ(ݍ) = 	−ܤᇱ(ݍ), we have 
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డ௔
డ௞
= − డ௕
డ௞
. Thus, 
 ܽ(݇) + ܾ(݇) = ܥ, (A49) 
in which ܥ represents a constant.  
 From the buyer’s reservation value, we have 
 1 = ݎ஻(1) + ߚ(1 − ߳)1 − ߚ න ௔ܲ[ܽ < ොܽ]݀ ොܽ௥ಳ(ଵ)	௔
= ݎ஻(1) + ߚ(1 − ߳)1 − ߚ න ݇ − ݇݇∗ − ݇ ܽᇱ(݇)݀݇௞∗௞ , 
(A50) 
where the second equality is obtained by performing a change of variables. Likewise, we have 
 0 = ݎௌ(0) − ߚ(1 − ߳)1 − ߚ න ௕ܲൣܾ > ෠ܾ൧݀ ෠ܾ௕௥ೄ(బ)
= ݎௌ(0) + ߚ(1 − ߳)1 − ߚ න ݇ − ݇݇∗ − ݇ ܾᇱ(݇)݀݇௞∗௞ . 
(A51) 
 From the above, it is obvious that 1 = ݎ஻(1) + ݎௌ(0).  Since ܽ(݇∗) = ܽ = ݎ஻(1)  and 
ܾ(݇∗) = ܾ = ݎௌ(0), we have ܽ(݇∗) + ܾ(݇∗) = 1. This implies ܥ = 1, and hence, 
 ܾ(݇) = 1 − ܽ(݇). (A52) 
 Plugging the Eq.(A52) into the optimality condition (Eq.(A47)) and differentiating with 
respect to ݇, we arrive at the following differential equation 
 
ܽᇱ(݇) − ܽ(݇)ߚܺ(݇)2൫݇∗ − ݇൯ = 14 − (1 + ݇)ߚܺ(݇)4(݇∗ − ݇) , (A53) 
in which 
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ܺ(݇) = 11 − ߚ(݇∗ − ݇)݇∗ − ݇ − 1 − ߳1 − ߚ + ݇ − ݇݇∗ − ݇ (1 − ߳)ߚ. (A54) 
The solution for the above differential equation is 
 
ܽ(݇) = ݁ି∫ ௒(௭)ௗ௭ೖ∗ೖ ቆ݇∗ + 12
+ න ቆ− 14 + 1 + ݖ2 ܻ(ݖ)ቇ݁∫ ௒(௨)ௗ௨ೖ∗೥ ௗ௭௞∗௞ ቇ, 
(A55) 
in which 
 
ܻ(ݖ) = ߚܺ(ݖ)2൫݇∗ − ݇൯. (A56) 
Thus, Eq.(A56) determines the equilibrium asks, and the equilibrium bids equal 1 − ܽ. 
 To determine the equilibrium ݇∗, we apply ݇∗ = ܽ(݇∗) − ܾ(݇∗) to the buyer’s reservation 
value ݎ஻(1) and get  
 1 = ݇∗ + 12 + ߚ(1 − ߳)1 − ߚ ቆ(݇∗ + 1)2 − 1݇∗ − ݇න ܽ(݇)݀݇௞∗௞ ቇ. (A57) 
           Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 2.2 
Proof: 
 The buyer follows a reservation pricing strategy when he searches in the OTC market. This 
means that 
 
ߥ஻ − ݎ஻(ߥ஻) = ߚනܸ ( ොܽ,ܽ௖ , ߥ஻)݀ߠ௔ . (A58) 
Plugging Eq. (A58) into the buyer’s value function before he starts to search, Eq.(2.23), we have 
 ܹ஻(ܽ௖ , ߥ஻) = max{0, ߥ஻ − ܽ௖ , ߥ஻ − ݎ஻(ߥ஻)}. (A59) 
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Since ݎ஻(ߥ஻) increases in ߥ஻ , and since ܽ௖ = ݎ஻൫ߥ஻൯, we have for any ߥ஻ ≥ ߥ஻, 
 ݎ஻(ߥ஻) ≥ ܽ௖ (A60) 
which implies that 
 ߥ஻ − ܽ௖ ≥ ߥ஻ − ݎ஻(ߥ஻) (A61) 
whereas, for any ߥ஻ < ߥ஻,  
 ݎ஻(ߥ஻) < ܽ௖ (A62) 
which implies that 
 ߥ஻ − ܽ௖ < ߥ஻ − ݎ஻(ߥ஻). (A63) 
Thus, for any buyer with ߥ஻ ≥ ߥ஻, he is better off buying the asset in the centralized market, 
whereas for any buyer with ߥ஻ < ߥ஻ , he is better off to buy the asset in the OTC market. 
Moreover, if the buyer has ߥ஻ ≤ ߥ஻ = ܽ, then  
 ߥ஻ − ܽ ≤ 0,∀ܽ ∈ ൣܽ,ܽ൧. (A64) 
Since ܽ = ܽ௖ , Eq. (A64) implies that the buyer loses if he trades either in the OTC market or in 
the centralized market. Thus, for any buyer with ߥ஻ ≤ ߥ஻, he is better off not to trade in any 
market. 
Q.E.D 
Proof of Proposition 2.3 
Proof: 
 This is similar to the proof of Proposition 2.2, since sellers and buyers are symmetric. 
Q.E.D 
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Proof of Proposition 2.4 
Proof: 
 The derivation of the price system in the OTC market is the same as in the proof of 
Proposition 2.1 except for the marginal dealer. Specifically, the winning market maker charges 
the bid-ask spread equal to the next most efficient market maker’s transaction cost ܭ(ଶ). Since all 
surviving dealers have to undercut the bid-ask spread posted by the winning market maker, ܭ(ଶ) 
defines the marginal dealer’s transaction cost. That is,  
 ݇∗∗ = ܭ(ଶ). (A65) 
The inventory constraint applied to the winning market maker implies that 
 1 − ܽ௖ − ߚ(1 − ߳)1 − ߚ න ௔ܲ[ܽ < ොܽ]݀ ොܽ௔೎௔ = ܦ஼(ܽ௖) = ܵ஼(ܾ௖)
= ܾ௖ − ߚ(1 − ߳)1 − ߚ න ௕ܲൣܾ > ෠ܾ൧݀ ෠ܾ௕௕೎ . 
(A66) 
From Eq. (A43) and Eq. (A44), we have 
 
௔ܲ[ ොܽ < ܽ] = ௕ܲൣ ෠ܾ > ܾ൧ = ௞ܲൣ ෠݇ < ݇൧ = ݇ − ݇݇∗∗ − ݇. (A67) 
Therefore,  
 
ܽ௖ = 1 − ܾ௖ = ܭ(ଶ) + 12 . (A68) 
Q.E.D 
Proof of Proposition 2.5 
Proof: 
 Similar to the proof of Proposition 2.4, the derivation of the price system in the OTC 
markets is the same as in the proof of Proposition 2.1 except for the marginal dealer. Since the 
winning market maker does not fear the entrance of the next most efficient market maker, he 
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posts the bid-ask spread that maximizes his expected profits. Consequently, the marginal dealer 
is no longer the one with transaction cost equal to ܭ(ଶ),	but the one with transaction cost equal to 
the winning market maker’s profit maximizing spread. 
 Since the winning market maker’s inventory constraint implies that ܽ௖ = 1 − ܾ௖ . Defining ෨݇  
as the winning market maker’s bid-ask spread, I rewrite the winning market maker’s profit 
maximization as follows, 
 max
௞෨
൫෨݇ − ܭ(ଵ)൯ ቌ1 − ෨݇ + 12
−
ߚ(1 − ߳)1 − ߚ ቆ෨݇ + 12 − 1෨݇ − ݇න ܽ(݇)݀݇௞෨௞ ቇቍ. 
(A69) 
If ෨݇ ≥ ܭ(ଶ), then the next most efficient market maker enters and undercuts the winning market 
maker’s bid-ask spread. If ෨݇ ≤ ݇, then no dealers survive in equilibrium. Hence, the interior 
equilibrium arises, if ෨݇ ∈ ൫݇,ܭ(ଶ)൯. Therefore, the marginal dealer ݇∗∗ is defined by the ෨݇  that 
maximizes Eq. (A78) and is in the interval of ൫݇,ܭ(ଶ)൯. 
Q.E.D 
Proof of Proposition 2.6 
Proof: 
 When all bid-ask spreads in the OTC market in Proposition 2.1 are smaller than the 
transaction cost of the most efficient market maker, the establishment of the centralized market is 
futile. All trades go to the OTC market. Therefore, the condition for the centralized market to 
survive is ܭ(ଵ) < ݇∗. 
Q.E.D 
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Proof of Proposition 2.7 
Proof: 
 In the corner equilibrium, the bid-ask spread in the centralized market equals to ܭ(ଶ). If no 
dealer is able to undercut this spread, i.e. ܭ(ଶ) < ݇, then the OTC market fails to survive in 
equilibrium. 
Q.E.D 
Proof of Proposition 2.8 
Proof: 
 In the interior equilibrium, if no dealer is able to undercut the winning market maker’s profit 
maximizing spread, the winning market maker can set a spread equal to ݇ to become the only 
trading intermediary in the economy as long as ݇ ≥ ܭ(ଵ) . When the winning market maker 
becomes the only trading intermediary, Proposition 2.2 and Proposition 2.3 show that the 
demand in the centralized market is 1 − ܽ௖ , and the supply in the centralized market is ܾ௖. The 
winning market maker’s profit maximization becomes  
 max
௔೎
൫2ܽ௖ − 1 −ܭ(ଵ)൯(1 − ܽ௖). (A70) 
The unconstrained optimal choice of ܽ௖ is 
௄(భ)ାଷ
ସ
, and the spread is 
௄(భ)ାଵ
ଶ
.  
 If ݇ ≤
௄(భ)ାଵ
ଶ
, then the winning market maker cannot set his ask price at the unconstrained 
optimal choice 
௄(భ)ାଷ
ସ
. In this case, the quadratic objective function (Eq.(A79)) implies that the 
optimal ask price is ௞ାଵ
ଶ
, which generates a spread equal to ݇. 
 When the winning market maker charges limited prices, his profit is 
൫௞ି௄(భ)൯൫ଵି௞൯
ଶ
. Hence, the 
winning market maker charge limited prices to eliminate dealers in the OTC market if and only if 
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൫݇∗∗ − ܭ(ଵ)൯ ቆ1 − ݇∗∗ + 12 − ߚ(1 − ߳)1 − ߚ න ܽ(݇)݀݇௞∗∗௞ ቇ
≤
൫݇ − ܭ(ଵ)൯൫1 − ݇൯2 . 
(A71) 
Q.E.D 
Proof of Proposition 2.9 
Proof: 
 From the proof of Proposition 2.8, if ݇ > ௄(భ)ାଵ
ଶ
, then the winning market maker sets his ask 
price to the unconstrained profit maximization choice, i.e, ܽ௖ = ௄(భ)ାଷସ . 
Q.E.D 
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Appendix B: Variable Names in Chapter 3
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Table B.1: Variable Definitions in Chapter 3 
Variable Description 
Firm size (log millions) Natural logarithm of total assets in the fiscal year prior to the bond issue  
Leverage Ratio of long-term debt over total asset in the fiscal year prior to the bond issue 
Firms' accounting standard-IFRS Binary variable equal to 1 when the accounting standard that a company uses in presenting its financial statements is International Financial Reporting Standards 
Firms' accounting standard-Domestic Binary variable equal to 1 when the accounting standard that a company uses in presenting its financial statements is Domestic 
Issuer is in finance industry Binary variable equal to 1 when the issuer belongs to the finance industry 
Issuer is a utility Binary variable equal to 1 when the issuer belongs to the utility industry 
Issuers' equity is private Binary variable equal to 1 when the issuer is a private firm 
Issue size (sq. root of millions) Square root of the par value of debt initially issued. 
Moody's bond rating A value of 1 (2,3,…) is assigned to Moody’s rating of Aaa (Aa1, Aa2,…) 
Years to maturity The number of years before the bond is expired 
Global Bond Binary variable equal to 1 when the issue is offered globally 
Variable rate bond Binary variable equal to 1 when the coupon type for the issue is variable 
Foreign bond Binary variable equal to 1 when the issue is denominated in a foreign currency. 
Senior bond Binary variable equal to 1 when the security is a senior issue of the issuer. 
Rule144a bond Binary variable equal to 1 when the issue is a private placement exempt from registration under SEC Rule 144a. 
Listed on the NYSE Binary variable equal to 1 when the bond is listed on the NYSE 
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